Problems of Communism

Book Reviews
Arnold Beichman
Antonio Jorge and
Jaime Suchlicki
Bruce Parrott

SEPTEMBER-OCTOBER 1984

HUNGARY
Rudolf L. Tőkés

PHILIPPINES
David A. Rosenberg

CPSU ID
Robert W. Kitrinos

Notes & Views

Transboundary TV
George H. Quester

Moscow's War Propaganda
Vladimir E. Shlapentokh

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Problems of Communism

5

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1 Hungarian Reform Imperatives
by Rudolf L. Tőkés

24 Communism in the Philippines
by David A. Rosenberg

47 International Department of the CPSU
by Robert W. Kitrinos
(with addenda by Wallace Spaulding)

NOTES & VIEWS

76 Transboundary Television
by George H. Quester

88 Moscow's War Propaganda and Soviet Public Opinion
by Vladimir E. Shlapentokh

BOOKS

95 Kremlin Factions and Foreign Policy
by Arnold Beichman

100 Castro's Costly Path to Dependency
by Antonio Jorge and Jaime Suchlicki

104 Theory and Praxis of Soviet Economic Modernization
by Bruce Parrott

Cover: Hungary's János Kádár, left, and Poland's Wojciech Jaruzelski at Yuriy Andropov's funeral in February 1984. Photo by SOVFOTO.

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IN THIS ISSUE OF

Problems of Communism

Articles

Hungarian Reform Imperatives
Rudolf L. Tőkés

With the introduction of the New Economic Mechanism in 1968, Hungary embarked upon the most durable reform experiment in the Soviet bloc. While NEM did free the economy from some constraints of central planning, enough of them remained—especially in the industrial sector—to raise questions about NEM's continued viability. The shortcomings in the implementation of the reform as well as its socio-political repercussions were spelled out in a public debate during 1982–84. However, despite the widespread calls for implementing those components of the reform that were to bring about a democratization of public life, party leader János Kádár has opted for caution.

Communism in the Philippines
David A. Rosenberg

The Maoist-oriented Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP), along with its New People's Army and its political coalition, the National Democratic Front, is experiencing a considerable revival. This is due largely to a shift among a new generation of radical leaders toward a Filipino version of protracted "people's war"; to a lack of other means to channel popular grievances; and to a decline in the Marcos government's political authority and economic performance, especially in the year since the assassination of Benigno Aquino. Even without foreign support, the CPP may yet pose a significant threat to the Marcos, and post-Marcos, Philippine authorities.

International Department of the CPSU
Robert W. Kitrinos

During the last decade, considerable material has surfaced indicating that the International Department of the CPSU Central Committee plays a far more significant role in the formulation and implementation of Soviet foreign policy than many Western scholars had thought. In addition to handling relations with nonruling communist parties, it appears that the International Department is responsible for channeling information and recommendations on foreign policy issues, based on inputs from the various ministries and intelligence services, to the CC Secretariat and Politburo.

* * *

Notes & Views

Transboundary Television
George H. Quester

Television signals "leaking" into communist countries from abroad have caused some political concern for the authorities, especially in East Germany and in the western republics of the USSR. New technologies, in particular direct satellite broadcasting and video cassette recorders, are likely to facilitate such leakage, raising the prospect of greater international political conflict on this sensitive emerging issue.

(continued on next page)

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Moscow's War Propaganda and Soviet Public Opinion
Vladimir E. Shlapentokh

The stress on the dangers of nuclear war in Soviet information media beginning in the early 1980's marks a sharp shift from nearly three decades of messages that suggested that war was not inevitable. Whatever the intended target of this propaganda, the Soviet people—more inclined to believe their government on international than on domestic matters—are displaying signs of concern over the prospect that they might be involved in a world catastrophe.

* * *

Essay-reviews

Kremlin Factions and Foreign Policy
Arnold Beichman

Factionalism has been a persistent feature in the making of Soviet foreign policy, a feature which has often reflected internal rivalries as much as it has responded to outside initiatives. New research has revealed much about the influence of Politburo factions in Stalin's later years; as for the contemporary period, Western scholarship has made limited but welcome progress in penetrating the veil of official Soviet secrecy.

Castro's Costly Path to Dependency
Antonio Jorge and Jaime Suchlicki

The chaotic sequence of reversals in economic strategy, the stultifying effect of ideology on rational decisionmaking, and the charismatic, mass-mobilizational nature of Castro's rule have dissipated many of the economic and social assets and the sound developmental approach with which Cuba entered the post–World War II era. For all the wrenching social and political changes, the island finds itself virtually as dependent on a single export commodity (sugar) and on an external power (now the Soviet Union) as it was before the 1959 revolution.

Theory and Praxis of Soviet Economic Modernization
Bruce Parrott

Evidence from Soviet sources suggests the existence, against a background of declining growth and difficult economic tradeoffs, of liberalizers as well as conservatives among Soviet theoreticians. In seeking to modernize the Soviet economy, both the liberalizers, with their abstract theories, and the conservatives, with their computerized techniques, must contend not only with practical problems but also with the vested interests of bureaucrats, military officials, and even factory managers.

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Hungarian Reform Imperatives

Rudolf L. Tökés

Our politics is economics and our economics is foreign trade was reportedly János Kádár's answer to a Western visitor's request for a succinct characterization of the essence of Hungary's politics in the late 1970's. This statement accurately sums up the interdependence and complexity of Hungary's domestic politics, economic policies, and foreign affairs in the last decade. 1984 is the 16th year of the communist bloc's longest ongoing reform experiment, the Hungarian New Economic Mechanism (NEM). Over the years the reform process has come to influence every aspect of that country's public affairs and has penetrated the private lives of its citizens. Indeed, in the 1980's no one can escape the NEM in Hungary: radio, TV, and print media are full of "reform" news and commentary. This helps foster a national preoccupation with wages, prices, housing conditions, the lot of the elderly, the career problems of the young, and other socioeconomic problems (high rates of alcoholism and suicide, low birth-rates), and with the way these matters affect and are affected by productivity, energy costs, industrial organization, the balance of trade, the terms of foreign trade, and Hungary's hard currency indebtedness.

In recent years some of these domestic policy dilemmas have spilled over into the realm of Hungarian foreign relations. Despite the regime's none-too-subtle endorsement in the summer of 1982 of Yuriy Andropov's candidacy to succeed Leonid Brezhnev, a year later Kádár came back from Moscow empty-handed, failing to secure from the Soviets more than a cautious approval of Hungary's agricultural policies. This left in limbo the far more important issues of the second economy, economic decentralization, and the democratization of public life in Hungary. Konstantin Chernenko has yet to take a firm position on what some of his CPSU Politburo colleagues might perceive as Hungary's ideological ambivalence, excessive economic experimentation, pre-succession political disorientation, and too autonomous stance in foreign policy. The Hungarian Socialist Workers Party (MSzMP) will hold its next congress in 1985, during which substantial leadership changes—perhaps even Kádár's exit and the end of the era associated with his personality and politics—might occur.

Given these urgent problems in the "twilight years" of the Kádár era in Hungary, it seems appropriate to take stock of the way the regime has managed its policies since the inauguration of the NEM. An attempt will be made to review briefly the initial results of the NEM; to discuss general issues of legitimacy, social contract, and the nexus between economic reforms and political democratization as these emerged in Hungary in the 1970's; to summarize and comment on the national debate in 1982–1984 regarding the socio-political consequences of the NEM; and to offer an assessment of the regime's response to the dilemmas—primarily domestic but also foreign—created by the reform process.

NEM: An Overview

The main aims behind the 1966 Central Committee decision to launch the NEM in 1968 were to free the country's productive resources and capabilities from the stranglehold of centralized economic management and inflexible budgetary allocation processes and to generate new incentives for higher productivity and more cost-effective management at the enterprise

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level.[1] Although much of the reform package had been in the incubation stage for the preceding decade, and none of the specific provisions were particularly daring, by 1972 the New Economic Mechanism had run into rough political weather. The combined opposition of party conservatives, orthodox central planners, and the trade union hierarchy (with substantial help from their Soviet friends) succeeded in virtually halting the reform process.[2]

The hardliners' political victory proved to be very costly for the Hungarian economy and, in the longer run, for Hungarian consumers as well. Instead of belt-tightening and continued search for ways to cut costs and improve productivity, the conservative recentralizers kept on making large capital investments, at an annual average of 8.5 percent of GNP between 1973 and 1977, with much of the funding coming from Western hard-currency credits. As a leading Hungarian economist János Kornai has pointed out, during this period in three West European countries of comparable size (Austria, Denmark, and Finland), the annual rate of capital investment was 2.5, 2.0, and 0.6 percent of GNP respectively.[3] The continued availability of Soviet oil deliveries priced on the basis of a five-year rolling average of world market prices created for a time the illusion that Hungary might somehow escape the five-fold increase of energy costs during the 1970's. This was not the case. In fact, it has been estimated that the price tag in deterioration of the terms of foreign trade due to higher energy costs was approximately one billion US dollars a year between 1973 and 1980.[4]

Confronted with growing foreign indebtedness, higher raw material costs, declining earnings from exports, and stagnating productivity, the Hungarian party again reversed itself and authorized the continuation of reform programs in late 1978. The regime's "second go" at reforming the economy proved to be much more difficult and more dangerous politically than it had been the first time. In the late 1970's, Hungarian economic policymakers were compelled to adjust to the realities of a world market beset by "stagflation," high interest rates, and slackening demand for Hungarian hard-currency exports. These conditions required austerity measures and crash programs that would restore Hungary's competitiveness abroad without, however, cutting living standards too drastically. Unlike in 1968, when the regime's reform policies had enjoyed the confidence of an optimistic public, in 1978 the government's credibility was undermined by the retreat from its original policies of decentralization, unrestricted labor mobility, and tolerance for individual initiative.

The many components of the resuscitated economic reform program have been discussed elsewhere.[5] What must be noted here is that the five to six year pause in reform implementation brought considerably lower returns than the regime's cautious reformers had hoped. No amount of tinkering with the economy and earnest exhortations to increase hard-currency exports across the board could overcome the burden of past mistakes, particularly high debt service costs, or attract new Western investments in the post-Afghanistan period.

In the first quarter of 1982, in what one might describe as a run on the Hungarian National Bank's hard-currency reserves, several foreign depositors (led by the Libyans and the London branch of the Soviet National Bank) withdrew their funds from it and nearly plunged Hungary into a liquidity crisis. As luck would have it, in the summer of that year, Hungary was admitted to membership in the International Monetary Fund (IMF). This opened up new lines of convertible-currency credit for the country's hard-pressed economy.[6] IMF membership, however, also entailed the obligation to curtail imports, to increase domestic prices, and to cut back on new investments. Anxious to avoid debt rescheduling and thus to be bracketed with Poland and Romania as a poor investment risk by the Western financial community, Hungary had no choice but to comply with conditions established by the IMF.[7]

The cumulative impact of the three major price rises between July 1982 and January 1984, together with the less well publicized price hikes for gasoline,

[1] On the origins of the NEM, see, Iván T. Berend, *Gazdasági utkeresés 1956–1965* (Search for an Economic Path, 1956–1965), Budapest, Magvetö, 1983.

[2] See András Hegedüs, "The Hungarian Economic Reforms from the Perspective of a Decade," in András Hegedüs, *Lehetséges-e történelmi kompromisszum Keleteuropában?* (Is a Historic Compromise Possible in Eastern Europe?), Budapest, Alternativ könyvek—AB Kiado, 1981, samizdat; and Csaba Gombár, "Setback or Defeat? Comments on the Politics of Hungarian Reforms," *Uj Forrás* (Budapest) August 1983.

[3] János Kornai, "On the Present Situation and Prospects of the Hungarian Economy," *Gazdaság* (Budapest), No. 3, 1982.

[4] Ferenc Gerencsér, "The Nature of Prices," *Magyar Hirlap* (Budapest), July 13, 1983.

[5] For a comprehensive overview, from an economist's perspective, of the entire record of the NEM, see Paul Marer, "Hungary's Economic Reforms: From Traditional Central Planning to Market Socialism," a study prepared for the Joint Economic Committee, US Congress, for a forthcoming compendium on the economies of Eastern Europe.

[6] For IMF's published assessment of the Hungarian economic scene in that year see, Patrick de Fontenay et al, *Hungary: An Economic Survey*, Washington, DC, International Monetary Fund, 1982.

[7] See Ferenc Havasi, "The Main Economic Goals Have Been Achieved," *Magyar Hirlap*, Dec. 17, 1982.

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

The Danube Oil Refinery at Százhalombatta, built to refine oil shipped to Hungary from the Soviet Union via the Friendship II pipeline.

—EUPRA.

construction materials, public transportation, and the like is not yet possible to estimate with any degree of precision. It is safe to assume, however, that these measures are merely the first steps toward the full implementation of IMF conditions and the restoration of Hungary's competitiveness on the world market. More difficult to predict is whether and for how long the population will tolerate what it perceives to be a continuing erosion of its living standard without demanding compensation from the regime in the areas of civil rights and political freedoms.

The central objective of economic reforms in Eastern Europe has been to generate political legitimacy in the postmobilization period. To obtain popular approval of, or at least tacit consent to, the political status quo, the East European regimes undertook more or less ambitious programs seeking to improve living standards, increase food supply, and provide new housing and social welfare services to all citizens. Regardless of their scope, reforms implied changes in the existing system of political management, in economic planning and administration, and above all, in the way the state's budgetary resources were distributed. Therefore, economic reforms in the broadest sense called for adaptation to new circumstances for which no tested precedents existed in the history of communist system-building, either in the USSR or elsewhere in the communist world.

The Stalinist or "mobilization" pattern of legitimacy-building *had* been tested, but the events of 1956 in Poland and Hungary, and indeed the experiences of all East European regimes, discredited it and necessitated the introduction of new policies and new methods of political management. As attempted in Eastern Europe, the basing of a one-party regime's legitimacy on its ability to steadily provide more goods and services, adequate housing, full job security, upward social mobility, and improved quality of life for everyone, while retaining most of the *pre-reform* political and economic decision-makers might strike one as an

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unrealistic undertaking from the outset.[8] Since economic reforms in communist states by definition entail movement toward decentralized decision-making, there is growth in the number of those authorized to make semi-autonomous judgments with respect to resource allocation, investment, jobs, services, and the economic well-being of the population. To the extent that economic reforms also expand the role of the market and create new opportunities for consumer autonomy, there is a devolution of political authority and an erosion of the party's monopoly on decision-making. As Wlodzimierz Brus commented on the consequences of "marketization": every reform decision means a "contraction of the sphere under direct control" of what he calls "the mono-archy" or the party-state's ruling elite.[9]

The history of the Hungarian NEM offers an unusual example of how some of these obstacles can be overcome, as well as how some other, mainly political, roadblocks cannot be removed in the pursuit of reform objectives. The legacy of the revolution of 1956, the terms of the "Kádár compromise," the country's productive capabilities, and perhaps the unique chemistry of the relationship between the regime and the intellectuals can explain, up to a point, why the idea of "the reform" is still alive in Hungary 16 years after its inauguration, while similar reform movements have fallen by the wayside elsewhere in Eastern Europe (with the possible exception of Bulgaria).

NEM: A Social Contract?

Hungary did experience an increase in the number of quasi-independent economic actors once the reforms were implemented. However, due to a number of specific factors, in Hungary the day of reckoning could be postponed until the early 1980's. The legacy of the 1956 revolution undoubtedly has been critical in shaping the relationship between the society and the Hungarian regime. The "lessons" of that event were painfully clear to all concerned: for the people, the crushing of the revolution unambiguously defined the limits of spontaneous political activity in pursuit of national independence and personal freedoms; for the regime, it demonstrated the bankruptcy of the Stalinist model and gave political leverage to those who sought to find noncoercive solutions for the dilemmas of legitimacy and economic tools for the building of a new political equilibrium.

The well-known words "who is not against us is with us" of the "Kádár compromise" aptly described the political stalemate between the people and the regime. At the same time, they were the terms of a post-totalitarian social contract that were spelled out over the next several years by political spokesmen, the literary and technocratic elites, and, in the 1970's, by dissident intellectuals as the ground rules of political coexistence between the regime and the people in Hungary. The very existence of a social contract—a *negotiable* instrument—and its generally prudent management by János Kádár and his closest advisers have probably been the main reasons for the implementation and continuation of reforms.

The regime's economic development strategies were another reason for the viability of reform policies. Use of indicative guidelines instead of command planning, the replacement of administrative fiat by the market in middle- and lower-level economic decision-making, emphasis on enterprise profitability, and a host of related measures have produced positive results. Although the birth of the second economy and the widening of income differentials were successfully seized upon in 1971 by antireformist forces as ideological heresy, the resulting reversals of the reform proved to be economically and politically harmful and were subsequently jettisoned by a pragmatic leadership.

Consumerism, as János Kornai pointed out in his seminal study,[10] does not work without goods and services to consume by a population that had been denied both the means and the objects of consumption in the preceding 30 years. New emphasis on light industries and imports of durable consumers' goods did meet some of the demand. However, what proved decisive was the priority accorded to the modernization of agricultural production and the green light given to the development of a rural second economy. The result was adequate food supplies for the domestic consumer (with substantial amounts left for export) and the availability of basic foodstuffs at subsidized prices (at least until 1983). The partial reprivatization of the rural economy has also helped dim the memory of the regime's often brutal recollectivization campaign of 1958–60 and created a basically reform-supportive consensus in the countryside.

[8]This proposition is developed at greater length in Rudolf L. Tőkés, "Human Rights and Political Change in Eastern Europe," in Rudolf L. Tőkés, Ed., *Opposition in Eastern Europe*, London, Macmillan, 1979, pp. 1–25.

[9]Wlodzimierz Brus, "Political Pluralism and Markets in Communist Systems," in Susan Gross Solomon, Ed., *Pluralism in the Soviet Union*, London, Macmillan, 1983, p. 113.

[10]János Kornai, *A hiány* (Scarcity), Budapest, Közgazdasági és Jogi Kiadó, 1980.

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From the viewpoint of political stability and hence the regime's sense of security in resuming the reform process in the late 1970's, an important factor has been the birth of what might be called a new socialist middle class in Hungary.[11] By this I mean the beneficiaries of reform policies: both the older, already well-established elements and the young, educated, and still potentially upwardly mobile people in the cities and provincial towns. For the older members of the establishment, the reforms offered a chance to continue to remain politically on the top but in a far more benign atmosphere than in the 1950's when they first joined the ruling elite. For the younger ones who matured under the post-1956 social contract, there seemed to be enough promise in the early 1970's for most of them to "buy into" the reforms in the hope of replacing sooner or later the older elite. (In the 1980's these hopes remain largely unfulfilled due to the refusal of many veteran bureaucrats or working-class cadre managers to quit until literally carried from their offices on stretchers.) At any rate, whether old or young, these elites remained supportive of regime-sponsored incremental reforms as long as these did not threaten their incomes and elite status.

On the other side are those who failed to benefit from the economic reforms, who were—and perceived themselves to be—worse off because of the reforms. If the NEM in the broadest sense is understood as a centrally guided process that rewards achievement, tolerates high income differentials, and encourages a more intensive utilization of individual productive capability (either in the first or in the second economy), it is apparent that economic reforms were not for everyone.[12] The old, the infirm, those without sufficient training and educational background to become part of a highly skilled labor force, women (still significantly handicapped in their chances to attain income levels comparable to men), and members of the underclass (the rural poor, urban slum dwellers, and the Gypsies) did not benefit from and therefore had no stake in the reforms. During the first half of the

[11] See Antal Böhm and Tamás Kolosi, Eds., *Structure and Stratification in Hungary*, Budapest, Institute for Social Sciences, 1982.

[12] See Zsuzsa Ferge, "Human Relations and Social Values," *Társadalomtudományi Közlemények* (Budapest), No. 1, 1983, pp. 102–25; and idem, *Társadalmi Újjátermelés és Társadalompolitika* (Social Reproduction and Social Policy), Budapest, Közgazdasági és Jogi Kiadó, 1982, and two stimulating reviews of this book by Pál Péter Tót and Dávid Birò in *Szociológia* (Budapest), 1983, No. 1–2, pp. 193–204.

Hungarian contrasts: at left, women on a village street; at right, vacationers caught in a traffic jam near Lake Balaton.

—Leonard Freed/MAGNUM.

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1970's, the hidden but growing poverty of this group, estimated at 15–20 percent of the population, was of interest only to crusading writers and rebellious sociologists. For this economically underprivileged one-fifth of Hungary, there was no social contract to invoke to the powers that be. Indeed, it is remarkable that the regime, presumably committed to social justice and the elimination of poverty, took no official notice of the plight of the poor until 1981, and even then only as a reaction to a movement by the unofficial intelligentsia to provide relief to the underprivileged strata of Hungarian society.[13]

When attempting to reconstruct the political balance sheet of the first two-thirds (1968–78) of the reform period in Hungary, one is struck by the basic incongruity between the political leadership's objectives and the expectations of the intended beneficiaries of the reforms. The regime wished to reap from the decentralization and marketization of the economy a politically acquiescent, hard-working population bent on its private pursuits. Yet, the party and government bureaucracies were fearful of relinquishing and delegating substantial decision-making powers to enterprise managers, export industries, local governments, and other nonparty organizations. The ruling establishment was fully aware that these individuals and entities had the potential of being monitors of government performance and of becoming interest groups under certain conditions. The elites and others with a stake in the success of reform policies tended to evaluate the reforms mainly in terms of economic benefits to themselves. These could prove inimical to principles of economic rationality on which the NEM had been founded, if circumstances demanded higher productivity, greater labor intensity, and yes, the possibility of job redundancy in unprofitable enterprises. In other words, neither the regime nor the new middle class, each for its own reasons, was prepared to pay the price for the full implementation of the NEM.[14]

The revival of the NEM in 1978–79 had been necessitated mainly by adverse external economic conditions. However, an increasing realization of a basic irreconcilability of the regime's and the elites' expectations regarding the reform process introduced an element of urgency into discussions about ways to avert the impending crisis. By 1982, matters had gotten "out of hand" in some respects. First, there was the growing assertiveness by some elite groups (economists, sociologists, the "farm lobby," the "export lobby," financial experts) who had lost patience with the party-government diehards' inept fumbling with economic policies. They demanded in esoteric journals of the Academy of Sciences, in mass circulation publications, such as *Valóság, Élet és Irodalom,* and in quasi-radical journals, such as *Mozgó Világ,* that *something* be done to avert grassroots unrest and possibly a full-fledged political crisis. In fact, some of the bolder critics of the economic stalemate began linking the issues of the absence of democracy in public life, unaccountability of public officials, and excessive government regulation of daily life in a cause-and-effect sort of way with lower living standards and chronic underperformance in industry, particularly in the giant enterprises and large construction trusts.

Second, prompted more by shrinking purchasing power than by a sudden rebirth of entrepreneurial spirit, an increasing number of people felt compelled to engage actively in the second economy at the end of the 1970's.[15] Involvement in the second economy usually entailed the taking of a second job by one or both members of a working couple, the barter of services, the participation in some sort of income-producing scheme—legal or illegal. The resulting income differentials (particularly large for persons with certain skills in the service industries, members of agricultural cooperatives with unusually productive household plots, and some others in the high cash-flow retail trade) encouraged conspicuous consumption by a few and demoralized many—especially those living on fixed incomes or lacking talents marketable outside their work place. To mollify the latter, the government authorized the formation of various "after hours" small work collectives to perform tasks (for contracted sums well in excess of normal hourly wages) that the enterprise labor force could not (or would not) accomplish during the regular working day.[16] Although the additional income was welcome indeed, the added work load of 50 to 80 hours of overtime a month was considerably less so, especially when the extra money seemed just enough to stay even with rising costs. Whereas the consumer price index (1949=100) increased only 7 percent (from 170 to 177) between 1960 and 1969, the increase between 1979 and 1983 was 79.1 percent (from 256.6 to 335.7).[17] It takes a great deal of overtime to

[13] "Debate on Groups with Multiple Handicaps," *Társadalmi Szemle* (Budapest), No. 6, 1981.

[14] Katalin Farkas and Judit Pataki, *Az Életszinvonal Tényei és Tükröződése a Közvéleményben* (Living Standards: Facts and Perceptions Through the Mirror of Opinion Surveys), Budapest, Tömegkommunikációs Kutatóközpont, October 1983, p. 9.

[15] István R. Gábor and Péter Galasi, *A "második gazdaság,"* (The "Second" Economy), Budapest, Közgazdasági es Jogi Kiadó, 1981.

[16] "Small Enterprise" *Heti Világgazdaság* (Budapest), Jan. 7, 1984, pp. 34–36.

[17] "Price Rises: Background," ibid., Jan. 28, 1984, p. 34.

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Table 1: Trends in Personal Incomes and Prices in Hungary, 1960–83

(in percent)

	Average annual growth		Total growth	
Years	Income	Prices	Income	Prices
1961–65	3.3	0.4	18.1	1.9
1966–70	6.2	0.8	35.0	4.0
1971–75	4.5	2.8	25.0	14.6
1976–80	1.6	6.3	8.1	35.5
1981	—	—	8.5	4.6
1982	—	—	7.6	6.9
1983	—	—	7.9	7.3

SOURCES: for 1961–80, Ferenc Gerencsér, "The nature of prices" *Magyar Hirlap* (Budapest) July 13, 1983; for 1981–83, Hungarian Central Statistical Office, *Statistical Pocket Book of Hungary 1981*, Budapest, Statistical Publishing House, 1982, pp. 31 and 39, idem, *Statistical Pocket Book of Hungary 1982*, Budapest, Statistical Publishing House, 1983, pp. 35 and 42, and idem, *Statistical Pocket Book of Hungary 1983*, Budapest, Statistical Publishing House, 1984, pp. 33 and 39.

keep up with a domestic price explosion in a country where people used to get by without "breathing too hard" (as the Hungarian joke had it) in factories and offices.

A 1981 opinion survey on income utilization and the second economy found that 56 percent of the respondents considered "moonlighting" and extra jobs to be a "good" thing, but a similar percentage (57 percent) responded "no" when asked whether they wished to join a private enterprise or start up a business of their own.[18] In any case, because of severe restrictions on and ideological disapproval of capital accumulation and the restricted scope of legitimate investment opportunities, there did not seem to be too much point in jumping into the treacherous waters of the second economy. (In March 1984, a would-be Hungarian private investor could buy up to five kinds of utility and construction bonds at 6 to 8 years maturity with an annual yield of 7 to 11 percent; but the total value of available bonds was less than 380 million forints[19]—somewhat less than 0.04 percent of *recorded* savings deposits in Hungary.) In other words, it appeared that without some fairly drastic changes to release entrepreneurial energies by lifting restrictions on private initiative, the second economy would not grow sufficiently to make up for the production and service shortfalls in the inefficient part of the economy managed directly by the government.

The main consolation for the failure of the deteriorating price/income ratio to rebound in the early 1980's was provided by the "negative demonstration effect" of long food lines in Poland and Romania and the smug (although increasingly hesitant) conclusion that "things are still better here." However, food shortages elsewhere did not seem to compensate for the perceptible deterioration in the quality of life in Hungary as demonstrated by an epidemic growth of alcohol consumption, high suicide rates, declining birth-rates and the alarming increase in crimes against property.[20]

The third, probably foreseeable, consequence of mismanaged reforms was the rise of organized dissent in Hungary. The origins, personalities, strategies, and main positions of the latest wave of Hungarian dissidents have been described and analyzed elsewhere.[21] What is of interest in this context is not necessarily the kinds of self-published writings that depict regime failures in the area of economic policies and their implementation (the official press has been full of stories of this sort) but those that deal with underlying issues, such as human rights and the quality of life under conditions of "existing socialism" in Hungary.

The dissidents' concern with what they considered to be vague and fragile legal safeguards of the individual freedoms of citizens in all walks of life touched perhaps upon the most vulnerable aspect of the entire Hungarian reform experiment. "What good are the reforms," they asked, "if they fail to protect the individual's rights to make autonomous choices in daily life (in offices, factories, and in dealings with the authorities), if the regime still treats the population like children rather than like mature citizens of the state?"[22] Probably quite deliberately, the dissidents' question was aimed at the growing existential insecurity of the new middle class (particularly the younger generation still struggling with housing problems, inadequate salaries, and waiting impatiently for the retirement of their bosses of the 1950's vintage) whose political loyalty was critical for the regime. The young professionals were becoming impatient with the regime's lame

[18] Judit Pataki and Katalin Farkas, "On Income Utilization and the Second Economy," *Jel-Kép* (Budapest), No. 3, 1982.

[19] "The Bond Market," *Heti Világgazdaság*, Mar. 17, 1984.

[20] Between 1970 and 1983, per capita consumption of beer in Hungary rose from 59.4 liters to 89 liters; consumption of distilled spirits (converted to 50 percent alcohol content) rose from 5.4 liters to 9.6 liters. Hungarian Central Statistical Office, *Statistical Pocket Book of Hungary 1983*, Budapest, Statistical Publishing House, 1984, p. 38. In 1983, there were 4.76 suicides per 10,000 population. Ibid., p. 23. Between 1980 and 1983, live births per 1,000 population declined from 13.9 to 11.9; indeed, Hungary's population appears to have peaked in 1981 at 10,713,000 and had by January 1, 1984, declined to an estimated 10,679,000. Ibid., pp. 19 and 9. From 1970 to 1983, the number of persons convicted of crimes annually rose from 46,036 to 60,282; of the last figure, more than 19,000 were convicted of theft, embezzlement, fraud, robbery, or motor vehicle theft. Ibid., p. 93.

[21] "Hungary's Democratic Movement," *Labor Focus on Eastern Europe* (London), Summer 1982, pp. 2–16.

[22] Perhaps the most compelling discussion on this point is by the (non-dissident) Elemér Hankiss in his *Diagnozisok* (Diagnoses), Budapest, Magvetö, 1982, pp. 254–304.

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excuses for shortfalls of all kinds, since, as the Hungarian samizdat publications repeatedly pointed out, there was a "Polish way" to compel the government to heed the young people's demands.

None of the above should suggest that the combination of critical elite opinions, deteriorating living standards, and organized dissent—or "para-opposition" as George Schöpflin put it—amounted to anything like an immediate danger to Hungary's political stability.[23] This is not to say, however, that these signs of growing dissatisfaction were perceived by the regime with apathy or with the unconcern that characterized the Polish party's conduct in the months preceding the Gdańsk agreement. Quite the contrary: the Hungarian party—still haunted by the memories of 1956—was extremely anxious to find peaceful and noncoercive ways out of its difficulties and seemed willing to do many things to head off the brewing political crisis. Yet, knowing what to do was not easy. Perhaps the most succinct characterization of the regime's dilemmas was offered by János Kis, a leading thinker of the Hungarian dissident movement:

The free play of supply and demand might temporarily aggravate the shortages, inflationary pressures might grow, and unemployment might come about. There is the danger that upon the implementation of reforms the dissatisfaction of those who have been excluded from active participation in politics will increase. People could become convinced that the economic shelter over their heads had been ruined and cannot remain passive and tolerate what the country's leaders had been doing. This danger could be minimized if there were significant stocks of goods and hard-currency reserves available that might be deployed during periods of readjustment to satisfy consumers' demand, to stabilize prices, and to increase production. If there are no such reserves available and social dissatisfaction is already on the rise, even before the resumption of reforms, then the government is compelled to make choices. If it wishes to carry out the reforms, it must make political concessions, and the public support it gains could be used to break down the resistance of the [party-government] apparat. Or, if it does not wish to take a chance on political concessions, it must rally the apparat to show its strength toward the society.[24]

The strategy of decoupling economic reforms from political liberalization and the regime's cautious attempts to bolster individual rights by a modicum of personal autonomy that, as consumers, most Hungarians had already attained in the 1970's, could not be continued beyond a certain point, and certainly not beyond December 13, 1981. Up to that point the idea of "the reforms" had a magic of its own, which kept most Hungarians spellbound in the belief that progress under socialism was still possible at least in one country in Eastern Europe without the state resorting to force to have its way. The drastic turn of the Polish events put an end to such illusions. The date of the declaration of martial law in Poland should therefore be regarded as a symbolic watershed not only for that country but for Hungary and the rest of Eastern Europe as well.

It may be argued that it was at this point that the post-1956 social contract and the "Kádár compromise" that sought to implement it exhausted their legitimacy-generating capabilities. Or, as a faculty member of the MSzMP Central Committee's Political Academy put it, "We know now that the present situation of the Hungarian economy and society has not been caused only ... by the global economic crisis, but by the total exhaustion, beyond recall, of the inner reserves of a certain growth model."[25] The ideological expert had the Hungarian NEM in mind. Clearly, something new was needed to replace the regime's increasingly dysfunctional prescriptions for political stability in Hungary.

Debates on Reforms

By 1982, conditions were ripe for placing the matter of "reforming the reforms" on the political agenda. Public discussions in Hungary about ways to meet the challenges of the 1980's and overcome the adverse socio-political consequences of a stagnant economy can be analyzed on two levels. One could take the published evidence at face value and conclude that the debate was all about resource allocation priorities, investment strategies, techniques of enterprise management, prices, profits, balance of trade, and similar economic concerns. On further probing, however, it becomes apparent that the real, though hidden, debate is rather different from what meets the eyes of a reader of the daily press and specialist publications on economics and politics. The Hungarian political

[23] George Schöpflin, "Opposition and Para-Opposition: Critical Currents in Hungary, 1968–78," in Tőkés, op. cit., pp. 142–86

[24] János Kis, "Thoughts on the Near Future" *Beszelö* (Budapest), No. 3, May 1982, p. 11, samizdat.

[25] Jenö Andics, "The Reciprocal Effects Between Politics and Economics in the Early 1980's," *Valosag* (Budapest), No. 7, 1983, p. 3.

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scientist Mihály Bihari actually made these implicit questions explicit:

In the relationship between the economic system and the political system, the latter has played a decisive role through the issuing of specific political directives by which politics has "descended" to economics, and in doing so, incorporated economics into the political system. As the result of the total politicization of the economic system and the total economization of the political system, the two social subsystems coalesced into one another and the relative autonomy of the economy disappeared completely.[26]

The 1982–84 dialogue between regime spokesmen and the proponents of further reforms focused on several issues. The most urgent of these was about the severity of the economic situation. Ferenc Havasi, a secretary of the party's Central Committee, took an optimistic view of the matter in a September 1982 lecture:

What progress has been made in carrying out [our] program in the past four years? Between 1979 and 1982 retail prices have risen 33–34 percent, per capita nominal income has increased by 37 percent. The real income of the population has thus grown by almost 3 percent, and consumption has gone up by 6 percent. In these years many countries have been unable to raise consumption, and most could not even maintain existing levels. Indicative of the growth of consumption in Hungary is the yearly average sale, even in those difficult years, of more than 100,000 passenger cars and 300,000 television sets, 20 percent of which are color sets. From December 1978 to the end of this year the stock of savings bank deposits has grown by Ft 50,000 million. An average of 82 to 83,000 homes a year, 1,100 to 1,200 general-school classrooms, 3,000 places in nurseries and 13,000 in kindergartens, as well as 2,000 hospital beds have become available. Even in these difficult years the number of Hungarians traveling abroad has reached 5 to 5.5 million. Let us keep in mind that Hungary is a country with ten million inhabitants where the overwhelming majority of the adult population thus make trips abroad every year.[27]

The question, even if one accepts Havasi's price and income figures, is *whose* income rose, *who* bought cars and television sets, *who* had extra income to put in savings accounts, *who* built new houses and *how* were they paid for? Surely, not those living at or below a monthly minimum (for 1981) income of Ft 1,800, or the 35,000 old-age pensioners in Budapest whose income failed to meet the cost of living index which the Hungarian trade unions in the 1930's had reckoned as the basic minimum during the depression! Moreover, though Havasi may be statistically accurate when saying that 5 to 5.5 million people had traveled abroad in the previous year, one might ask *who* did the traveling when the "majority of Budapest's population" could afford a vacation "not even every 4 to 5 years."[28]

Even a cursory look at the components of recent price indices indicates that people in the lower income brackets, especially those with two or more children, those on pension (2,212,000 in 1983), and members of the unskilled labor force were having difficulty in keeping up with the rising prices.[29] The population's consumption habits (particularly the percentage of income spent on alcoholic beverages versus that spent on basic food supplies) are worthy of note and provide partial support for some Hungarian sociologists' concerns about the negative socio-psychological consequences of the eroding living standards in that country.[30]

All participants in the reform debates seemed to agree that the modernization of the Hungarian economy, increased productivity, and the slowdown in the annual rate of inflation from 8–9 percent to 4–5 percent would call for sacrifices by "everyone." In an interview that initiated the *Heti Világgazdaság* "symposium" on the reforms in late 1982, Márton Tardos, an economist and leading advocate of further reforms, stated that existing economic policies did not work; that reforms were needed, but these would inevitably entail negative side-effects on the living standards of "certain social groups"; and that piecemeal changes

[26]Mihály Bihari, "Political Mechanism and Democracy" in Henrik Vass, Ed., *Válsag és megujulas* (Crisis and Renewal), Budapest, Kossuth, 1982, p. 280.

[27]Ferenc Havasi, "Equilibrium Through Productivity and Savings," *The New Hungarian Quarterly* (Budapest), No. 89, Spring 1983, p. 12.

[28]Gyula Fekete, "Below the Line: Minimum Income Calculations for Three Generations of Budapest," *Budapest*, July and December, 1982.

[29]"Hungarian Incomes and Prices," *Heti Világgazadaság*, Apr. 2, 1983. According to a 1983 survey, families with three children earn only 67 percent, and families with four or more children, only 48 percent as much as childless couples: "large families have almost no chance to attain the level of the average family income on the national level." Another survey, of single-parent families in Budapest, showed that 94.6 percent of such families were headed by women. Of the 728 single heads of households, half were divorced, and 35.4 percent had had no husbands at the time of childbirth. Some 188 such families had incomes below 3,000 forints a month. While some families in Budapest enjoy monthly incomes of 4,000 forints *per family member*, others must make do with 10 forints (US$ 0.20) forints (including child support and alimony) a day. See Péter Kertész, "Where Do the Pennies Go?" *Otlet* (Budapest), Oct. 13, 1983.

[30]Per capita expenditures for beverages and tobacco run higher than 10 percent of disposable income. See *Statistical Pocket Book of Hungary 1983*, p. 40.

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amount to the de facto postponement of overdue reforms without which "acute crisis" can be expected.[31] Elsewhere, Tardos noted that "the crisis itself cannot be survived without reforms, unless the relationship between the two most important tools for the maintenance of social order and tranquility, i.e., the carrot and the stick, is reversed in favor of the latter." However, he concluded: "I wholeheartedly support the government's desire ... to maintain social order on the basis of an agreement with the people."[32]

In the *Heti Világgazdaság* symposium whose contributors were mainly economists and engineers, with a sociologist and a top central planning official added for good measure, there was a remarkable consensus as to the causes of Hungary's economic malaise, but considerable disagreement about the cure. The contributors to the debate were dismayed by reckless administrative interventions by powerful yet essentially unaccountable bureaucrats into ongoing reform processes. The practices of solemnly enunciating new policies and almost immediately interfering with their implementation by enterprise managers and local authorities, of penalizing successful performers by siphoning off their profits to subsidize inefficient plants and industries, and of stunting local initiative by the expropriation of local tax revenues only to invest these in the ministries' favorite projects were denounced by all.

There was also concern with "growing alienation, official passivity in face of corruption, alcoholism, and other forms of deviant behavior." The regime's line that these ought to be regarded as "still surviving burdens of the past" was dismissed by one contributor who warned: "we must be concerned about the euphoric smugness of 'welfare socialism,' of the daydreams of being 'kept' by the state and the inevitable disappointments associated with this attitude."[33] Another contributor ironically recommended a "new industrial development path" for the country: "Hungary could fill a void created by the disappearance of antiquated industries in the West by becoming a supplier of what the West does not bother to produce any more."[34] (The reference to Academician Imre Vámos's much-discussed recommendation that Hungary become a kind of medium-technology service station and repair shop between the computerized West and the developing world was unmistakable.)

Assembly work at the Crusher Producing Factory in Hatvan, which produces sorters, hammer mills and roll mills for export to Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, the Soviet Union, and India.

—EASTFOTO.

One could add to this list of grievances, but the burden of the technocrats' case was self-evident: marketization and economic rationality were incompatible with the political managers' priorities and survival instinct. This point was made brutally clear by the sociologist Elemér Hankiss:

Although there are many supporters of reforms ... there are many whose interests, sense of security, reflexes, and sincere beliefs commit them to established or traditional practices. It is entirely natural, because in a society not accustomed to a self-managed economy and one which has lost its poorly established habits of independence and self-reliance, a central planner, administrator, or controller when confronted with the need for prompt and decisive action to avert an impending crisis, quite understandably believes that without him the country, its economic life and social order would inevitably lunge into anarchy.[35]

So who are the enemies of continued economic (and political) reforms? The list by Hankiss should discourage those who hope for a token opposition by a handful of political diehards:

...some of those employees of state and local administrations, and of mass organizations, the entire large-

[31] *Heti Világgazdaság*, Oct. 2, 1982.

[32] "Reform Here and Now? Conversation with Márton Tardos," *Mozgó Világ* (Budapest), February 1983.

[33] Gusztáv Gehl, "Which Way Should We Move from the Dead Center," *Heti Világgazdaság*, Nov. 6, 1982.

[34] Pál Juhász, "Obligatory False Images," ibid., Nov. 13, 1982.

[35] Elemér Hankiss, "We Need Social Self-examination, Too," ibid., Nov. 27, 1982, p. 34.

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scale industry, some managers of state industrial enterprises, many white collar employees and much of the intelligentsia including those involved in pure research, and also a significant percentage of the heavily, by a factor of several magnitudes, overstaffed economic and public administrative agencies. . . .[36]

Lest anyone should be worried about the likelihood that *actual* changes might be generated by this particular debate, János Hoós, state secretary of the National Planning Office, in his concluding comments to the *Heti Világgazdaság* symposium, reassured the readers that central planning would continue to be dominant over the market and placed his hopes in the upturn of the (capitalist) world economy to alleviate Hungary's current economic woes.[37]

Another forum of reform thought was the nonconformist journal *Mozgó Világ*. There Tamás Bauer, a professor at the Karl Marx University (Budapest) and a senior economist at the Institute for Economics of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, mounted more or less simultaneously with the *Heti Világgazdaság* symposium) a different kind of attack against the reforms' opponents. Bauer's analysis, "The Second Economic Reform and Property Relations," begins with the fairly innocuous premise that the East European states' postwar economic transformation through the nationalization of all means of production and the establishment of centrally planned economies had been undertaken for the altruistic ideological purpose of eliminating the alienation of men from their workplace and the product of their labor.[38] Then the supposed realization of the classical Marxist dream turned into a nightmare because, as Bauer explains, "a real planned economy which is operating under [contemporary] technical-economic needs and constraints neither is simpler than the capitalist one, nor does it produce for the satisfaction of the producers' immediate 'needs'" (as Marx had envisaged); hence, it retains a capacity for alienation—possibly a worse kind than under capitalism. From this insight Bauer proceeds to demolish the Stalinist pseudoscience found in standard—originally Soviet—political economy textbooks and, with it, much of the ideological armory from which the conservative foes of the Hungarian reforms draw ammunition.

Moreover, as Bauer convincingly demonstrates, the main reason why the traditional centralized planning model could produce fairly high growth rates in the 1950's had been the existence of a well-developed infrastructure inherited from the capitalist system. This "gift" from the prewar regimes enabled economic decision-makers to maintain high levels of growth without regard for waste, depreciation, and maintenance. The "prodigal" 1950's were followed by the "consumerist" 1960's and 1970's that brought social peace (at least in Hungary), but at the cost of postponing vitally needed structural reforms in the economy.

However, earlier reform attempts had sought to achieve more than the rational management of the East European states' economic resources. Bauer's observation touches on the heart of the entire dispute about the *kind* of reforms that ought to be launched in Hungary:

On the whole, the reform programs of the 1960's were aimed not only at the better realization of ideas of economic rationality, but they were more or less parts of a reform program of social democratization. The politicians who proposed reforms thought not only that through the reforms the further deterioration of economic conditions could be avoided, but that the reforms would create a more democratic, more humane, and more socialist socialism. Such considerations seem to be almost wholly absent today.[39]

As Bauer sees it, continued economic stagnation and the further postponement of the issue of democratization of public life is a certain prescription for disaster; and his explicit references to Poland leave no doubt as to the kind of disaster he has in mind. In what seems to be the most daring part of the entire argument, Bauer offers a gloomy prognosis for the rest of Eastern Europe:

Slow economic growth, should it become a permanent feature, cannot be the foundation for the maintenance of social stability here and now in Eastern Europe—at least outside the Soviet Union. Yet, this is the only possibility in a system of centrally planned economies. At the same time, under the present social, political, and ideological conditions in most countries of the area there is no evidence that the necessary changes in their economic mechanisms will be carried out. It is in this sense that we can talk about the general crisis of East European centrally planned economies. It seems obvious that in the 1980's more thought should be given to the links that tie Hungary to this crisis-ridden region of the world economy.[40]

[36]Ibid.
[37]See ibid., Dec. 11, 1982.
[38]Tamás Bauer, "The Second Economic Reform and Property Relations," *Mozgó Világ*, November 1982.
[39]Ibid.
[40]Ibid.

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Although Bauer gives high marks to many achievements of the first phase of Hungarian reform policies, he also locates the ultimate obstacle to further essential changes in the economic and, by inference, political system in the entrenched elite of "professional revolutionaries," "technocrats," and "old and new captains of industry," who have systematically sabotaged the effective implementation of the main components of the Hungarian reform policies. For this reason, Bauer concludes that in terms of growth rates Hungary is no better off than those CMEA countries that never carried out reform programs.[41]

János Kornai's study, "On the Present Situation and Prospects of the Hungarian Economy," analyzes some of the macro-level consequences of inconsistent and haphazardly carried out reform policies between 1979 and 1982 in Hungary. One of the means by which the 1979 reforms sought to "toughen up" conditions for price formation by enterprises was to compel them to adjust their prices to those prevailing in Hungarian export industries, which try to compete on Western markets for hard-currency sales. When it appeared that only very few enterprises could live up to such high standards, their supervising ministries provided relief to as many as 741 out of 1,136 firms. The routine provision of "life belts" for inefficient producers, and the continued "hands-on" tutelage by ministries of marginal performers introduced, Kornai argues, an element of unreality into the entire process of reform implementation on the enterprise level.[42]

Indeed, economist László Csaba reports that in 1980, out of 1,735 enterprises only 10 showed a loss for the year, and a year later only 11. Only three enterprises were allowed to go out of business in 1980, and 11 merged with others to prevent the same. Moreover, rewards sometimes have gone hand in hand with underperformance:

The agricultural producers' cooperative Aranykalász of Ráckeve, for instance, each year in 1977–1980 received the Grand Prix of the Ministry of Agriculture and Food before going bankrupt in mid-1982, and the construction company TANÉP of Heves County, whose bankruptcy is also illustrated by the prosecution of its corrupt managers, received awards from the regional offices and the Ministry of Construction and Urban Development on ten occasions, the last just in the year of bankruptcy.[43]

One of the cherished notions of Hungarian (and Soviet and other East European) central planners has been the achievement of inexpensive mass production (usually of low-technology goods and equipment) through the realization of "economies of scale." Kornai's analysis (based on 1980 data) of the profitability of enterprises according to value of fixed assets and size of annual wage fund offers some rather startling findings in this area (see Table 2).

Although in 1982–83 several giant enterprises were dismantled into their regional components and generally decentralized into smaller units, the fact remains that these changes affected very few of the largest 275 firms which were responsible for producing 73.3 percent (by value) of Hungary's industrial output—at a profit of between 6.0 and 9.9 percent annually. What Kornai did not state, though it must have been obvious to his Hungarian readers, was that the top managers and party and trade union officials of the largest and least profitable enterprises were in remarkable numbers also members (in their political capacity) of the party's Central Committee, deputies of the National Assembly, ex-officio members of county, city, and district councils, and executives of various Patriotic People's Front organizations. By virtue of their positions, these people have consultative or veto power over many things—including the implementation of economic reforms—while there are no meaningful external checks on their performance. In addition, 55 percent of upper-level economic managers, 67 percent of middle-level technical managers, and 72.7 percent of middle-level economic managers do *not* have formal advanced training in an appropriate field.[44] And it is these people to whom the Hungarian party entrusted the fate of its new high technology "development path" for Hungary. They have created, with the party's support, a politico-economic oligarchy

[41]"Perhaps to demonstrate the proposition that nothing is stronger than an unorthodox reform idea whose time has come in a one-party state, one might mention that a year later, when György Kulin, the editor of *Mozgó Világ*—where the Bauer study had appeared—was fired, hundred of university students signed protest petitions and subsequently engaged Dezsö Tóth, the deputy minister of culture, in an unprecedented public debate over censorship and academic freedom (taped portions of which were subsequently re-broadcast by Radio Free Europe). Subsequently, *Mozgó Világ*—with a totally new editorial board—interviewed the leading reform economist and MSzMP Central Committee member, Reszö Nyers, who had only this to say about the Bauer article: "It is a pity that the study caused problems, because the burden of his case did not justify this kind of reactions even though there were one or two carelessly formulated propositions in it with which one cannot agree." See "I Linked My Fate to the Reforms—Interview With Rezsö Nyers" ibid, No. 1-2, 1984, p. 14.

[42]Kornai, op. cit.

[43]László Csaba, "New Features of the New Hungarian Economic Mechanism in the Mid-Eighties," *The New Hungarian Quarterly*, No. 90, Summer 1983, p. 51.

[44]Zoltán Tömpe, "The Manager's Interest," *Valóság*, November 1982 p. 30. According to the director of the National Technical Information Center and Library, of the 9100 chief engineers and technical directors employed in Hungarian industry, 3100 have, as their highest academic degree, a high school diploma, *Heti Világgazdaság*, Mar. 31, 1984, p. 47.

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Table 2: Profitability of Hungarian Enterprises by Size, 1980

Total of fixed assets plus wage fund, in million Forints	Number of units	Average profitability, in percent	Share of total production, in percent
10.1 to 15.0	69	26.1	—
15.1 to 30.0	232	21.3	—
30.1 to 50.0	183	20.5	—
50.1 to 100.0	219	19.7	—
100.1 to 150.0	75	16.1	—
150.1 to 300.0	121	16.6	—
300.1 to 500.0	72	13.4	—
500.1 to 700.0	61	11.1	—
700.1 to 1,300.0	144	9.9	19.1
1,300.1 plus	131	6.9	59.2

SOURCE: János Kornai, "On the Present Situation and Prospects of the Hungarian Economy" *Gazdaság* (Budapest), No. 3, 1982.

whose "iron law" is survival at all costs.

Managers of large enterprises, an extremely influential political interest group, are the target of the most sharply critical review of the results of NEM to appear so far. The author, András Hegedüs, is a former prime minister (1955–56) who became an academic sociologist, was expelled from the MSzMP in the early 1970's, and emerged as an outspoken critic of the opponents of reform. He turned the normally harmless vehicle of a book review in the January 1984 issue of the influential *Közgazdasági Szemle* into a vehement denunciation of the bêtes noires of economic progress in Hungary, whom he identifies as the managers of large industrial enterprises.[45] As Hegedüs sees it, the Hungarian "metal eaters" (to use Khrushchev's apt phrase) have been opposed to *reforms of any kind* since 1953. Hegedüs holds this group responsible for delaying until 1970 the partial rechanneling of investment funds into agricultural modernization and mechanization (without which there would have been "Polish" food lines in Hungary a few years later); for browbeating the party into a massive hard-currency borrowing program for industrial investments (though the party kept some of the funds as political investment in the form of subsidized consumer prices) without delivering meaningful results of any kind; and for maintaining, at their own enterprises, an older, lethargic (but politically loyal) labor force and driving the younger and, by virtue of their low seniority, underpaid workers into the second economy and the agricultural cooperatives' ancillary industrial sector. To keep on a short leash the expansion-happy enterprise managers, Hegedüs recommends the creation of supervisory enterprise councils composed of workers, technical staff, and outside economists and consulting engineers.

The foregoing selective summary of some typical (the *Heti Világgazdaság* symposium) and atypical (the Bauer study and the Hegedüs review) contributions to the ongoing public debate about the agenda for the next round of reforms sought to identify some of the policy dilemmas that economists, sociologists, and journalists put to the party for study and decision between 1982 and early 1984.[46]

The Party's Response

The openness and frankness of some of these recommendations, and the fact that they were published at all, testifies to the authorities' deep concern about the state of the country's economy and fear about the possibility of social unrest.

The Hungarian party's response to the reform debates may be inferred from the published reports of the Central Committee plenums of April 1983 and 1984, and from several policy declarations on reform subjects issued in the intervening period.[47] Because of the voluminous documentary evidence and the deliberately cautious formulation of the party's stand on many issues, it is not possible to reconstruct the political leadership's position on the full spectrum of questions raised by the latest crises of the NEM. Therefore, for the sake of brevity and of conveying the views of the party's only authentic (and genuinely popular) spokesman, I shall concentrate on János Kádár's report to the April 1983 plenum.[48]

As a general proposition, it may be argued that on the basis of various recommendations that had surfaced in the course of the reform debates, there were four basic policy options available to Kádár in addressing Hungary's economic troubles and increasingly wobbly elite consensus with respect to system management and policy priorities. The first might be called the "back to the 1966 reform decisions" plat-

[45] András Hegedüs, "Large Enterprises and Socialism," *Közgazdasági Szemle* (Budapest), January 1984, pp. 63–70.

[46] For an excellent and fully documented summary on the reform debates, see Matyás János Kovács, "In the Thick of the Reform Tug-of-War," *Valóság*, March 1984, pp. 30–55.

[47] See "Resolution on the Work Done since the 12th Congress and the Party's Tasks; Adopted by the April 12–13 Session of the MSzMP Central Committee," *Népszabadság* (Budapest), Apr. 16, 1983; "Policy Statement of the MSzMP CC on the Development of Trade Union Work and on the Party's Tasks, *Pártelet* (Budapest), November 1983, pp. 3–8; and "Communiqué on the April 17 Session of the MSzMP Central Committee," *Népszabadság*, Apr. 19, 1984.

[48] "János Kádár's Report at the April 12–13 Meeting of the CC," *Pártélet*, May 1983.

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form. Its proponents (for example, Imre Pozsgay) may or may not have had the "democratization" dimension of the original NEM program in mind, of which Bauer had written, but they believe that the original charter for reform is still a valid source of inspiration if consistently implemented. A second option is encapsulated in the code phrase "the experiences of the last 15 years." Its adherents seem to be prepared to live with a watered-down version of the initial reform program, including a limited marketization but a firmly controlled second economy as well as active party control of public life. The proponents of a third option take their departure from the 1978 "second start" of the NEM and belong to the party's moderate reform wing that Kádár seems to lead. Their sense of pragmatism is manifest in certain basic postures: no turning back from Hungary's export orientation; gradual decentralization of the economy; willingness to experiment with cautious political institutional reforms; and candor in owning up to difficulties. A fourth position is adopted by those who sense an impending economic crisis and the threat of a political landslide, and thus argue for dramatic changes.[49] They are in favor of "reforming the reforms," i.e., scrapping (as in 1978) the main components of the current five-year plan, of rapid decentralization, of significant expansion of the market, and of creation of a "safety net" (but no more than that) in order to prevent the further spread of impoverishment among the economically disadvantaged segments of the population.

To be sure, there is a fifth posture, though it is virtually invisible in print, with respect to economic and political reforms. By this I mean that of the incorrigible Stalinists in the party who, mainly by deeds rather than by words, have done their level best over the years to sabotage the implementation of reform policies—in the party, in their places of work, and in

[49]The "landslide" analogy is also used by János Berecz (former head of the CC's Foreign Department and currently editor-in-chief of the party daily *Népszabadság*, who seems to belong to the second group). As he put it, "our forward progress may be likened to the movements of a man whose path was once crossed by a landslide *(kőomlás)* and now has to proceed with caution to avoid initiating another possible landslide." János Berecz, "Instead of Accusations Let There Be Real Debate," *Népszabadság*, Apr. 7, 1983.

A couple from an agricultural cooperative privately selling piglets from their auto trunk at a market near Tokaj.

—Marilyn Silverstone/MAGNUM.

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the communities where they live. "Old captains of industry," many a cashiered party official, old-time internal security men on "long furlough," sidelined intellectuals, demoted ideologues, many alumni of Soviet universities, and a considerable number of embittered old party pensioners are still around and are not without influence with key party and government officials. To call these people "enemies of reforms" is to oversimplify the mixture of ambivalence, suspicion, and hostility with which these slighted party stalwarts view the alien world of "pseudo-capitalist" reforms. They seem to be without political influence today, but they are not to be discounted as a potential political force until at least the end of the decade.

Space limitations prevent a nuanced analysis of each of these policy postures, but it seems apparent, as indicated above, that János Kádár shares the views of those who think that on the whole the regime's record since 1978 is sound enough to justify staying that course—at least until the next party congress. By tentatively assigning to Kádár the role of spokesman of this group, I am implying that, should conditions deteriorate further, he may not have the Central Committee's majority behind him—support that he could take for granted over the past 27 years. Kádár's speech was a politically masterful performance in terms of seeking to conciliate all mainstream factions at the expense of the ultraconservatives and the radical reformers. Following a low-key, though impeccably orthodox, review of the international situation, Kádár devoted the rest of his speech to domestic concerns.

In answer to the rhetorical question, "What kind of development is taking place in Hungary—socialist or capitalist?" Kádár briefly reviewed the history of the regime's economic innovations from the abolition of compulsory agricultural deliveries in the late 1950's to the most recent official encouragement of small-scale private enterprise in the service sector, and counseled: "Let us give it a year, let us look at the results, let us put things in proper perspective ... [and in the end we shall see that] these forms [of economic activity] serve our socialist goals and the people's interests." Thus, Kádár simply shrugged off his critics by concluding: "The country must live and must work, and the economy must be kept going.... If it were up to us communists, we would immediately vote in favor of living in a uniformly socialist international environment. Alas, these things are not decided by vote." Kádár insisted that in the final analysis it was not the means (a mixed economy) but the ideological ends (the building of socialism) by which the political soundness of his policies should be judged.

To balance his anticonservative soliloquy, Kádár also lashed out at those who demand to "reform the reform," and seek the withdrawal of state and party from the economic arena. He recommended that the Central Committee refuse to accept, or to entertain at any time in the future, a pre-plenum proposal to drastically revise the current five-year plan. He firmly asserted that party-state tutelage of the economy was here to stay, as were the main indicators of the current five-year plan.[50]

While discussing the situation of the young people, of whom he spoke with warmth, he nevertheless cautioned them against trying to push their elders aside:

We can encounter notions that in the life of the country a certain generation should run things for twenty years after which they are "discharged" by the next one. Generational change does not happen the same way as two military divisions relieving one another of duty. This is a gradual process in society![51]

Lest the young generation harbor hopes of advocating dissident or oppositionist ideas, Kádár hastened to reassure his listeners that he too considered the dissidents to be dupes of anticommunism (but *not* more than that) who would be denied opportunities to establish themselves as organized entities within the Patriotic People's Front and the official peace movement. His recurrent emphasis on persuasion (rather than "administrative measures") to combat political deviance of this kind helped soften his message to those, particularly the intellectuals, who have been chronically fearful about the unleashing of the security organs to restore ideological harmony in these troubled times.

Kádár, however, reserved his strongest words to respond to what one might call the criticism of the "invisible party" phenomenon in Hungary. The case in point had been the party's attempts in the preceding years to remain silent, to hide behind the government (especially its lower- and middle-level agencies in charge of policy implementation), and generally to distance itself from bad news and failures of any kind.

Certain critics—oppositionists and non-oppositionists, but panicked individuals nonetheless—say that the

[50] A year later, in a commentary on the decisions of the April 17, 1984, CC meeting, *Népszabadság* reiterated the same point with a certain amount of fervor: "The party will not withdraw from the economy as may have been assumed from positions taken in previous debates. The party will stand at the helm of development of the economic guidance system, and its leading role in solving economic problems will be greater." Trans. in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Eastern Europe* (Washington, DC—hereafter *FBIS-EEU*) May 3, 1984, p. F/18.

[51] See Kádár's 1983 report, loc. cit.

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leadership (kormányzat) *had not solved a single economic issue in the last few years. By "leadership" they mean, though do not say, the Central Committee as well. Contrary to such opinions, I want to state with full responsibility that in the area of economic work the Central Committee and its executive organs have in the last three years always made the decisions which have been necessary for the solution of all issues on their agenda.*[52]

Whether this was an old man protesting too much after agreeing to delegate (for health reasons) much of the day-to-day running of the party to his colleagues in the Central Committee Secretariat, or a reminder to the membership of the CC to stand up and be counted on the reform policies, was not clear from his speech. What was obvious, however, was that Kádár was extremely displeased with the way the media (probably he had in mind certain provincial literary monthlies, and perhaps borderline dissident journals, such as *Mozgó Világ*) tolerated the violation of official taboos with respect to subject matter and tone of arguments. "I am not pleased to talk about it, but in certain Hungarian journals sometimes such economic views see the light of day that make one ask whether it is a mad brainstorm or a bad joke that one has just read."[53] Still, Kádár was not advocating a return to institutionalized censorship. Instead, he recommended that media management "ought to be taken more seriously," and left the matter at that.

Kádár also perceived signs of a "growing wave of nationalism" and, rather mildly, made the sensible point that those riding the waves of nationalism should think about "where the drift could take them." That an anti-Romanian groundswell in Hungary might push the country closer to the USSR (in this context this *had* to be Kádár's meaning) was not a novel proposition, but to have Kádár bring up the matter in this fashion was new—perhaps as a warning, particularly to the provincial apparat, to deliver results instead of nationalist rubbish to the people.

Turning to the party's internal affairs, Kádár called attention to manifestations of "erosion in the party's ranks." He was particularly incensed about the conduct of (probably leading) cadres who "disagree with a certain party position, but remain silent until a decision is made, then they go around to preach their dissenting views to anyone who cares to listen." "It is also unacceptable," Kádár added, "that someone publicly holds and professes views that are contrary to the position of the appropriate party organs." It was not only the party foot soldiers, but "all of its officials from the highest organs down" who were put on notice to stay in step. It appeared that no immediate changes of key personnel were to be effected but that there would be changes implemented in a "gradual and orderly way" before the party congress scheduled for 1985. Although an immediate purge of the top and middle-level personnel was postponed, all those who had taken advantage of the reform debates to position themselves around putative contenders for party leadership, and had been indiscreet, unwise, or unlucky enough to be found out, were warned to fall in line behind Kádár, or be prepared to be removed from party affairs in the near future.[54]

Policy Outcomes

The party's response to the dilemmas of the NEM was not limited to speeches. The Central Committee approved a series of measures in the political and economic spheres that were intended, however incrementally, to address the demands for a democratization of public life. As we shall see, these proposed measures have also affected Hungary's foreign relations.

Politics. In an attempt to improve opportunities for political participation by citizens, the Central Committee endorsed the idea of an electoral reform.[55] When fully implemented, this will result in at least two candidates competing for most National Assembly seats, as well as for seats on local councils. Although a "national list" is going to shield the top leaders from the bother of participating in a contested election in any case (one wonders who might be put up against a Politburo member), the local candidates, entered by either the Patriotic People's Front or nominated by voters at precinct caucuses, will also have to be approved by committees staffed by the local party establishment. As little as 25 percent of the votes cast in

[52] Ibid.

[53] Depending on one's definition of "mad brainstorms," Kádár may have had in mind as many as a dozen publications, ranging from a Kecskemét-based literary journal in which the writer Sandor Csöri criticized, inter alia, the secrecy of the government's deliberations, to *Heti Világgazdaság* (a kind of Hungarian *Economist*), which in the summer of 1982 had run a feature article giving a *Consumers Report*-like dispassionate (and positive) evaluation of the Israeli Air Force's scorecard in eliminating Soviet-made Syrian fighters and missile bases in Lebanon.

[54] The first victim of major stature of the promised purge was the trade union boss, Sándor Gáspár, who was made a kind of chairman emeritus of the Trade Union Federation in December 1983. Gáspár, rumored to be one of the main architects of the 1972 anti-reform coup, had long been a thorn in the side of reformers in the party and the government.

[55] See *Népszabadság*, July 6, 1983.

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a district will produce a "deputy candidate" who would take over in case of the incapacitation or recall of the principal representative. Because candidates proposed from the floor have to be approved by open vote at the nominating caucuses, one wonders how meaningful this "reform" is going to be in the eyes of the electorate. From the followup publicity on this innovation, it appears that the media does not anticipate the National Assembly's becoming an actual overseer of the government—something that the prominent reform economist-politician Rezsö Nyers had advocated in the past.[56]

On the local level, however, there might be possibilities for some changes. I have had some indications that in the winter of 1982–1983 members of perhaps as many as one-fifth of Hungary's agricultural cooperatives voted down officially endorsed candidates for coop chairman and instead elected one of their own to direct the farm for a specified term.

Closely linked with the issue of membership autonomy over the management of agricultural production units has been the matter of self-determination for local councils in setting priorities regarding local investments and development projects. The tradition of full extraction of local revenues and their redistribution by central organs to benefit mainly urban and industrial areas has left Hungary's 3,000 villages bereft of sufficient amounts of investment capital to effect long overdue improvements of infrastructure. The lack of potable water, the preponderance of dirt roads, the scarcity of cultural, recreational, and health facilities in many Hungarian villages have been noted by latter-day "Village Explorers" and local authorities. The disagreement concerns the percentage of local revenues over which the councils might have autonomy without second-guessing and vetoes from county, ministry, and bank officials. Perhaps the newly inaugurated system of granting to city and local governments authority to issue municipal and community development bonds might, in the longer run, satisfy the demand for fiscal autonomy and self-determination in local affairs.

However, decrees encouraging political participation may not produce positive results in a country where a 1970 survey conducted in a large industrial town (Jászberény) indicated that 53 percent of the sample declined to articulate any opinion on any political subject whatsoever, and where a 1971 survey found that only 3 per cent of the respondents considered "democratism" (or its absence) to be a "problem."[57] The citizens' low sense of political efficacy and overwhelming preoccupation with material concerns is probably the main stumbling block to the effective implementation of "democratization" decreed from above. The other is the party's obvious reluctance to relinquish any of its decision-making prerogatives. János Berecz, editor-in-chief of the party's daily, has already indicated that any number of things—including "domestic and international objective and subjective conditions," the country's "level of economic development," and "its barely existing traditions of democracy"—could slow down the process of democratization in Hungary.[58] Moreover, the introduction—on a trial basis—of a secret ballot and two candidates for the position of county party secretary in a few instances in the fall of 1983 might be viewed as the central leadership's attempt to shift the burden of selection between two candidates (undoubtedly previously cleared "from above") from the central apparat to the county party officials.[59]

Economics. With respect to the economic measures introduced recently, I shall focus on questions of enterprise management and refer the reader to Paul Marer's comprehensive study and discussion of foreign trade, the second economy, banking, and finance in the 1980's.[60] As indicated above, the extreme consolidation of Hungarian industry has been justified by the orthodox Marxist "economies of scale" argument. The reversal of the initial NEM between 1972 and 1978 led to the creation of industrial dinosaurs which in turn required the creation of a "superministry" to oversee them and, beginning in 1982, to dismantle them. By early 1983, 26 major industrial trusts and conglomerates had been carved up into 167 enterprises with the agreeable result that profits rose from about 6 to 9 percent per year.[61]

The party's endorsement of "principles of scientific macro-management" also touched upon the politically sensitive matter of the selection of an enterprise direc-

[56]In prewar Hungary, the main instrument of the executive branch's accountability to the legislature was the "parliamentary question" addressed by deputies to cabinet members from the floor of the National Assembly. It may be of interest to note that during the last 35 years only one such question was addressed to the minister of interior and none to the minister of foreign affairs. This habit may be difficult to break, particularly when both the legislative deputy and the cabinet member are, as a rule, party members and, as such, bound by the higher wisdom of "democratic centralism" and the ban on airing the regime's disagreements in open forums.

[57]Guy Lázár, *A Magyar lakosság politikaitörténelmi tudata a közvéleménykutatások tükrében 1969–1980* (The Political-Historical Consciousness of the Hungarian Population in the Mirror of Public Opinion Surveys 1969–1980), Budapest, Tömegkommurikációs Kutatóközpont, 1983, pp. 14, 13.

[58]János Berecz, "We Have Answers and Programs," *Társadalmi Szemle*, No. 12, 1983.

[59]*Pártélet*, December 1983.

[60]See Marer, op. cit.

[61]"Reform and Reflexes," *Magyar Hirlap*, Aug. 13, 1983.

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tor. The principle of personal accountability for performance was to be facilitated by electing enterprise directors through open competition. The director thus chosen is to be appointed for a five-year term, during which he (and much less frequently she) is subject to annual review by the enterprise council. In 1982, there were 103 new directors in industry, of whom two received their positions through open competition. In 1983, 30 to 40 new appointments were to be made, *some* of them competitively.[62]

Unlike the selection procedures for enterprise managers, which can apparently be finessed without upsetting the political equilibrium, the question of enterprise autonomy is fraught with grave ideological and political implications for the regime. As Márton Tardos has argued, unless the workers, technical personnel, and management have a direct stake in the performance of their enterprise, it can never perform adequately on the market. Instead, it will languish under the inherently inefficient control of the relevant branch ministry. The institutionalization of workers' self-management in industry (minus the ideological freight associated with this institution in Yugoslavia) would, according to Tardos, remove present obstacles to the articulation of "partial interests" of primary producers in pivotal sectors of the economy.[63]

However, if the enterprises are expected to assume greater financial responsibility for the direct delivery of social welfare and cultural services (which is one way of freeing the central authorities from some of the burdens associated with this increasingly costly area of centralized budgetary allocations) yet remain profitable, a great deal of discretionary financial autonomy must be available at the "micro" or enterprise level. The issue of outright ownership by the employees, as opposed to their use of the enterprise and its productive resources, touches a raw nerve in a socialist state. It is a reminder why enterprise autonomy became necessary in the first place as part of a general pattern of economic decentralization. Thus, the question of enterprise autonomy points to the functional inadequacy of the bloated central state bureaucracy and to the severe economic challenges Hungary faces in the mid-1980's.

The April 1984 Central Committee plenum responded to this issue by declaring: "The relationship between the organs of macro-management and the state enterprises must be further developed so that the sphere of influence of macro-management should increase, and the responsibility and independence of enterprises in management should grow.[64] This formulation, which gives "the goat its fill and leaves the cabbage intact," is clearly nonsense, but it is typical of the way the party has shied away from implementing the logic of its "new economic development path" by cutting the central bureaucracy down to size.

In specific terms, "without changing the character of property relations," the party authorized the introduction of "two new forms of management" for state enterprises. Henceforth, at some medium-size and large enterprises either an enterprise council (to oversee the director) or an elected management (mainly at smaller firms) will be installed to make "strategic decisions," although "the control of legality" over the two kinds of management "is to be exercised by the branch ministries."[65] Without prejudging the outcome of this modest "reform," it should be noted that these new regulations will not affect a whole range (probably the majority) of industrial enterprises. Such enterprises, however, might form "consumers' councils" to advise the management, which—as before—reports only to the branch ministry.

Clearly, it would be premature to draw far-reaching conclusions from the Hungarian party's latest attempt at tinkering with the economy to maintain a positive balance of trade and to protect the population's living standards at the same time. The paucity of the party's response to the critical issue of enterprise autonomy suggests severe divisions over economic policy at the top, as well as ideological vacillation about making drastic revisions in the property (i.e., power) structure of the socialist state.

Foreign relations: In retrospect, it seems inevitable that the economic reform process, if sustained, would spill over into the realm of politics, and from there, to the country's foreign affairs, diplomacy, and international political posture. Whether the cumulative record of the NEM and its socio-political consequences amount to a "model" or a "Hungarian road to socialism" is debatable. What matters is that, given Hungary's location, limited natural resources, and realistic growth options, the regime had no choice but to "externalize" its domestic economy by way of heavy involvement in international trade with both socialist and market economies. As a result, the regime, more from necessity to build up Hungary's commercial links with Western and Third World trading partners than from any ambition by Kádár to develop a new foreign

[62] Ibid.

[63] "Reform Here and Now. Conversation with Márton Tardos," loc. cit.

[64] *Népszabadság*, Apr. 19, 1984.

[65] Ibid.; see also Frenc Havasi, "The Further Development of the Management of the Economy," ibid., Apr. 30, 1984.

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

Preparation of meat for export at an agricultural cooperative in Nadudvar, Hungary.

—EASTFOTO.

policy orientation, has become a visible participant on the European diplomatic scene since the mid-1970's.

It matters little whether it was Hungary's involvement in the international deliberations leading to the Helsinki Final Act of August 1, 1975, or Kádár's public disagreement with Todor Zhivkov over Eurocommunism at a Vienna press conference in December 1976 (Kádár's first Western trip since 1959), that precipitated an active Hungarian foreign policy in the service of national—originally purely economic—objectives. The Hungarian economy's need for Middle Eastern oil, Western high technology, and hard-currency export markets required the stabilization, upgrading, and intensification of the country's international contacts.

Kádár's trips to Austria, Germany, France, Italy, Finland, and those by his top associates to countries all over the world, undoubtedly began with trading and commercial objectives in mind. However, as these new international contacts developed, it became necessary to protect Hungary's economic interests by means of political, cultural, and personal diplomacy. The normalization of US-Hungarian relations in 1978, especially the granting of most-favored-nation status and the extension of US bank credits to Hungary, was an important step in what one might describe as Kádár's new strategy of "going international" to protect the regime's domestic achievements.

Hungary's "opening to the West" also coincided with the development of a different attitude toward the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance and the ways that Hungary's involvement in the bloc's "socialist international division of labor" affected the NEM and the government's ability to meet its domestic objec-

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tives. Without going into details about Hungary's objections to intra-bloc transactions in convertible rubles, frustrations over its socialist trading partners' chronic inability to meet delivery dates and quality standards, and chagrin over the massive food purchases in Hungary by millions of Eastern bloc tourists, the signs were unmistakable that both the regime and the people considered CMEA membership something of a liability and an obstacle to economic growth.

Nationalistic fretting of this kind, though symptomatic of the public mood in recent years, cannot be taken seriously. If all of Hungary's outstanding export-import commitments to its CMEA partners were to vanish overnight, the country would have nowhere to go to replace its lost markets and suppliers. Where else could Hungary barter its marginally competitive (on Western markets) low- to medium-technology industrial products and agricultural surplus for energy and essential raw materials? All of this indicates that Hungary has no realistic alternative to conducting the bulk of its foreign trade with CMEA and the USSR. Perhaps the best it could do to loosen its trade dependence on the bloc would be to increase, step by very small step, the volume of its hard-currency exports to the West. Some Hungarian economists wistfully call this the "escape forward" strategy to keep NEM alive and shelter it from the increasing difficulties of CMEA. "Escapism" might be a better word for it.

As far as can be surmised from the verbal thicket of press commentaries and ritualized communiqués following official meetings, Soviet reactions to NEM and to Hungary's more visible posture on the international scene have been positive, though perhaps not as breathlessly supportive as Moscow's published views on the doings of Gustáv Husák and Zhivkov. On balance, at least until recently, the Soviets had nothing to lose and much to gain from tolerating the Hungarian economic experiment. "Existing socialism" at least in *that* country did *not*, as in Poland, entail food rationing, shortages of consumers' goods or, as in Romania, maverick international posturing and second-guessing of Moscow in European security affairs. Although the Hungarians tended to stay aloof from the vigorous involvement of their Bulgarian, Czechoslovak, and East German comrades in Third World affairs, and refrained from running terrorist training camps and clandestine foreign broadcasting activities at home, they always voted "correctly" when and where it counted.

However, what the Soviets may have overlooked is that the Hungarian party neither forgot nor (at least in the case of the reform wing) forgave Moscow's interference with NEM in 1972 and the subsequent reduction of subsidized oil supplies. In that instance, Hungary's giant neighbor overplayed its hand. It was one thing to veto further reforms, to cause the restoration of defunct economic policies, and to demand (and receive) the heads of the politically most exposed reformers, such as Nyers. It was something else to deprive Hungary and the rest of the bloc of the required oil at preferential prices after the first and second oil price explosions occurred. By revealing its inability to meet its political clients' energy needs at subsidized prices, Moscow also lost some of its capacity to enforce ideologically desirable but economically ineffective policies in the bloc. The cost of the 1972 Soviet intervention can never be fully measured; but Hungarian media, writing about the dollar cost of the deterioration of terms of foreign trade between 1974 and 1980 due to higher energy costs, equate it with the value of all material losses sustained by Hungary in World War II.[66] Right or wrong, various regime spokesmen blame the Soviets for the disaster.

British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher meets with Hungarian party chief János Kádár in Budapest on February 3, 1984.

—EASTFOTO.

The third aspect of Hungary's different foreign policy posture pertains to the regime's desire to come to terms with the demographic consequences of World War II. Although one might suspect that the government's sudden interest since the mid-1970's in the welfare of Hungarians in Romania, Czechoslovakia,

[66] Ivan T. Berend, "Catching Up or Falling Behind? The Lessons of a Decade," *Magyar Nemzet* (Budapest), Dec. 24, 1983.

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and Yugoslavia had more to do with its economic legitimacy problems than with the Helsinki Agreement that seemed to ratify the post-World War II borders that assigned over three million Hungarians to the jurisdiction of three neighboring states, the issue of minority rights abroad became a visible component of the regime's foreign policies.

Hungarian nationalism has always been an explosive commodity, and any government that tries to make use of it for short-term advantages is playing with potentially uncontrollable social forces. By keeping the issue alive the government no doubt gains domestic popularity, especially with the nationalistic intelligentsia. On the other hand, by being unable to produce results, such as drastic improvements in the fields of cultural autonomy, economic opportunity, and eased restrictions on travel by Hungarians in Transylvania and Slovakia, the regime merely demonstrates its own limitations.

Nemzeti érdek (national interest) is a relatively new word in the Hungarian regime's foreign policy vocabulary. The proposition that the country, notwithstanding its membership in the Warsaw Treaty Organization, must have flexibility in the conduct of its foreign affairs has been advocated by Mátyás Szürös, a secretary of the MSzMP Central Committee, in the January 1984 issue of *Társadalmi Szemle,* the party theoretical monthly.[67] The genesis of the position presented by Szürös may be traced back to the 1976 East Berlin meeting of European communist parties where the notion of "one leading center" was rejected and the legitimacy of "national roads" to socialism reaffirmed. However, the transformation of abstract ideological independence (i.e., the freedom to *talk* about separate roads to socialism) into operative *inter-state* relations must be considered a quantum leap, with unforeseeable implications for the entire bloc.

As indicated above, the logic of the NEM called for more room for maneuver for Hungary, mainly in the form of privileged relationships with West European states in the areas of trade, tourism, and scientific-cultural cooperation. Perhaps taking its cue from the example of the profitable (at least for East Germany) intra-German trade, Hungary developed intimate economic and political ties with Austria that include the waiver of visa requirements and the free entry of Austrian citizens into Hungary. Similar arrangements with the Federal Republic of Germany are contemplated.

Szürös argued that "the socialist countries' basic foreign policy objectives are identical," the most important of which are the "preservation of peace, the limitation of the arms race, and the promotion of policies of peaceful coexistence." However, "each socialist country has unique possibilities" to foster the achievement of these shared objectives. From this he concluded that "historic traditions of relations and certain contemporary situational factors make it possible that the relationships between a given socialist and capitalist country may still develop when the general tendency of East-West relations is characterized by deterioration and the narrowing of the range of contacts." And if the "class enemy" (i.e., the Western press) praises Hungary's policies at home and abroad, "we cannot object that they acknowledge that as the result of our party's consistent policies in the last quarter century, our nation has, without *unnecessary sacrifices,* made progress on the road to socialism and that in our work for the realization of socialist objectives we have been able to rely on a national consensus (*nemzeti konzenszus*) for some time" (emphasis added).

The implied criticism of those socialist states, such as Czechoslovakia, that lacked the wisdom and the foresight to effect domestic reforms, failed to develop a national consensus around the party's goals, ran into crises at home, and, as a consequence, became isolated on the international scene, strikes one as a rather ingenious argument for the recognition of the "Hungarian way" as a viable model of international conduct by a socialist state. Lest Moscow and Prague miss this essential point, Szürös added:

Questioning the correctness of the disparate methods of others and publicly formulating reservations and suspicion of them—mainly as the result of insufficient familiarity with the national characteristics of another country—may produce tensions. Of course, this is only further strengthened by the overestimation of indigenous solutions and their promotion as some kind of uniquely correct model. It is known that such problems do crop up in the relationship between our nation and certain other socialist countries. They are not of recent origin; in fact, they tended to intensify in the wake of every significant innovative step we have taken during the last quarter century.[68]

It took more than two months for the fraternal Czechoslovak party to reply in a *Rude Pravo* article entitled "The National and the International in the Pol-

[67] Mátyás Szürös, "The Reciprocal Effect of the National and International in the Development of Socialism in Hungary," *Társadalmi Szemle,* January 1984, pp. 13–21.

[68] Ibid.

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icy of the CPCZ."[69] The burden of Prague's case is accurately conveyed by the subtitles of this piece: "We draw on experience;" "Let us not yield to anticommunist tactics;" "Unity in joint interest;" "For harmonized cooperation;" "Against the false interpretation of the national;" and, of course, "The key to success lies in internationalism." As a kind of Pavlovian reaction to the chimes of Prague, 10 days later Moscow's *Novoye Vremya* republished the piece without the lurid subtitles.[70]

Szürös's reply to the *Rude Pravo* critique took only five days to appear as a Hungarian Liberation Day interview.[71] Perhaps emboldened by the reprinting in *Neues Deutschland* of his original article, Szürös chose to remind Prague that Hungary was not alone in its emphasis on national interests: "Our experience indicates that the parties of socialist countries are not only showing greater understanding than before of each other's specific problem-solving methods, but are paying greater attention to the adaptation of the usable experience of others."

An influential Soviet commentator O. B. Rakhmanin, the first deputy head of the CPSU Central Committee Department for Liaison with Communist and Workers' Parties, writing under the pseudonym O. V. Borisov in the April 1984 issue of *Voprosy Istorii KPSS*, failed, however, to display the kind of understanding for Hungary's position that Szuros expected of other "fraternal parties" in the socialist camp. In a comprehensive pre-CMEA summit meeting review of the achievements and shortcomings of member party-states of the socialist community, he took the Hungarian leadership to task on a variety of issues.[72]

—On the April 1984 reforms of enterprise management and the second economy in general he wrote:

While speaking of the search for effective operations methods in socialist countries, it must be admitted that far from everything in this sphere looks simple. Some solutions to economic problems are controversial. For example, diminution of the state's role in economic management and also attempts to develop private enterprise to the detriment of the new society's socioeconomic structure.

Mátyás Szürös, a secretary of the Central Committee of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party.

—EASTFOTO

—On "national interest" and internationalism:

In the name of the great fraternity of Communists the CPSU also considers "neutrality" toward violations of the correct combination of international and national unacceptable. . . . proletarian and socialist internationalism in no way encroaches upon the sovereignty of any socialist country or upon the independence of any Communist Party.

—On Hungary's role as a mediator between East and West:

Just as groundless are attempts to define the roles of great and small countries outside the context of class struggle and of the fundamental contradiction between socialism and imperialism, that is, outside the main characteristics of the contemporary era. . . . In this way, an artificial watershed line is drawn between large and small states, and the latter—irrespective of

[69] Michael Stefanek and Ivan Hlivka, "The National and the International in the Policy of the CPCZ," *Rude Pravo* (Prague), Apr. 30, 1984, in *FBIS-EEU*, Apr. 5, 1984, pp. D/5–11.

[70] "On the National and the International," *Novoye Vremya* (Moscow), No. 16, 1984, pp. 12–14.

[71] "Common Interests, National Interests—Interview with Mátyás Szürös, Secretary of the MSzMP Central Committee," *Magyar Hirlap*, Apr. 4, 1984.

[72] O. V. Borisov (pseud.), "An Alliance of a New Type: The Further Strengthening of the World Socialist Community—A Most Important Aspect of the Activities of the CPSU and the Fraternal Parties," *Voprosy Istorii KPSS* (Moscow), April, 1984. For the Hungarian party's latest official statement on this matter, see Ferenc Havasi, "The Further Development of Economic Macromanagement; Speech at the April 17 Session of the MSzMP Central Committee," *Társadalmi Szemle*, May 1984, trans. in *FBIS-EEU*, June 13, 1984, pp. F/20–37.

[73] For the text of the latter, see Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Soviet Union* (Washington, DC), June 15, 1984, pp. BB/11–18.

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their class affinity—are attributed only positive functions in the development of international relations, those of overcoming contradictions, working out sensible compromises, and promoting East-West dialogue.

Perhaps the unkindest cut of Rakhmanin's attack was quoting a *1969* speech by Kádár in which the latter had upheld the permanent validity of the "general laws of building socialism" and, as used in the context of Rakhmanin's article, refuted claims to "correct national models" of any kind. If this was an invitation to Kádár to disown Szürös's "autonomist line" or an ukase to silence Hungarian regime spokesmen and their enthusiastic promotion of the NEM as a viable model, Budapest has yet to oblige.

A summit meeting of CMEA was finally convened in Moscow in June 1984. Two main declarations were issued: "The Statement About the Main Directions of Further Development and the Deepening of Economic and Technical Cooperation Between CMEA Member-States"; and the "Declaration on Preservation of Peace and International Economic Cooperation."[73] Of necessity, these documents were vague about the kinds of economic changes that member states were expected to implement. Yet, Budapest could derive small comfort from the fact that Poland's General Wojciech Jaruzelski, of all people, was asked to speak in support of these declarations on behalf of CMEA members. Apparently, *his* "model" of political management threatened no one in Moscow.

From the somewhat muted Hungarian reactions to the results of the CMEA meeting it appears that the NEM survived the latest round of external inspection by Moscow, though the regime was put on notice to go slow on further reforms. In the longer run, however, the Hungarian economy's continued dependence on the USSR for energy and raw materials, the dictum to "further intensify" trading ties among CMEA states, and the commitment of Hungary, together with the other European CMEA countries, to participate in a massive aid program to "bring up to level" the economies of Vietnam and Outer Mongolia bode ill for the future prospects of economic, let alone political, reforms in Hungary.

Conclusions

The evidence presented in this article suggests that the logic of economic reforms has necessitated not only structural changes in the domestic economy, but has also had a significant impact on the lives and expectations of Hungarian citizens. The much overdue implementation of the hitherto suppressed "democratization" component of the NEM has thus far not gone beyond token concessions in the spheres of meaningful political participation and local fiscal autonomy. The foreign policy dimension of the domestic reform program is still in its infancy. Brave words about "national interest" in and of themselves will change neither the country's links to CMEA nor the ground rules of the Warsaw Treaty Organization and the geopolitical realities that require Hungary to remain a member in good standing of that military alliance.

The flexibility needed by Hungary to survive as a stable and economically viable entity in the1980's has to come from two sources. The first involves Kádár and the party he has led for the last 27 years. Kádár must find a competent successor and "sell" him to both Moscow and the Hungarian people. The party must make room for a younger generation that would manage the system in the years to come.

The second source of flexibility lies in Hungary's external environment. It is contingent on the evolution of Hungary's ties with the USSR, on the development of informal alliances with similarly reform-oriented parties in Eastern Europe, and, ultimately, on the existence of an atmosphere of détente rather than confrontation in East-West relations. All, or none of these circumstances may come about in the 1980's. However, as history tells us, the impossible takes just a little longer in Eastern Europe.

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Communism in the Philippines

David A. Rosenberg

One year after the assassination of opposition leader Benigno Aquino, Jr., at Manila International Airport, the highly personalistic regime of Ferdinand Marcos in the Philippines is still groping for ways to deal with the country's continuing crisis. The prospects for major institutional change and political instability seem high. Political violence of all kinds has been increasing in recent years. A heavy foreign debt burden will impose several years of economic austerity on a country that already has one of the most unequal distributions of wealth and income in Asia.

In the wake of the Aquino assassination, anti-Marcos protest became overtly defiant. The parliamentary elections of May 1984 provided another avenue for anti-Marcos sentiment, as the opposition increased its representation from 15 to as many as 73 (out of 200) seats. Inasmuch as martial law (1972–1981) was originally justified by Marcos as necessary to curb a communist threat, an oligarchic conspiracy, and growing social chaos, it is ironic that the opposition is now stronger than ever, that foreign private and central banks have so much influence over the national economy, and that the government now faces a growing communist revolutionary movement. Also ironic is the possibility of a regime change with no widely accepted or tested means for presidential succession or transfer of power.

The revolutionary movement is not strong enough to pose a serious challenge in a coming succession struggle. But it has been successfully revived from near-extinction, and it has demonstrated a capability to influence the terms of political debate and to work with other opposition groups in extra-parliamentary efforts. It is thus well prepared to survive in the power vacuum that may follow 12 years of one-man rule.

An orderly transition to the post-Marcos period, therefore, is by no means assured. Given the reports about the failing health of President Marcos, the disunity of the traditional political leadership, the prospect of economic austerity, the new political powers of the military, the violations of human and property rights, and the rise of a wide range of militant opposition groups, the scramble for power after Marcos could get out of control. Under these conditions, the revolutionary movement would prosper. Hence it is important and timely to reexamine its current revival and future prospects, both as the movement sees itself and as others see it.

Even within the camp that advocates armed struggle or other revolutionary means to challenge or overthrow the existing state authority in the Philippines, there is a wide variety of groups, many of which have undergone major changes in outlook and influence. They include a pro-Soviet communist party, a Maoist communist party, almost a dozen independent Marxist-Leninist groups, as well as a number of quasi-Marxist, radical Christian groups. In addition, there remains a dormant but potentially volatile movement for Muslim autonomy in the southern Philippines.

This analysis focuses on the avowedly communist parties, insurgent groups, and front organizations. It first describes the recent background of political polarization and economic stagnation against which these groups now operate. Next, it analyzes the historical evolution of the Philippine communist movement, in order to highlight the distinctive theoretical views it has developed. In later sections, it examines how those views are being applied today by the dominant group, the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP),

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as demonstrated in the structure and operations of its military branch, the New People's Army (NPA), and of its political coalition, the National Democratic Front (NDF). The article concludes with a brief look at communist prospects in the uncertain future facing the Philippines today.

Political Polarization

Besides Marcos himself, two groups have increased their powers since 1972. One is the military, which has grown from 60,000 to 155,000 men in the past 10 years. Its budget has also increased substantially. The Armed Forces of the Philippines, along with the Police Constabulary, the Presidential Security Command at Malacanang Palace, the National Intelligence and Security Authority (NISA), and the various paramilitary forces, have become essential to the Marcos government at many levels, from national economic agencies to local government authorities.

The other major but unintended beneficiary of authoritarian rule has been the revolutionary movement in the Philippines, which has capitalized on the absence of other institutional outlets for popular grievances. In 1968, the new, more activist Communist Party of the Philippines broke away from the old, largely discredited Partido Komunista ng Pilipinas (PKP). The New People's Army has grown slowly but steadily during the Marcos years. In the political sphere, the National Democratic Front, created and led by the CPP, now shows some signs of developing significant support among certain radical Christian groups, labor organizations, student groups, and others.

More than any other single event, the assassination of Aquino enhanced the prospects of the opposition by undermining the credibility of the Marcos government. Long a political rival of Marcos, Aquino had been arrested at the outset of martial law and kept under arrest for the next seven and a half years. He returned to the Philippines in August 1983, after three years of exile in the United States, with the goal of unifying the opposition—which had been fragmented and ineffectual throughout most of the preceding decade—in order to contest the May 1984 national assembly elections. Aquino sought a "national reconciliation program" with Marcos, an idea also advocated by another moderate critic of the regime, Cardinal Jaime Sin. The most obvious political significance of the assassination was that it quickly rallied a wide range of opposition groups. Aquino thus achieved only in death what he sought in life: a massive, peaceful protest and appeal to Marcos either to reform or to remove himself from power. Well over one million people, for example, took part in Aquino's funeral procession.

The Aquino assassination thus marked an important turning point from passive compliance to active protest against government policy, especially on the part of the middle and upper classes. Perhaps the most publicized of these are the participants in the "middle-class revolt" or the "Makati Uprising," named after the capital's central business district. But there were many others; funeral services for the slain leader were organized by a newly formed, loose coalition of about 70 groups. "That such a coalition organized the church service is another indication that more activist groups could assume greater importance now that the established moderate opposition has lost Mr. Aquino's leadership," reported *The Asian Wall Street Journal.*[1]

A notable example of these activist groups was the May First Movement (Kilusan Mayo Uno—KMU), a constituent member of the CPP's National Democratic Front formed by workers in May 1980 to protest declining real wages. It has survived government harassment, and now claims half a million members. KMU and another NDF member, the League of Filipino Students, were instrumental in organizing thousands of students and workers to help guide the funeral procession. Within a week of the assassination, the loose coalition of mourners was formalized in an umbrella organization, "Justice for Aquino, Justice for All" (JAJA), headed by Former senator Lorenzo Tanada. As its name suggests, JAJA was established to investigate the Aquino assassination and "the many ills and injustices" of the country and to demand the resignation of Marcos and his chief advisers.

The demonstrations quickly became more explicitly antigovernment. On September 21, 1983, the 11th anniversary of the declaration of martial law, half a million Filipinos attended a rally in Manila to denounce the Marcos government. Sponsors of the rally established another political coalition, the Nationalist Alliance for Justice, Freedom, and Democracy, which included a wide spectrum of opposition groups. They issued a "Manifesto of Freedom, Democracy, and Sovereignty," which condemned both the Marcos government and the United States:

[1]Editorial, "After Aquino," *Asian Wall Street Journal* (Hong Kong), Aug. 26–27, 1983. See also Joel Rocamora, *The Philippines After Aquino, After Marcos?* Philippine Support Committee and Southeast Asia Resources Center, Berkeley, CA, Oct. 13, 1983. For a useful analysis of the post-assassination situation, see two recent "Issue Briefs" by Marjorie Niehaus: "Philippines in Turmoil: Implications for US Policy," July 30, 1984; and "Philippine Internal Conditions: Consequences of the Aquino Assassination," July 31, 1984, Washington, DC, US Congressional Research Service.

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A massive demonstration in Manila on September 21, 1983, to protest the assassination of Benigno Aquino a month earlier.

—T. Matsumoto/SYGMA.

The Filipino people will no longer tolerate the loss of their liberties, the exploitation of their labor, the plunder of their natural resources, the shameless looting of public funds, the arbitrary arrests, brutal torture, and ruthless murders of their childen and their leaders, the arrogant presence of alien military bases on their land, the mockery of elections and the denigration of their sovereignty—all perpetrated by a government that has forcibly imposed itself upon them with the support of the U.S. government.[2]

The Communist Party of the Philippines was quick to align itself with the popular outrage over the Aquino killing. In a news release three days after the event, the CPP stated:

The former Senator and we had our differences over how to bring about the downfall of the Marcos fascist regime. . . . But our objectives—to end the hated regime—run parallel to each other. In many ways his efforts and ours complemented each other as we fought a common enemy of the Filipino people. The Party and the entire Filipino people recognize Aquino's immense contribution to the struggle against the regime. His example and sacrifice leave all of us a concrete lesson: that all forces must unite, persist in all forms of struggle against it, bring about its downfall at the earliest possible time, and attain the Filipino people's national and social liberation.[3]

The Marcos government blames the communists for Aquino's murder, as for most of the political violence that has plagued the country in the past few years.[4]

[2]"Manifesto of Freedom, Democracy, and Sovereignty," Manila, Sept. 21, 1983, as published in the *Philippine News* (San Francisco, CA), Oct. 5–11, 1983.

[3]Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP), "Statement on the Assassination of Ninoy Aquino," Aug. 24, 1983, as quoted by Rocamora, op. cit., p. 17.

[4]While Aquino's assassination was perhaps the most publicized case, it was only one event in a growing trend of killings, kidnappings, disappearances, "savagings," ambuscades, bombings, and other forms of violence. Earlier incidents include the killing of Moro Jabidah trainees on Corregidor Island in 1969, the assassination of Crisologo in 1970, the bombing of the opposition Liberal Party rally in Plaza Miranda in 1971, a wave of bombings during the Constitutional Convention of 1970–72, the death of General Marcos Soliman in 1972, the attempted assassination of former Vice President Emmanuel Pelaez in 1982, and the disappearance of Primitivo Mijares, a former Marcos press secretary who threatened to expose the Marcos government. Rising political violence in the months just before the Aquino assassination is documented in Belinda Aquino, "The Philippines in 1983: High Noon in Political Violence," *Southeast Asian Affairs 1984*, Singapore, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1984.

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According to the government, Aquino was killed by Rolando Galman, alias Commander Bert Ramos of the New People's Army, who was recruited for the job by Rodolfo Salas, chairman of the CPP. But few people give credence to this version. According to the London *Sunday Times*, Galman's past "suggests he had more in common with the military."[5] The truth about the Aquino assassination may never be known, but several analyses have pointed out errors and inconsistencies in the official version.[6] There was speculation that Imelda Marcos, wife of the president and a major political force in her own right, and Fabian Ver, Philippine Military Chief of Staff, may have arranged the assassination to eliminate their most threatening rival.[7]

As the credibility of the Marcos government has declined, the appeal of violent resistance and the prospects for revolutionary change have risen. As one opposition analyst put it, "by murdering Aquino, Marcos has ... pushed the polarization of the country further than it has travelled in the last few years."[8] This process already threatens to eclipse more moderate groups that have also opposed the Marcos regime.

Included among these moderate opposition groups are the traditional leaders of the pre-martial law Nacionalista and Liberal parties, such as Salvador Laurel and Eva Estrada Kalaw, who together created the United Democratic Opposition (UNIDO) coalition. Another group, including Francisco Tatad and Reuben Canoy, early defectors from the Marcos administration, formed a Social Democratic Party in a parallel effort to reform the government or remove it through popular pressure. A new, post-martial law generation of local and regional political leaders, such as Luís Jose, Samuel Occena, and Aquilino Pimentel, formed the Filipino Democratic Party to pursue a "Christian Socialist" program.[9] Various business, church, and reform groups, such as the Civil Liberties Union of the Philippines, have likewise taken some part in the moderate anti-Marcos opposition.

Although most of these groups share a generally nationalist and liberal democratic outlook, they have been notably unable to form a durable and united opposition program. They agree on the need to remove Marcos from power by peaceful means, and on the need to restore civil liberties and fully representative government. They also agree on the need to implement more meaningful socioeconomic reforms. However, when these general principles are applied to specific cases—like how to regulate multinational corporations, or what to do about US military bases, or whether to boycott the National Assembly elections—the consensus breaks down.[10] Personality conflicts among these highly personalized political groupings have further inhibited formation of a common program. Moreover, after the declaration of martial law, the moderate opposition was unable to pose a legal challenge to the Marcos government. As a result, radical opposition groups had greater opportunity to garner support for more militant challenges to state authority.

Nevertheless, in the 1984 National Assembly elections, millions of Filipinos overcame a well-organized radical boycott campaign—and popular cynicism and frustration—to vote for moderate opposition candidates, primarily from UNIDO. The high voter turnout and the strong showing by opposition candidates have been interpreted as a defeat for the boycott movement and for NDF efforts to discredit the electoral procedures of the Marcos administration. But one might also view the results as evidence that—in the wake of the Aquino assassination and the national economic crisis—Filipinos will take any opportunity they have to show their opposition. In fact, the NDF's mistake may have been to underestimate the degree of anti-Marcos sentiment.

Early returns gave the opposition a clean sweep of all major cities in the country and a sizable lead in many other areas. Later returns, however, gave Marcos and his Kilusan ng Bayong Lipunan (KBL—New Society) party a majority of 110 of the 183 seats at stake in the election, amid numerous reports of election fraud and violence. In addition, Marcos can still appoint 17 of his own representatives to the National Assembly. He can also overrule the assembly through his decree powers, and he can dissolve the assembly at will.

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[5]Rosemary Righter, "Dubious History of 'Assassin' Rolando," *Sunday Times* (London), Sept. 4, 1983.

[6]A useful collection of twenty-four news reports and editorials about the Aquino assassination and its impact accompanies the essay by Rocamora, op. cit., pp. 23–55. Also see Don Oberdorfer, "Philippine Officer Calls Slaying of Aquino 'A Military Operation,'" *The Washington Post*, Feb. 24, 1984; "Military's Version of Slaying Shattered," *Malaya* (Manila), Feb. 27, 1984; "Legal Groups Charge Escorts Killed Aquino," *The New York Times*, July 15, 1984.

[7]For examples, see Jack Anderson's syndicated column of Sept. 27, 1983; and Kim Rogal, "Was the Military to Blame?" *Newsweek* (New York), Sept. 26, 1983, p. 45.

[8]Joel Rocamora, "Is Marcos A Lame-Duck Dictator?" *Southeast Asia Chronicle* (Berkeley, CA), December 1983, p. 11.

[9]For a valuable biographical survey of the major prospects for national political leadership, see the 17th Anniversary Special Report, "Crisis of Leadership," *Business Day* (Manila), Feb. 27, 1984.

[10]For examples, see Guy Sacerdoti, "The Search for Unity," *Far Eastern Economic Review* (Hong Kong), February 2, 1984, pp. 10–11; William Branigin, "Marcos' Foes Split Over Participation in May 14 Election," *The Washington Post*, Feb. 24, 1984; and idem, "Opposition Groups Fail to Capitalize On Marcos' Woes," ibid., Mar. 11, 1984.

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Senator Salvador Laurel, leader of the UNIDO party which won a significant number of seats in the May 1984 Philippines national elections, leads a May 15 Manila demonstration against alleged election fraud.

—T. Matsumoto/SYGMA.

It remains to be seen, therefore, whether the newly elected opposition representatives will be able to surmount their own divisions and government dominance to form a coherent political force. If not, more radical groups will be better poised to take advantage not only of the political ferment unleashed by the Aquino assassination, but also of the recent Filipino record of economic stagnation, government mismanagement, and imposed austerity.

Deteriorating Economy

Radical insurgencies in the Philippines have often been rooted in economic and social grievances. The general problem of the Philippine economy is a familiar one for developing countries pursuing an export-led growth strategy. Import costs have increased significantly in the past decade, especially for oil. A major recession in the developed countries and a general decline in world trade also decreased demand for Philippine exports. The result has been a steady increase in the balance of payments deficit. Rising interest rates and new protectionist policies in industrial countries have turned the problem into a major foreign debt crisis.

In order to qualify for foreign credit to finance the growing Philippine debt, the Marcos government had to negotiate a standby agreement with the International Moneary Fund (IMF) detailing fiscal and monetary policies to reduce the debt and restore the country's creditworthiness. These include a devaluation of the peso, budget cutbacks, deferral of development programs considered less essential, a wage freeze in public-sector employment, and a variety of monitoring and reporting controls.

The task of managing the balance of payments deficit under conditions of stagnant economic growth would have been difficult enough for any well-intentioned, reasonably competent government. However, recent financial scandals cast doubt on the intentions and competence of the Marcos government.[11]

[11] The details of financial mismanagement are described in Jose Galang, "Things Fall Apart," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, Jan. 19, 1984, pp. 90–91; Guy Sacerdoti and Jose Galang, "Manila Money Games," ibid., Jan. 26, 1984, pp. 42–43; Hobart Rowen, "Philippine Debt Stunned Lenders," *The Washington Post*, Jan. 29, 1984; "On the Back of A Manila Envelope," *The Economist* (London), Apr. 7, 1984, p. 79.

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For example, IMF auditors discovered that the total foreign debt had been understated by over US$7 billion for most of 1983, due to "accounting errors." The real debt is now estimated at over $25 billion. To make matters worse, the money supply was expanded by about 30 percent during 1983, far in excess of past growth rates and IMF guidelines. Some foreign bankers have said that the increased money supply was part of an attempt by senior financial officials to bail out a number of ailing businesses and to transfer capital out of the country. One consequence was an inflationary surge in consumer prices in 1983–84, especially for food, causing a decline in living standards for many. Meanwhile, central bank reserves dropped from $2.28 billion to $430 million between June and October 1983, when foreign exchange controls were imposed.

These developments were followed by charges of financial mismanagement and corruption leveled against business friends of President Marcos. There have been a few personnel changes resulting from these exposés, most notably the removal of Central Bank Governor Jaime Laya. But not much else has changed. On the whole, conditions are poor for implementation of an effective or equitable national austerity program.[12]

The economic crisis has two major consequences. First, Marcos has lost the support of a large part of the international business community.[13] Moreover, many Filipino business groups have moved toward opposition. The chief cause of the current economic crisis, they say, is not the sagging international market for Philippine exports; rather, it is the imcompetence of the Marcos administration. The best way to cure the problem, these critics claim, is to remove that administration—not by armed struggle, but by international financial pressure against what they see as the system of "crony capitalism."

A second major political consequence of the economic crisis is that it has now become much more difficult for Marcos to continue his well-practiced techniques of pay-off politics. Under current conditions, there just are not enough material benefits to go around. This has long been the case for much of the population, as demonstrated by the persistence of high unemployment, declining real wages, widespread malnutrition, and high infant mortality rates. But the scarcity of material benefits has now affected the middle and upper classes as well. This is evident in declining savings rates, bank deposit withdrawals, capital flight, and the high number of recent bankruptcies and mergers. Many Filipinos, in particular skilled workers and professionals, have left the country to seek better opportunities abroad.

Serious conflicts among government supporters have been revealed in the scramble to assign the blame for these economic difficulties of the country. Imelda Marcos has publicly criticized Cesar Virata, prime minister and finance minister, for pursuing policies that have made the economy so vulnerable to downturn in the world market. Virata, in turn, has accused Mrs. Marcos of wasting scarce national resources on luxury projects and other nonessential activities. Outside this elite, the decline in economic performance has, predictably, further strengthened political opposition. This is true in particular of the communist opposition, whose internal dynamics the following section will explore.

Rise and Fall of the PKP

Perhaps the most important development among revolutionary movements during the Marcos years has been the decline of the pro-Soviet PKP and the rise of the Maoist Communist Party of the Philippines, the CPP. While the former has now reached an advanced state of decay, the CPP has in the past 15 years achieved a position of indisputable supremacy among radical movements in the Philippines. How and why did this transformation take place? The reasons for this change—internal party policy differences, personality conflicts, a successful government counterinsurgency campaign, the Sino-Soviet split—have long been debated among scholars.[14] Recent research, in particular by Francisco Nemenzo of

[12]The severity of the economic crisis was summarized by one international management firm as indicating that "the Philippines is entering an era of widespread instability, characterized by a worsening economic situation, growing political unrest, and rampant corruption." It advised its foreign business clients not to make any new investments in the Philippines. See "Force '83 Report on the Philippines," Business Environment Risk Information (BERI), Washington, DC, 1983, p. 1, as reported in Alex Magno, "The BERI Report: What Do The Corporate Soothsayers Say?" *WHO* (Manila), Oct. 12, 1983, p. 18. Other, equally gloomy independent business risk assessments include Ron Napier, "The Philippines: The Economics of 'No Choice,'" Data Resources, Inc., Washington, DC, May 1983; and "The Philippines: A Country Risk Assessment," International Business-Government Counsellors, Washington, DC, November 1983.

[13]See, e.g., Colin Campbell, "Bankers Say Marcos Must Move," *New York Times*, Oct. 29, 1983; Michael Sesit, "Bankers Delay Bailout Talks With Manila," *The Wall Street Journal* (New York), Dec. 12, 1983; Eduardo Lachica, "U.S. Is Pushing Marcos To Curb His Cronies And Prepare Successors," ibid., Jan. 5, 1984; and William Branigin, "Foreign Lenders Aim to Change 'Crony Capitalism' in Philippines," *The Washington Post*, Feb. 20, 1984.

[14]This scholarly debate was discussed by Philip Dion in an essay-review on "Communism and Philippine Reality" in *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), May–June 1982. By 1984, new political developments and new scholarship necessitate a reappraisal of the significance of the Philippine communist movement.

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the Australian National University,[15] provides detailed information and valuable insights into the process, and makes a reexamination of these issues worthwhile—the more so since shifts in communist doctrine, organization, and strategy may well have some bearing on the fortunes of the Filipino movement "on the ground" today.

The PKP was founded in November 1930 by Crisanto Evangelista. In 1938, it merged with the Socialist Party. From the time of the 1938 merger until the 1967 split that led to the founding of the CPP, the PKP was virtually the only radical party in the country. During the Japanese occupation of the Philippines in World War II, the military branch of the PKP, the People's Army Against Japan (Hukbo ng Bayan Laban sa Hapon)—or the "Huks," as they were popularly known—created a large resistance movement. "Hardened by the exigencies of guerrilla life and schooled in the Stalinist norms of iron discipline," Nemenzo writes, "the PKP projected a public image of monolithic unity."[16] Democratic centralism was rigidly applied. While a few party leaders resigned or were expelled over policy disputes, no rival factions were created.

The head of the PKP for most of the wartime period was Vincente Lava. The first of three brothers to serve as secretary general of the PKP, Lava was removed from office in 1944 because of his "retreat for defense" policy, which broke up Huk units in an attempt to retreat through Japanese encirclement at Mount Arayat. Many Huks were captured and executed in their attempts to penetrate Japanese lines. A new secretary general, Pedro Castro, leader of the tobacco workers federation, was elected at a postwar Central Committee meeting.

[15]Francisco Nemenzo, "Divergence and Consensus: Trends in Philippine Communism," Seminar on Armed Communism in Southeast Asia, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, Nov. 17, 1982. An abbreviated version of this paper has just been published as "Rectification Process in the Philippine Communist Movement," in Lim Joo-Jock with Vani S., Eds., *Armed Communist Movements in Southeast Asia*, New York, St. Martin's, 1984. In broad outline, Nemenzo's analysis follows other recent analyses of Philippine communism; however, as a participant-observer, he provides valuable first-hand details and commentaries that are frequently cited here because they are not available elsewhere.

[16]Nemenzo, "Divergence and Consensus," p. 8.



Philippine Prime Minister Cesar Virata addresses a church-business conference in Manila on March 12, 1983, as Jaime Cardinal Sin looks on.

—UPI/Bettmann Archive.

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The PKP and the Huks began the postwar period with much greater strength than they had in the 1930's. They had achieved legal status and greatly enlarged membership. The association of Huk veterans had 10,000 fully armed members. The PKP-affiliated peasant union, Pambansang Kaisahan ng Magbubukid (PKM), had local branches in almost every town and barrio in Central and Southern Luzon. The allied Congress of Labor Organizations (CLO) controlled the unions in all the major industries in Manila and Panay, representing most of the organized labor force in Manila. PKP influence was also strong in the Philippine Government Employees Association (PGEA). The PKP-led political party, the Democratic Alliance, won six congressional seats in the 1946 elections. However, in a harbinger of conflicts to come, they were not allowed to take their seats because of dubious charges of election irregularities.

The Democratic Alliance candidates and the Central Luzon farmers they represented were the targets of a campaign by local landlords to roll back the wartime agrarian policies implemented by the Huks. While many landlords were spending the war years abroad or in Manila under Japanese occupation, many of their tenants took over the abandoned land and took up arms to defend it. Jose Lava, younger brother of Vicente and then Secretary of Organization for the PKP, advocated armed struggle to resist efforts by the landlords and their armed guards to impose the status quo ante.

The peasants who comprised the overwhelming majority of the wartime Huk movement were well-organized, well-armed, and experienced in battle. The new government was weak and discredited by charges of collaboration. Nevertheless, Pedro Castro and most other members of the Central Committee favored parliamentary struggle, that is, working for congressional representation through legal means. By the time the Central Committee met to resolve this issue, many peasants and PKP members had already taken their weapons and gone underground to begin fighting. Given this fait accompli, the party had little choice but to sanction the armed struggle policy. Jose Lava replaced Pedro Castro as head of the PKP.

In 1946, the wartime Huk organization was reorganized as the National Liberation Army (Hukbong Mapagpalaya ng Bayan—HMB). All party resources were concentrated on armed struggle, which scored many early successes. Government troops, undisciplined and demoralized, were no match for the veterans of the HMB. By 1950, Lava declared that a revolutionary situation existed and that the party should plan for an early seizure of power.

In January 1950, the party adopted a series of policies based on this view. For example, the Politburo decided to avoid tactical alliances with other groups opposed to the unpopular government of Elpidio Quirino. The "bourgeois-nationalist opposition" was identified as "within the direction of the main blow" and as competing with the PKP. The party virtually abandoned its legal mass organizations and efforts at parliamentary struggle.

The party also began a very rapid membership drive. In a program called "geometric expansion," Jose Lava directed all PKP and HMB members to recruit at least three other members every three months starting in July 1950 and continuing until September 1951. According to the program, the party would increase in size from 3,500 to 50,000 members, and HMB would increase from 10,800 to 172,000. The consequence was that PKP and HMB were opened to all sorts of opportunistic and disgruntled elements in Philippine society, including many poorly trained and poorly motivated recruits. Others who joined the Huks during this period were often sent to regions of the country where they had few local ties. Later on, these new recruits weakened party and HMB discipline, losing those organizations a great deal of popular support.

As part of the plan for an early seizure of power, the small, mobile guerrilla squads of the HMB were reorganized into larger units capable of meeting government troops in positional warfare. Thus, the HMB sacrificed mobility and greatly increased its logistical requirements. It could no longer rely heavily on local peasant support for its material needs; special units for food production and procurement became necessary. Their activities also made it easier for the government to locate HMB units. In order to demonstrate HMB power, a number of raids on major towns, cities, and constabulary camps were conducted to commemorate important dates in the revolutionary movement. Lava called these attacks "dress rehearsals of greater things to come." While they were successful in the short run, these raids, too, gave the government an easier trail to follow.

The government caught up with the party leadership on October 18, 1950, when Lava and several other Politburo members were arrested in Manila just as they were planning major "dress rehearsal" raids on the capital city. With captured PKP plans for a communist revolution in hand, President Quirino turned to the United States for help under the terms of the 1947 Philippine-American Mutual Assistance Pact.

Acting on American advice, Quirino appointed a

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little-known Congressman from Zambales, Ramon Magsaysay, to be secretary of national defense. With the considerable assistance of two US advisers, Col. Edward Lansdale and Major T. H. Bohannan, Magsaysay implemented systematic surveillance of HMB positions. Several HMB main units were subsequently decimated by the Philippine military; others were demoralized. Social reforms and economic development aid further undercut the communists' appeal.

By 1954, the HMB had suffered defeats on the battlefield and a substantial loss of popular support. Dr. Jesus Lava, who had succeeded his brother as PKP secretary general, finally acknowledged the futility of the plan for an early seizure of power and proclaimed a strategic shift to parliamentary struggle. However, by that time, there were very few party members left for open, legal activities. Most had abandoned the mass organizations in 1950, when Jose Lava had first declared his plan for an early seizure of power. In any event, the shift to parliamentary struggle was blocked by the Anti-Subversion Law (Republic Act No. 1700), which declared the communist party and its affiliates illegal and imposed stiff penalties on party members.

The law contained a one-month grace period during which PKP and HMB members were encouraged to surrender in exchange for a government promise not to prosecute them for involvement in the postwar Huk rebellion. Lava urged party members to "return to civilian life" during the grace period. He also effectively disbanded the party structure by ending the collective, or cell-unit, membership requirement. Thereafter, party members were expected to act on their own initiative. The only way in which Jesus Lava exercised any leadership was through the issuing of "political transmissions," which provided occasional statements analyzing the political situation and prescribing a course of action. Under the new, "single-file policy," political transmissions were passed along from one party member to another, one at a time.

Lava's actions ended almost all political activity by the PKP. The political transmissions had a very uneven and sporadic distribution. Party organs ceased to function. The PKP had virtually liquidated itself. By the 1960's, the PKP was largely inactive except for a few renegade units who had degenerated into criminal bands practicing extortion and banditry, mostly in the hills of Central Luzon. Notable among these was the Sumolong Gang, a group of Huk remnants led by Commander Sumolong, who broke away from the PKP and set up gambling, prostitution, and other criminal activities outside the United States's Clark Air Force Base in Angeles City.

Jesus Lava, who propounded a parliamentary strategy for the Philippine Communist Party (PKP).

—Asiaweek News Service.

When martial law was declared in late 1972, most members of the PKP Politburo went into hiding. After two months of silence, the party's secretary general, Jesus Lava, issued a political transmission concluding that martial law was not all bad because the main targets were "not the 'genuine revolutionaries' but the Maoists, clerico-fascists [i.e., the Christian Left], and the CIA politicians like Senator Benigno Aquino and the *Manila Times* publisher Chino Roces." He applauded the martial law decree of agrarian reform, the disbanding of private armies, and other "progressive policies" of the martial law government. He ordered PKP and HMB units to lie low and conserve their resources, warning against any cooperation with the CPP or the "Maoists." Indeed, he said, "We should even help [government authorities] to crush them."[17]

The PKP attitude toward martial law provoked defections and internal dissent. In November 1972, militants who had recently joined the party broke away to form the Marxist-Leninist Group (MLG). The MLG declared that "since the party now turns its back on the

[17] "Partido Kommunista ng Pilipinas (PKP), "Political Transmission," Nov. 27, 1972, as quoted in ibid., p. 16.

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revolution, we can only remain loyal to the revolution by turning our backs on the party." The new group avowed its support for "the international communist movement, led by the CPSU," though it also stated that it hoped to overcome theoretical differences with the CPP and to pursue joint actions against the government.[18]

In October 1974, the demilitarization of the PKP became complete when the Politburo met with Marcos and his top generals at Malacanang Palace. The secretary general ordered all PKP and HMB cadres to turn over their weapons to the government and register with the local constabulary. The party formally pledged to cooperate with the government. In the current PKP constitution, adopted in 1980, there is no mention of armed struggle. Instead, the party claims to seek only a "frank and constructive dialogue with all ... elements honestly seeking meaningful changes in society."[19]

By that time, defections and schisms had greatly reduced the influence of the PKP. Nemenzo argues that the party

has earned for itself a rather unflattering public image: an old man's party that is prone to violence towards recalcitrant members but scared to confront the neocolonial government, an instrument of a foreign power that has little domestic following. Its present situation is extremely precarious because, despite the purges, disenchanted branches and individual members are seeking contacts with more militant Marxist organizations. The process of convergence which characterizes the Philippine communist movement today may leave behind the PKP leadership but increasingly absorb its rank-and-file.[20]

Origins of the CPP

While the PKP drifted into inactivity, other events revived the spirit of militant nationalism in the Philippines. Senator Claro Recto criticized the "subservient and mendicant" foreign policy of the Philippines toward the United States. He challenged President Magsaysay's administration in the 1957 presidential election campaign as a candidate for the Nationalist-Citizens Party. Although Recto lost by a wide margin, he attracted considerable support from high-school and college students. According to Nemenzo, himself a participant, "this group represented a new generation of Filipinos who have no recollection of the harrowing days of Japanese occupation, who did not share in their parents' postwar euphoria.... For them US imperialism was the scourge of the nation."[21] International events also influenced the new Filipino nationalist movement in the early 1960's: the Cuban revolution, the assassination of Patrice Lumumba, the escalation of the war in Vietnam, and the rise of the Sukarno government in Indonesia.

The event that turned ideas into actions came in response to accusations by Captain Carlos Albert (a retired naval intelligence officer and a veteran of the Lansdale and Bohannan counterinsurgency campaign) that subversives were spreading "communistic ideas" on the campus of the University of the Philippines (UP). An investigation was launched by the Philippine House of Representatives Committee on Anti-Filipino Activities (CAFA). The academic community protested en masse, forcing CAFA to discontinue the hearings. "The anti-CAFA rally was a historical landmark," according to Nemenzo. "Those who later formed the nucleus of the CPP trace their political awakening to that dramatic episode. Their leader was a young poet and English literature instructor at UP named Jose Maria Sison."[22]

A Students' Cultural Association of the University of the Philippines (SCAUP) was founded to carry on the ideals of the Recto campaign. *The Progressive Review*, started in 1963 and edited by Sison, Nemenzo, and Luis Teodoro, reflected the increasingly radical views of the new generation of political activists. In November 1964, a new youth movement was organized, Nationalist Youth (Kabataan Makabayan—KM), with Sison as national chairman. Other organizations were formed, including some with PKP leadership: a peasant federation, MASAKA; a labor group, Lapiang Manggagawa; and a Philippine chapter of the Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation. In February 1967, the Movement for the Advancement of Nationalism (MAN) was organized as a coalition of opposition nationlist groups, including several prominent political and business leaders.[23]

Old and new leftists became acquainted at meetings of the PKP which, in response to the new nationalist movement, was slowly reviving and cautiously be-

[18]"Deklarasyonng Grupong Marxista-Leninista," April 1973 (mimeo). The MLG was apparently decimated in a violent purge by the PKP, according to a story in the CPP newspaper; see "Lavaite Clique Resorts to Murder to Silence Its Dissenting Cadres," *Ang Bayan* (Manila), Oct. 15, 1979.

[19]PKP, "Political Resolution," 1980 (mimeo).

[20]Nemenzo, "Divergence and Consensus," p. 21.

[21]Ibid., p. 9.

[22]Ibid.

[23]For a critical view of these organizations and their activities, see Justus M. van der Kroef, "Communist Fronts in the Philippines," *Problems of Communism*, March–April 1967.

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ginning to reactivate old party members and set up mass organizations. But there were now sharp generational differences among radical political activists. "Those who had tasted defeat in the 1950's, mostly of peasant background, tended to be overcautious and bureaucratic," observed Nemenzo, "whereas the younger ones who joined the party (i.e., the PKP) in the 1960's, predominantly intellectuals and urban workers, were more daring and innovative. The veterans of the Huk rebellion were more scared of the past than inspired by an image of the future that the new recruits saw in Cuba, Vietnam, and China."[24]

Sison was commissioned to prepare a draft analyzing party history and contemporary politics to guide future policy. His draft criticized Vicente Lava for his wartime strategy of "retreat for defense," Jose Lava for his "early seizure of power" strategy, and Jesus Lava for his "single-file" policy. This is essentially the document adopted by the CPP in 1968 as one of its founding statements, under the title, "Rectify Errors and Rebuild the Party."[25] Longtime followers of the Lava brothers, increasingly suspicious of these critical junior party members, found an opportunity to expel Sison and his followers from the PKP at an enlarged meeting of the Central Committee in April 1967. Sison's group immediately formed their own provisional Politburo and issued their first public statement on May Day, 1967, "hailing the [Chinese] Cultural Revolution, condemning Liu Shaoqi and the Soviet Union, and depicting the so-called 'Lava clique' as the bearers of modern revisionism in the Philippines."

On December 26, 1968, the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) was formally established by 11 young revolutionaries gathered in a barrio somewhere in Pangasinan. They called their meeting a "Congress of Reestablishment" in order to suggest that the original PKP had ceased to exist in 1957 when Jesus Lava declared the "liquidationist single-file policy." Hence, it was necessary to "reestablish" the party "guided by Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought." Sison became chairman of the CPP. The declared purpose of the new party was to work for "the overthrow of U.S. imperialism, feudalism, and bureaucratic capitalism, the seizure of political power and its consolidation," as Sison later wrote (under the pen name of Amado Guerrero) in "Philippine Society and Revolution," still the basic treatise of the CPP.[26]

Beginning with the Maoist principle that "power grows out of the barrel of the gun and the party controls the gun," the CPP line advanced in "Rectify Errors and Rebuild the Party" advocated armed struggle but criticized the "putschist line" Jose Lava had attempted in 1950. Lava and the HMB commanders had relied on US Army field manuals and more or less conventional tactics to try to defeat the government forces. According to the CPP, the PKP and the HMB command had failed to combine political struggle with armed struggle. The old leadership had "overstrained the limited revolutionary forces, made them leap over unstable areas instead of advancing wave after wave, and impelled the imposition of bourgeois rules of war and sectarian punishments on the overstrained cadres, soldiers, and masses." They did not construe the armed struggle as a "protracted people's war in which the revolutionary forces would gradually strangle the enemey-controlled cities from stable bases in the countryside." The founding CPP document also criticized the PKP leadership for concentrating its efforts in Manila and the surrounding areas of Central and Southern Luzon, ignoring the rural mass base and exposing HMB forces to nearby government troops. According to Nemenzo, the PKP secretariat had remained in Manila because Jose Lava was reluctant to leave his job as an economic analyst for the Philippine National Bank.[27]

"Rectify Errors and Rebuild the Party" marks a dividing line between two traditions in Philippine communism. It explained the failures of the Huk rebellion; it questioned the legitimacy of the PKP; it provided encouragement and, later, a serious basis of analysis and action for a new generation of revolutionaries.

The new generation soon put their revolutionary zeal into practice. On January 26, 1970, demonstrators gathered in downtown Manila to protest what they viewed as broken campaign promises of the recenty re-elected President Marcos. They moved on to Malacanang, the presidential palace, where they were met by the police and constabulary. Fighting spread throughout the area, resulting in one fatality, several injuries, and hundreds of arrests. A few days after, on January 30, several thousand demonstrators—including CPP members, Christian Left militants, workers, and students—stormed Malacanang Palace. Demonstrators fought the police in downtown Manila through the night. The "First Quarter Storm" of street demonstrations in 1970 was a period of exuberant leftism, in which the guerrilla mystique was reflected in acts of increasingly violent protest against the government. It

[24]Nemenzo, "Divergence and Consensus," p. 9.

[25]CPP, "Rectify Errors and Rebuild the Party," 1968 (mimeo).

[26]Amado Guerrero, *Philippine Society and Revolution*, Hong Kong, Ta Kung Pao, 1971 (originally published in the Philippines in mimeo by the "Revolutionary School of Mao Tsetung Thought").

[27]Nemenzo, "Divergence and Consensus," p. 24.

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Jose Maria Sison, a founder and first chairman of the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP), is shown during a court proceeding.

—Asiaweek News Service.

was followed by jeepney strikes, the "Diliman Commune" at the University of the Philippines, and several other demonstrations.[28]

When martial law was declared, ostensibly in response to such disturbances, the CPP was relatively well-prepared. Many party members had made plans to go underground after the 1971 suspension of the writ of habeas corpus, a move justified by Marcos as necessary to find the terrorists who had bombed a Liberal Party rally in Plaza Miranda. Although hundreds of Marcos critics and opposition leaders were detained at the outset of martial law, almost all CPP cadres in Manila managed to escape.

The first major policy statement made by the CPP Central Committee after martial law, in October 1972, viewed "the present situation as far more favorable to the revolutionary movement than ever before...."[29] While some CPP members and supporters remained in cities and towns to work in trade unions and universities, others who could no longer safely remain in the Manila region were sent to work with NPA units forming in rural areas. The party thus had an opportunity to recruit and train new cadres and send them to new regions to organize popular support.

The CPP began to organize protest actions in a cautious manner, for example, urging people to wear black ribbons to symbolize the "death of democracy." Within a short time, however, there were many issues available for organizing more militant protest actions. A wage freeze and strike ban in the midst of inflation, the construction of energy projects in places sacred to the mountain tribes, slum-clearance programs, and the luxury hotel projects all provided ammunition for the CPP to increase the scope and intensity of antigovernment agitation. A fair number of Filipinos, deprived of freedom of speech and other civil liberties, turned to the CPP, which benefited considerably from its ability to provide Filipinos an opportunity to register their dissent.

Significantly, the CPP has developed with very little assistance from any foreign supporters.[30] As this analyis has shown, the basic issues in the split of the Philippine communist movement were local; only afterward did the PKP and the CPP become entangled with the ideological struggle between the Soviets and the Chinese. China's Xinhua News Agency and Radio Beijing later carried the first statement of the provisional CPP Politburo, thus giving tacit endorsement to the breakaway group. The PKP, by contrast, sent a delegation to the 1969 International Conference of Communist and Workers' Parties in Moscow, and, in 1970, openly attacked Mao Zedong Thought and the breakaway CPP group and endorsed the Soviet line. The chronology is important because it corrects a popular misconception that the PKP-CPP split was due to the Sino-Soviet split.

Ever since that time—with the possible exception of a brief period in the early 1970's, when the People's Republic of China provided some ideological and material support—the CPP has relied primarily on indigenous backing. Its last reported contact with China was in 1974.[31] When the Philippine government established diplomatic relations with the PRC in June 1975, the PRC and the CPP apparently broke all ties. The rupture was widened by subsequent ideological shifts away from Maoism in Beijing. The CPP and

[28]For a survey of the activities of the two communist parties in the 1970's, see Tilman Durdin, "Philippine Communism," *Problems of Communism*, May–June 1976.

[29]CPP, "Tasks of the Communist Party of the Philippines in the New Situation," *Ang Bayan*, Oct. 12, 1972.

[30]On the absence of a major foreign connection with Philippine communist movements, see, e.g., Donald E. Weatherbee, "The Indigenization of ASEAN Communist Parties," in Charles E. Morrison, Ed., *Threats to Security in East Asia-Pacific: National and Regional Perspectives*, Lexington, MA, Lexington Books, 1983.

[31]Durdin, loc. cit., p. 45, n. 13; compare John Wong, *The Political Economy of China's Changing Relations with Southeast Asia*, New York, St. Martin's, 1984, pp. 148–49.

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China are now opposed on a number of issues. For example, the PRC supports the maintenance of US bases in the Philippines "as a necessary counterweight to Soviet expansionism," while the CPP works for their removal.[32] China's ambassador in Manila disclaims any connection with the CPP, noting that his government "never interferes" in such "internal affairs."[33] Chinese Foreign Minister Wu Xueqian, on the other hand, recently declared that Beijing does maintain a "moral relationship" with the Malaysian and other Southeast Asian communist parties.[34] In the Malaysian case, this relationship appears to include clandestine radio broadcasts;[35] but no such broadcasts have been reported for some time as far as the Filipino communists are concerned. Meanwhile, official Chinese-Philippine trade has grown steadily. On her last visit to Beijing in January 1984, Imelda Marcos arranged a $140 million purchase of oil on a deferred payment basis and $60 million in government-to-government loans for non-oil imports.[36]

The Soviet Union, so far as is known, also provides no support for the CPP. To the contrary, it has pursued stronger Soviet-Philippine government relations and the expansion of trade and cultural ties;[37] and there is no evidence that Moscow is currently willing to jeopardize these ties by providing significant amounts of undercover weapons or other aid to Philippine opposition groups. The Soviet Union does provide some support for a few PKP leaders; however, since they work with the official approval of the Marcos government, they are largely discredited in the revolutionary movement. Perhaps the most important foreign political support for the CPP comes from expatriate Filipino groups opposed to the Marcos government, for example, the Union of Democratic Filipinos in the United States. More worrisome for the Marcos government than any such pressures from abroad is the recent surge of communist guerrilla operations inside the Philippines. The extent of CPP success in mobilizing an indigenous insurgency there can be measured by the activities of the party's military organization, the New People's Army.

[32] *Ang Katipunan* (Oakland, CA), April 1983, as quoted in the chapter on the "Philippines" in Richard Staar, ed., *Yearbook on International Communist Affairs, 1984*, Stanford, CA, Hoover Institution Press, p. 267. *Ang Katipunan*, a publication of the Union of Democratic Filipinos (KDP), is aimed at the Filipino community in the United States.

[33] Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: China* (Washington, DC), Mar. 1, 1984, p. E/1.

[34] Ibid., Feb. 29, 1984, p. E/3.

[35] For some of the most recent such broadcasts, see Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Asia and Pacific* (Washington, DC—hereafter *FBIS-APA*), June 22, 1984, p. O/1; July 9, 1984, p. O/1; Aug. 3, 1984, p. O/1.

[36] "Imelda Marcos Returns From China," *The Washington Post*, Jan. 11, 1984.

[37] For example, see "U.S.S.R.-Philippines: Successful Rapprochement," *Metro Manila Times*, Dec. 4, 1983.

[38] Nemenzo, "Divergence and Consensus," p. 25.

[39] Ibid., p. 26.

The New People's Army

When the small band of radical activists met in December 1968 to establish the CPP, they faced a fundamental problem: they advocated a peasant-based revolutionary strategy, but they had no peasant base. They were themselves students and young professionals drawn from the ranks of the urban intelligentsia. Although they were well-schooled in Maoist theory, they had no practice in guerrilla war. Within a few weeks, however, they were able to attract the support of a group of peasant guerrillas under the leadership of Commander Dante, an HMB cadre who had rebelled against the increasingly criminal activities of Commander Sumolong; "his Army in search for a party encountered Amado Guerrero's party in search for any Army."[38] Their fusion established the New People's Army on March 29, 1969.

The objectives of the NPA, according to its basic document, are to engage in party building; to carry out agrarian revolution, build rural bases, and advance the armed struggle; and to help construct the national united front. Unlike the PKP-HMB relationship, the CPP designed the NPA to be a propaganda and organizing force as well as a fighting force.

NPA recruits were initially organized into local militias, guerrilla bands, and regular mobile forces. Young activists from urban areas strove to overcome their "bourgeois education" and gain acceptance from local villagers by helping to introduce simple irrigation facilities, crop rotation methods, public health techniques, and other useful services. According to former CPP member Nemenzo, NPA units were viewed by villagers not only as soldiers, but also as social workers, agricultural advisers, paramedics, and teachers who were "more effective than the police in clearing up carabao thieves, usurers, abusive overseers, and other hated elements."[39]

As far as its overall strategy was concerned, the New People's Army was clearly inspired by the Maoist model of a People's Liberation Army. The 1969 basic document demonstrates this influence:

It is only by having stable base areas that the New People's Army can wage a protracted people's war. From these stable base areas, it can advance wave upon wave against the enemy. By building stable base areas to encircle the city, the biggest graveyard of the

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enemy forces is created. It is here in the countryside that the enemy is compelled to spread out thinly and [is] destroyed piece by piece over a long period of time. It is here in the countryside that the enemy becomes exhausted and defeated before the main forces of the New People's Army march on the cities to seize power, with the help of the workers in general strike or in general uprising together with the urban petty bourgeoisie.[40]

The NPA initially attempted to establish base areas in the remote provinces of Isabela and Quezon. In mid-1972, however, government forces got wind of the operation when they discovered a fishing vessel, the *Karagatan*, grounded off the northern coast of Quezon Province. The boat, from a still-unknown source abroad, was fully loaded with arms and ammunition intended for the NPA. This led to a major counterinsurgency effort in the region that took a heavy toll on NPA forces.

The *Karagatan* affair and the imposition of martial law forced the CPP to reexamine the relevance of the Maoist model to the Philippine case. The result was contained in Amado Guerrero's analysis, which appeared in 1974 under the title "Specific Characteristics of Our People's War." In the chapter on "Fighting in a Small Mountainous Archipelago," Guerrero provided an original formulation of party strategy. Revolutionary struggle in the Philippines would have to be guided by three geographic conditions:

First, our countryside is shredded into so many islands. Second, our biggest islands, Luzon and Mindanao, are separated by such a clutter of islands as the Visayas. Third, our small country is separated by seas from other countries.[41]

Under such conditions, Guerrero reasoned, it would be impossible to establish any single large liberated area as Mao did in Yenan. "In a small, fragmented country like the Philippines," he continued, "it would be foolhardy for the central leadership to ensconce itself in one limited area . . . and consequently invite the enemy to concentrate his own forces there." Rather, the party should strive to create guerrilla fronts in "a few major islands first, then the other islands later."[42] A guerrilla front, according to this program, would encompass several adjacent towns and villages and would consist of a party organ, an NPA unit, and a network of mass organizations. Given the highly fragmented terrain and diverse ethnolinguistic groups in the country, each guerrilla front should be as self-sufficient as possible. To achieve this, he said:

We must distribute and develop throughout the country cadres who are of sufficiently high quality to find their own bearing and maintain initiative not only within periods as short as one or two months, but also within periods as long as two or more years, in case the enemy chooses to concentrate on an island or a particular fighting front and blockade it.[43]

The best cadres were often sent to the regional committees and guerrilla fronts rather than concentrated at party headquarters. They were given a great measure of autonomy and urged to rely on their own initiative in applying party policy to local circumstances. The Central Committee of the party, in turn, limited its role to the formulation of general policies and guidelines. Guerrero summed this up as "Centralized Leadership and Decentralized Operations."

There were several advantages to the new strategy. The party could exercise a high degree of flexibility. Small integrated units were better adapted to strike roots in local cultures, such as the Kalinga and Bontok in the isolated northern areas of Luzon. They had the autonomy and initiative to experiment with different tactics in implementing general party policies.

The strategy received a severe test in 1976–77, when government forces captured the top leadership of the party, including Sison. Despite these arrests and some defections, both CPP and NPA membership has, by all estimates, increased. Although the strategy of decentralized operations carries a serious risk of deteriorating into isolated fiefdoms, there has been no evidence of such a trend. For example, evidence suggesting an effective network of leadership and communication was displayed to one Western reporter by NPA cadres at a Mindanao rebel camp. Political direction of the NPA appears to remain as cohesive as it was before the new strategy was launched, though little is known about current CPP leaders. (Philippine military intelligence has identified Rafael Baylosis, a University of the Philippines graduate, as the party's new secretary general.)[44]

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[40]New People's Army (NPA), "Basic Document," 1969. This document, along with many other CPP/NPA and PKP/HMB statements, were captured by government forces and published by the Armed Forces of the Philippines in 1970 under the title, *So the People May Know*. Much of the material was also serialized in a pre-martial law Manila daily newspaper, the *Philippines Herald*.

[41]Amado Guerrero, "Specific Characteristics of People's War in the Philippines," Oakland, CA, International Association of Filipino Patriots, 1979, pp. 7–8.

[42]Ibid., p. 9.

[43]Ibid.

[44]Mark Fineman, "Marcos Regime Loses Control of Strategic Island to Rebels," *The Miami Herald*, May 13, 1984; Rodney Tasker, "Elusive Law and Order," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, July 5, 1984, pp. 12–14.

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As the new guidelines went into effect, NPA units set aside their weapons and began political work in the main areas designated by the party. The number of NPA clashes with government forces declined after 1975, giving the false impression that the communists had been rooted out by the Army. Government troops were reassigned to the southern Philippines to fight the Muslim secessionists led by the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF). This gave the NPA several years of valuable time to pursue clandestine work and political activity, as well as to establish local guerrilla fronts and develop strong and reliable local support. By 1980, on the occasion of the 11th anniversary of the New People's Army, a statement was published in *Ang Bayan*, the CPP newspaper, declaring that conditions were right for the NPA to resume the military offensive.[45]

In the 1980 statement, the NPA claimed to have 26 guerrilla fronts scattered among the islands of Luzon, the Visayas, and the Christian provinces of Mindanao. Of these, 13 were considered large, covering 12 to 23 municipalities; 6 were medium-sized, covering 8 to 11 municipalities; and 7 were small, covering 5 to 7 municipalities. The fronts were widely distributed, this document asserts, covering many areas that had no history of revolutionary activity. By the end of 1983, according to CPP figures, party membership had increased threefold, from 10,000 to 30,000, and the number of NPA soldiers, full- or part-time, had expanded from 8,000 to 20,000.[46] Due to this increase in CPP members, the NPA was able to expand into new territories. The number of guerrilla fronts increased to 45. Branching out from their strongholds in the north, the communists established influence in southern and central Luzon, and in parts of the southern island of Mindanao where previously only Muslim insurgents had been active.[47] With rich natural resources and deep-water ports, Mindanao is potentially of both military and economic importance. Defense Minister Juan Ponce Enrile acknowledged that island as the region where the NPA problem had intensified the most, citing at least 16 guerrilla fronts.[48]

The NPA "attacks soldiers, policemen, suspected government informers and rural officials whom it considers corrupt, but usually does not harm ordinary villagers," reports Robert Trumbull of *The New York Times*.[49] He describes a typical NPA attack to acquire arms and ammunition that occurred in the town of Claveria, 25 miles from the major Mindanao city of Davao. About 100 "polite but determined" raiders appeared suddenly one Saturday noon. "They said they wouldn't harm us and they didn't" said one official. They quickly located the local police armory, took a dozen or so rifles, a typewriter, and a calculator, and left. "It was all over in 15 minutes," the official said. In the rugged Mountain Province on Luzon, two hundred miles north of Manila, there were reported to be 600 guerrillas led by Father Conrado Balweg, a rebel priest and reputedly the NPA's highest ranking leader still at large. Balweg claimed his men had killed 21 soldiers in ambushes between April 10 and June 30, 1984.[50] It is in skirmishes like these that the NPA apparently obtains most of its weapons.

In certain cases, "sparrow units" of two or three NPA guerrillas will kill government officials in rapid hit-and-run attacks. "It's rough justice," says Jose Diokno, a leading political opponent of Marcos, "but in their way the NPA is doing what the Government should be doing."[51] Such daylight assassinations have lately become more common, especially on Mindanao; in a two-week period during November 1983, at least 31 such killings were reported in Davao. In that city alone, according to local reporters, there were 56 additional NPA assassinations (including several of ordinary traffic policemen, a favorite local target) in the first half of 1984.[52] On May 24, 1984, Brigadier General Thomas Karingal, superintendent of Manila's northern police district, was shot, gangland style, as he sat down for dinner in a restaurant. Police originally suspected organized crime syndicates, but later claimed to have uncovered "an unholy alliance between crime gangs and drug syndicates and the New People's Army."[53]

In addition to hit-and-run ambushes and raids, there have been NPA attacks on fixed government installations and short-term takeovers and occupations of municipalities in areas where the guerrillas have strong local support. Large-scale ambushes, involving company-sized units, have also become more common. On September 29, 1983, about 70 NPA guerril-

[45]NPA, "Statement on the Eleventh Anniversary of the New People's Army," *Ang Bayan*, Mar. 29, 1980.

[46]Guy Sacerdoti, "Red 'Army' on the March," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, June 28, 1984, pp. 40–41.

[47]Rodney Tasker, loc. cit.

[48]Ibid.

[49]Robert Trumbull, "Filipino Communist Rebels Press Attacks on Army and Corruption," *The New York Times*, Nov. 30, 1983.

[50]Carmel Pizarro, "Military Steps Up Drive Vs NPA in Mountain Province," *Business Day* (Manila), in *FBIS–APA*, July 11, 1984, p. P/4; *The Washington Post*, July 11, 1984.

[51]Trumbull, loc. cit.

[52]William Branigin, "Philippine Communist Rebels Press Ahead With Insurgency," *The Washington Post*, Dec. 11, 1983; Tasker, loc. cit.

[53]Ibid., July 11, 1984.

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las ambushed and killed 39 soldiers and 7 civilians riding in an armored weapons carrier on patrol northwest of Zamboanga on Mindanao. This was the highest death toll suffered by government forces since NPA operations began in 1969.[54] Almost every day in 1983 saw at least one NPA action against government authority somewhere in the country.

In 1984, there were several reports of NPA efforts to disrupt the May parliamentary elections. In Samar, for example, 427 ballot boxes were snatched by the NPA on election day. Around the country, more than 60 government troops were killed by the NPA on that day alone.[55] Altogether, according to Marcos, communist guerrillas were responsible for the deaths of 4,922 Philippine soldiers and civilians in the three years ending in August 1984.[56] "We have to face up to the fact that if we do not weaken the NPA subversives now," said Marcos, "later on they'll be marching in the streets here and proclaiming a takeover of the government."[57]

Overall, a valuable assessment of the NPA is available in the 1983 US Congressional testimony of James A. Kelly of the US Defense Department, which is worth quoting at some length:

The New People's Army ... remains the principal organized security challenge to the Philippine government. It has an estimated guerrilla strength of about 10,000 with perhaps less than seventy-five percent

[54]For more details of this and other NPA clashes with government forces, see also Belinda Aquino, loc. cit.; "NPA Wipes Out 39 Soldiers," *Ang Katipunan*, November 1983, p. 4; and Fred Poole and Max Vanzi, *Revolution in the Philippines*, New York, McGraw-Hill, 1984, Ch. 8.

[55]Sacerdoti, loc. cit.

[56]*The Washington Post*, Aug. 9, 1984.

[57]Ibid., May 27, 1984.

Guerrillas of the New People's Army photographed in northern Luzon, fall 1983.

—Owen Franken/SYGMA.

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possessing arms. The NPA is active to varying degrees in nearly all areas of the country. About one-fourth of all villages are affected by guerrilla activity; the most affected areas currently are in Northeast and Southeast Luzon and Eastern Mindanao. Guerrillas remain militarily inferior to the Philippine Armed Forces but are able to carry out successful limited actions to acquire weapons.

1983 appears to have been the most active year in the long-standing government-insurgent struggle. Government casualties were their highest ever, although still substantially lower than ... at the height of its conflict with the MNLF. The upsurge of the NPA is not, however, a result of the Aquino assassination, which apparently has not caused communist leaders to alter their basic antigovernment strategy. Political developments in Manila remain secondary to the pursuit of rural-based armed struggle....

We do not know how many non-combatant NPA supporters there are among the Filipino people, but NPA efforts to build more support in the countryside have been impressive. Insurgents have downplayed ideology and emphasized numerous local economic and social grievances. Non-combatant supporters provide important intelligence, logistics, and security assistance.[58]

The Philippine government has responded in a number of ways. The overall size of the military as noted earlier, has increased greatly. All local police forces have been consolidated under the Integrated National Police (INP). "Intelligence units" and local militia added to the above give the government approximately half a million troops at its command.

By mid-1984, the government was claiming some successes in its struggle against the NPA. Several of its leading organizers have reportedly been captured. On April 15, the military raided an NPA safe house and took into custody Pantaleon Parasi, allegedly a secretary of the CPP, along with weapons and documents revealing plans to mount attacks during the May 14 elections. On July 7, armed forces chief General Fabian Ver reported the capture of Judith Acosta, likewise reputed to be one of the CPP's leaders. In larger engagements on Mindanao, the military claims that, in the first five months of 1984, some 320 NPA guerrillas were killed and 300 captured, as against government losses of about 180 troops.[59]

Despite the increase in government forces and in anti-NPA combat battalions, and the transfer of military units from MNLF areas to NPA areas, communist guerrillas remain active. "It isn't because people like the [communist] ideology," says Reverend Oscar Millar, Rector of Xavier University in Mindanao, "They're the only opposition really."[60] Some have argued that it is precisely the increase in government forces that has led to the resurgence of communist activity. Bishop Francisco Claver blames the military directly: "The biggest factor that makes the communists viable are your abuses, the way the military steals from people, robs them, kills them, tortures them. There are social injustices but the main problem is your men."[61] Abuses of military authority have been widely noted and condemned by national and international human rights groups; among these was the Philippine Bishops' Conference, which circulated a pastoral letter in February 1983 denouncing "the torture and murder of citizens simply because they are of a different political persuasion from that of present or would-be power-holders."[62]

Outside observers have noted this political dimension of the guerrilla conflict. Kelley, for example, has testified that US military analysts

believe Manila can cope with the present level and pace of insurgency. But that insurgency could reach critical proportions in future years if the government fails to improve its credibility and implement an effective counter-insurgency program which incorporates political and economic, as well as military components.[63]

Publicly, at least, the Filipino high command agrees; Defense Minister Enrile has said that the communist campaign affected "the hearts and minds of our peo-

[58] Testimony of James A. Kelley, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, in US Congress, House of Representatives, *FY 1985 Security Assistance for the Philippines*, Hearings before the Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs, Feb. 7, 1984, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1984, p. 9.

[59] *FBIS–APA*, Apr. 19, 1984, p. P/2; ibid., July 10, 1984, pp. P/6–7; ibid., July 13, 1984, p. P/6.

[60] As quoted in E.S. Browning, "Communist NPA Slowly Gains Influence in Philippines," *Asian Wall Street Journal*, July 4, 1983.

[61] Ibid. See also Claver's testimony in US Congress, House of Representatives, *Human Rights in the Philippines*, Hearings before the Subcommittee on Human Rights and International Organizations, Sept. 22, 1983, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1983, p. 25. In a similar vein, Trumbull, loc. cit., reports a statement by Mayor Aquilino Pimentel of Cagayan de Oro that in some areas NPA forces were regarded as liberators; Samuel Occena, a prominent Davao lawyer, concurs that the NPA "has grown tremendously" because of the repressive policies of the Marcos government and the corruption and economic exploitation attributed to some of the president's associates.

[62] *Honolulu Star-Bulletin*, Feb. 21, 1983.

[63] Kelley, loc. cit.

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Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos, second from left, at an October 2, 1983, meeting on security matters with Defense Minister Juan Ponce Enrile, left; General Fabian Ver, Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, second from right; and Lt. General Fidel Ramos, Chief of the Philippine Constabulary, right.

—Asiaweek News Service.

ple," and that the government should handle it with caution. "If we fail, we will not only lose our lives as fighting men, we will lose the support of our people."[64] But, while a few military offenders have been disciplined or dismissed, the problem of military abuses continues.

As the Philippine government gropes for an effective way to deal with the communist resurgence, NPA units have been very careful to avoid getting caught the way the HMB was three decades ago. They remain in the countryside in areas where they are sure of local support. They maintain high mobility with small, highly self-sufficient units, avoiding direct confrontations with government troops in positional combat. As a consequence, while they can hardly claim any major military victory, they have been successful in avoiding a crushing defeat. This no-win, no-lose situation may be a gain for the movement as a whole. All that the NPA has to do is to survive, and to maintain its credibility as a fighting force with occasional ambushes, in order to keep its revolutionary prospects alive, while causing considerable harm to the public image of the regime. Progress in this kind of conflict is measured not in terms of the military balance, but, more important, in terms of the impact on mobilization of a mass opposition throughout the country. This is the task of the political coalition organized by the CPP, the National Democratic Front.

[64]Tasker, loc. cit.

The National Democratic Front

The large majority of both CPP and NPA cadres do not fight on the active guerrilla fronts. Most work in rural barrios and poor urban communities, in factories and on plantations, in churches, hospitals, schools, and even government offices. Their efforts to "isolate enemy diehards" politically and to combat "imperialists, feudalists, and bureaucratic capitalists" are coordinated by the National Democratic Front.

In areas where guerrilla fronts have been well established, notably Isabela and Cagayan in northeast-

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ern Luzon, the NDF functions as a de facto "government." It collects taxes, implements land reform programs, organizes public works and schools, and administers "revolutionary justice."[65] In urban areas, the NDF provides a focus for opposition to the Marcos government. Even before the Aquino assassination, the NDF was able to mobilize thousands of Filipinos for strikes and demonstrations.

The NDF was established by the CPP on April 24, 1973, when a Preparatory Commission for the National Democratic Front announced a 10-Point Program, as follows:[66]

1. Unite all anti-imperialist and democratic forces to overthrow the US-Marcos dictatorship and work for the establishment of a coalition government based on a truly democratic system of representation.

2. Expose and oppose US imperialism as the mastermind behind the setting up of the fascist dictatorship, struggle for the nullification of all unequal treaties and arrangements with this imperialist power, and call for the nationalization of all its properties in the country.

3. Fight for the reestablishment of all democratic rights of the people, such as freedom of speech, the press, assembly, association, movement, religious belief, and the right to due process.

4. Gather all possible political and material support for the armed revolution and the underground against the US-Marcos dictatorship.

5. Support a genuine land reform program that can liberate the peasant masses from feudal and semifeudal exploitation and raise agricultural production through cooperation.

6. Improve the people's livelihood, guarantee the right to work, and protect national capital against foreign monopoly capital.

7. Promote a national, scientific, and mass culture and combat imperialist, feudal, and fascist culture.

8. Support the national minorities, especially those in Mindanao and the mountain provinces, in their struggle for self-determination and democracy.

9. Punish, after public trial, the ringleaders of the Marcos fascist gang for their crimes against the people and confiscate all their ill-gotten wealth.

10. Unite with all peoples fighting imperialism and all reaction, and seek their support for the Philippine revolutionary struggle.

The constitutent organizations of the NDF include: May First Movement (KMU), Christians for National Liberation (CNL), Nationalist Youth (KM), League of Filipino Students (LFS), Youth for Nationalism and Democracy, Nationalist Health Association (MASAPA), and Association of Nationalist Teachers (KAGUMA). While the first three groups existed before, as noted, and continue to conduct some activities independently of both the CPP and the NDF, little is known about the others, or about the internal decision-making process within the NDF.[67]

Among the movement's potential allies, the NDF founding document gives special attention to the Muslim groups in the southern Philippines fighting for secession or greater autonomy:

We salute the Moro people and those leading them in a resolute armed struggle for national self-determination. So long as they are confronted with a regime as oppressive as that of the U.S.-Marcos dictatorship, they are completely correct in going to the length of fighting for secession.

We are prepared to develop further relations with the Moro National Liberation Front, the Bangsa Moro Army and other Moro organizations. They have all the right to fight the imperialists and their puppets for grabbing their lands and other resources and for exploiting the people.[68]

CPP chairman Amado Guerrero, too, has called for strong party ties with the MNLF: "The CPP and the MNLF are bound by similar goals and by the need to struggle against a common enemy. So there is a wide basis for their unity, cooperation and coordination."[69] There were other, important personal ties between the CPP and the MNLF. Nur Misuari, founder and secretary general of the MNLF, had met Guerrero when the two were at the University of the Philippines. They were also both active in the KM youth organization.

Nevertheless, there is little evidence of any coordinated or even parallel activities on the part of

[65] For more details, see Rocamora, "Turning Point: The NDF Takes The Lead," *Southeast Asia Chronicle*, April 1982; and Nemenzo, "The Current Philippine Crisis," paper delivered at a Joint Seminar of the Department of Political and Social Change and the Department of International Relations of the Research School of Pacific Studies, Australian National University, Canberra, Oct. 20, 1983.

[66] The program with an explanatory text was published in the *Southeast Asia Chronicle*, June 1980, p. 7.

[67] For a brief account of the NDF, see Staar, op. cit. For more information, see the special issue of *Southeast Asia Chronicle*, April 1982, esp. Rocamora, "Turning Point"; and Robert Rose, "Inside the Philippine Revolution: With The New People's Army." The NDF Publishes a monthly, *Liberation*, in English, much of which reappears in *Ang Katipunan*.

[68] *Southeast Asia Chronicle*, June 1980, p. 7.

[69] *WHO*, Dec. 12, 1981, as quoted by Wilfrido Villacorta, "The Philippine Political System," Waseda University Lecture Series, "Lecture III: The Non-Legal Opposition," Tokyo, May 1982, p. 5.

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

Members of the May First Movement (KMU—a constituent member of the National Democratic Front) demonstrating for a boycott of the May 1984 National Assembly elections.

—Christopher Morris/BLACK STAR.

the MNLF and the NDF. As long as there was strong MNLF pressure, or even hope, for secession, that organization had little to gain from an alliance with northern, ethnically Filipino communists of Christian background. But the MNLF has been weakened by internal factionalism, by significant government concessions, and by the threat of renewed repression. For several years, it has been a largely dormant force. If hopes for secession do dissipate, pressure for reform within the Philippine Republic could lead to a working alliance with the NDF.

A more likely NDF ally, though, is the radical Catholic community. Indeed, one of the most important factors behind the rapid growth of the NDF is the spread of radical views among the Philippine clergy.[70] Historically, the Catholic church has been a very important—and a very conservative—institution in a largely Christian nation. Its anticommunist views figured prominently in the government's counterinsurgency campaigns of the 1950's. The PKP, in its early days, was correspondingly anticlerical and atheistic. However, significant departures began in the mid-1960's. According to one major group in the new Christian Left:

The reforms initiated by the Vatican II Council ... stirred the Roman Catholic Church in the Philippines from its apathy on many social questions. The liberalization process helped us to make our liturgy relevant to our needs and culture. More important, the reforms allowed us to get close to the basic masses, understand their just demands, apply the scientific method to the study of the nation's problems, and lift from our eyes various theological and pastoral blinders.[71]

In the new spirit of ecumenism, Catholics started dialogues not only with Protestants but also with Marxists. Several religious organizations were formed, mostly by young seminarians and students at religious schools, to pursue social and economic reforms. These included the Christian Social Movement, the Young Christian Socialists, the Laymen's Association for the Post–Vatican II Reforms, as well as several others. Religious activists encountered political activists in the street demonstrations and mass meetings of the early 1970's. Police crackdowns on the protesters had a unifying and radicalizing effect on the disparate opposition groups.

The radicalization of the Christian social reform movement followed several routes. There were mass meetings, organizing campaigns, and "politicial actions" aimed at giving the church a more active role in practicing liberation theology. Theological and pastoral concerns merged, enabling Christians "to discover the revolutionary dimensions of the Gospel and to discern guidance of the Spirit in salvation history as it is being shaped by the masses."[72] Some, including priests and nuns, joined the CPP and fully embraced Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought. Others were willing to work with the communists but unwilling to accept their ideology. Still others attempted to formulate a revolutionary alternative to both capitalism and communism.

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[70]For a good survey of current political activities and views of Philippine religious groups, see Earl Martin, "The Philippine Church Amidst Revolution," *Peace Section Newsletter* (Akron, PA), published by the Mennonite Central Committee, September–October 1982. Also see the special issue on the Philippines of *Asian Action* (Bangkok), published by the Asian Cultural Forum on Development, September–October 1983.

[71]Christians for National Liberation (CNL), "We Are Christians and Revolutionaries," Feb. 17, 1981, published in *Philippine Resistance* (Oakland, CA), No. 4–5, 1981, pp. 5–6.

[72]Ibid.

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On February 17, 1972, some 200 of these radical Christians formally established the Christians for National Liberation (CNL). Its first chairman was a Catholic priest, Fr. Edicio de la Torre of the Society of the Divine Word. Although the CNL was soon declared illegal and de la Torre was subsequently arrested, the organization has expanded considerably. In April 1973, CNL became one of the founding members of the NDF. It attempts to provide several important services to the NDF, including assistance in the transportation of cadres; care for wounded NPA fighters; assistance in the underground communications system; and organizational, propaganda, and educational work. A number of priests, nuns, and other CNL members also joined the NPA.

In May 1973, a revolutionary but anticommunist Christian group was formed: the Nagkakaisang Partido Demokratiko-Sosyalista ng Pilipinas (The United Democratic Socialist Party of the Philippines, or "Soc-Dem"). The Soc-Dems have been very secretive; almost nothing is known about their leadership or membership. They have a military organization, the SANDIGAN, because, in their own words, "when the political struggle of the organized masses is frustrated by the fascistic violence of the imperialist, big bourgeois and feudal interests who now wield state power, such as happens in a situation of fascist martial law, the people's struggle necessarily escalates to the military level."[73] However, their statements indicate that Soc-Dems "do not share the dialectical materialist view of man and the world.... Nor does the party share [communist] anti-democratic attitudes and repressive methods. Neither does it assent to the communist rejection of religion." Thus, despite its militant stance, the Soc-Dem party appears to be strongly opposed to any alliance with the communists:

The [party] maintains a policy of complete autonomy and independence from the two communist parties— the traditional, pro-Soviet and the Maoist. The party will certainly not enter into alliance with these parties, because both of them are anti-democratic and totalitarian in outlook. The communists still reject the very principle of democratic alternation in power. They still insist on the "dictatorship of the proletariat," which in effect means dictatorship by their respective factions of the communist movements. They still assert the privileged position of pseudo-scientific dialectical materialist philosophy, and are still possessed by a thinly disguised militantly atheistic and anti-religious spirit.[74]

Father Edicio de la Torre, first chairman of Christians for National Liberation, a radical Christian group that belongs to the National Democratic Front and cooperates with the New People's Army.

—Asiaweek News Service.

By the start of 1980, Soc-Dem had suffered at least two factional splits. One group, the April 6 Liberation Movement, dropped the anticommunist line from its program. Its Central Committee made the interesting observation that, while "the NPA could not make much headway for many years because of their underestimation of the deep anti-communist dimension in Filipino populist political culture," martial law had attracted many religious activists to the NPA and the NDF and had "certainly gone a long way in helping the NPA combat the dominant political culture of equating communism with 'godless totalitarianism.' "[75] The chief distinction of the April 6 Liberation Movement, however, is its advocacy of urban guerrilla warfare. For example, a rash of bombings in Manila in August and September 1980 has been attributed to this faction. Less is known about the other Soc-Dem breakaway faction, the Philippine Christian Socialist Party. It has been reported that it has no military force of its own but that it has some ties with the NDF.

[73] "Political Line of the Nagkakaisang Partido Demokratiko-Sosyalista ng Pilipinas," 1979 (mimeo).

[74] Ibid.

[75] April 6 Liberation Movement (A6LM) Central Committee, *The Philippine Struggle*, San Francisco, CA, Filipino Information Service, 1981, pp. 56–57.

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In recent years, as an increasing number of groups became alienated from the Marcos government, the NDF revised its 10-Point Program. The purpose was to establish a broader organizational framework to integrate more diverse opposition groups; the unifying themes were resistance to the Marcos government and to its American connection. One of the first manifestations of this broadened united front strategy was the boycott movement to protest the presidential election of June 1981. In February of that year, the NDF and a coalition of other groups formed the People's Opposition to the Plebiscite-Election (PEOPLE). They soon joined forces with the United Democratic Opposition (UNIDO), the main coalition of the moderate, pre–martial law political opposition, headed by former Senator Salvador Laurel. The new grouping, which called itself the People's Movement for Nationalism and Democracy (People's MIND), advocated a boycott of the presidential election, elimination of US military bases, and implementation of tighter controls on multinational corporations. In this fashion, the NDF was able to get its agenda more widely shared among opposition groups.

The boycott succeeded in greatly reducing voter turnout, though Marcos still claimed victory against token opposition. More significant, perhaps, were the working relations that the NDF achieved with other anti-Marcos elements. "Almost all moderate groups and personages now maintain links with the NDF," claimed *Liberation*, the official NDF publication.[76] In addition, the 1981 election boycott showed that the NDF could mobilize thousands of rural Filipinos.

The NDF also helped organize the boycott campaign against the National Assembly elections in May 1984. Several prominent Filipino politicians joined the NDF boycott, including Agapito Aquino, younger brother of the slain opposition leader; Lorenzo Tanada of the Nationalist Alliance for Justice, Freedom, and Democracy; and former Senator Jose Diokno, of the old Nacionalista Party, now head of KAAKBAY (Movement for Philippine Sovereignty and Democracy).[77]

The NDF appears to be well situated to take advantage of the current popular disenchantment with the Marcos government. It has begun a national membership campaign to capitalize on popular discontent and to build stronger ties with other anti-Marcos groups. It claims to have over 50,000 full-time organizers at work in two-thirds of the country's provinces. It also claims membership in constituent mass organizations of 1 million Filipinos, with a mass base of popular support among 10 million Filipinos. Apparently confident of its political base, the NDF has lately put greater emphasis on military operations. The organization may use parliamentary struggle to help achieve its objectives, but "the real united front for the people's democratic revolution," in the words of Amado Guerrero, "is one for waging armed struggle."[78] The revised 1982 NDF platform claims that the level of armed struggle has reached a new height, the "advanced substage for strategic defense," i.e., that the NPA is capable of launching coordinated though limited tactical offensives.[79]

Despite these optimistic claims, the NDF appears to be strongest in the most remote areas of the country. In urban areas, it has just begun to exert its influence. "While there is a need for anti-dictatorship forces to persevere in militant struggle in Metro Manila," reports the September 1983 issue of *Liberation*, "it would be foolhardy at this point to encourage widespread armed confrontation." The article continues:

To do so is to invite disaster. Not until the peoples armed forces in the countryside have gained enough strength to lay a siege around the capital, and the city's population is sufficiently prepared, will the outbreak of an armed uprising lead to a decisive victory for the people.... Notwithstanding its defensive character, the urban struggle has to be fully developed to wring crucial democratic concessions, heat up the fighting mood of the people, and hasten the regime's political isolation.[80]

Thus, the NDF appears to recognize that more preparation is needed for the political struggle and repression that will probably erupt after Marcos relinquishes power. Indeed, it will probably be some years before the NDF gains enough strength to make a serious bid for power.

Conclusion

Looking back over a turbulent quarter century of Philippine communism, one can see that the failure of the postwar Huk rebellion and the virtual collapse of the old PKP was not primarily due to the government's military counterinsurgency campaign. Nor did the

[76]National Democratic Front (NDF), *Liberation* (Manila), August–September 1981.

[77]Robert Trumbull, "Anti-Marcos, Anti-U.S. Party Draws Crowd," *The New York Times*, Nov. 6, 1983. The Nationalist Alliance program was published in the *Southeast Asia Chronicle*, December 1983, pp. 12–13.

[78]Guerrero, *Philippine Society and Revolution*, p. 284.

[79]Villacorta, loc. cit., p. 4.

[80]NDF, *Liberation*, September 1983.

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Sino-Soviet split tear the Philippine communist movement apart. It is also by no means clear that party leaders were out of touch with the peasant masses. All these explanations have been offered in one form or another by scholars and other observers of Philippine politics, but none is sufficient. This analysis, in contrast, argues that the PKP failed because of its own basic errors of political analysis, strategy, and tactics. Unwarranted assumptions and ill-conceived strategies isolated the PKP and weakend its capabilities and appeal; it was these internal errors that made the organization highly vulnerable to counterinsurgency efforts.

The rise of the CPP, on the other hand, came about precisely because a new generation of radical nationalists had learned the lessons of the PKP's failures. In response they have developed a Philippine variant of Maoist revolutionary theory. Briefly put, it calls for a rural-based, protracted people's war of highly decentralized guerrilla fronts, combined with parliamentary struggle. In pursuing the last part of this strategy, the new revolutionaries have benefited greatly from the spontaneous upsurge in popular protest after the Aquino assassination.

This combination of radical and popular insurgency comes at a particularly perilous time in Philippine politics. Few opportunities remain for moderate opposition groups to play a major role in national politics. Marcos has dominated Philippine politics for so long that no single person or party has the stature to form an alternative, legitimate government. In the economic sphere, the austerity measures adopted in mid-1984 have not yet taken full effect. It is likely that economic growth will continue to be sluggish or even negative, leading to rising unemployment, greater hardship among the poor, declining living standards for the middle class, and bankruptcies and expatriation of resources by the wealthy. According to many economic analysts, the worst is yet to come.

Therefore, when President Marcos does leave power, most likely in the next few years, it can be expected that the conflicts already evident will intensify. In that case, the major beneficiaries are likely to be the newly politicized military on the right and the newly strengthened CPP–NPA–NDF on the left. This could bring a sharp polarization of Philippine politics and, quite possibly, an escalating spiral of political violence, with no clear solution anywhere on the horizon.

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International Department of the CPSU

Robert W. Kitrinos

As the first communist party to seize and retain power, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union occupies a privileged position in the international communist movement. Indeed, despite periodic challenges to its leadership and a mixed record in protecting and supporting foreign communists, the CPSU remains the dominant actor in this movement. This is largely due to the USSR's ascendancy to superpower status and the advantages this status confers on the CPSU. Thus, the Soviet Union is able to extend political, economic, and organizational assistance to leaders of sympathetic Marxist-Leninist movements in their quest for national power. It also demonstrates the Soviet leadership's willingness to employ assertive and indirect means to support revolutionary movements abroad.

Initiating and coordinating the dissemination of effective propaganda and manipulating sensitive or unstable political situations are critical elements of this aspect of Soviet foreign policy. Such an undertaking requires the establishment of formal and informal channels by which CPSU representatives can regularly meet with sympathetic political leaders, recruit local government officials, conduct propaganda and "disinformation" campaigns, and instruct local surrogates on Soviet policies. Orchestrating this effort, however, is no easy task. Most of these activities cut across traditional institutional and functional lines and potentially involve jurisdictional disputes between the party and the state bureaucracy. To be effective, the institution responsible for overseeing these activities must occupy a privileged position within the Central Committee apparatus, be invested with considerable authority, and be headed by a relatively high-ranking and powerful party member.

The Central Committee's International Department (ID) is such an organization. Until recently, however, the ID was mostly ignored in Western studies of Soviet foreign policy. What little was known was either scattered throughout the literature or buried in the numerous articles on traditional Soviet diplomacy. During the past decade, though, considerable material has surfaced that indicates that the ID plays a far more significant role in Soviet politics than had been previously thought. Indeed, the International Department has been increasingly recognized in the West as the major actor in the CPSU's dealings with nonruling foreign communist movements[1] and as an organization that exercises considerable influence in the formulation of Soviet foreign policy.[2] This essay attempts to piece together this material in order to present a more complete picture of the International Department, noting in particular its origins, organizational structure, relationship with other Soviet institutions, mission, dealings with international and bilateral fronts, and overall effectiveness. It must be pointed out that there are few means of verifying some of this new information, since the inner workings of the department and much of its international activities are regarded as sensitive information and thus shielded by the CPSU.

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[1] See, e.g., Leonard Schapiro, "The International Department of the CPSU: Key to Soviet Policy," *International Journal* (Toronto), Winter 1976–77, pp. 41–55; Jerry F. Hough, "Soviet Policymaking Toward Foreign Communists," *Studies in Comparative Communism* (Los Angeles, CA), Autumn 1982, pp. 167–83; and Vladimir Petrov, "Formation of Soviet Foreign Policy," *Orbis* (Philadelphia, PA), Fall 1973, pp. 819–50.

[2] Schapiro, loc. cit., p. 44.

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Nonetheless, the ID deserves far more comprehensive coverage than it has received to date, and a start must be made somewhere. It is in this vein that the present study was undertaken.

Origin

The International Department today is the product of several reorganizations within the CPSU Central Committee which began in the mid-1940's and were designed to define its role and status. Created in 1943, the year the Communist International (Comintern) was disbanded, the ID was tasked to handle relations with foreign communists.[3] During its first decade and a half, however, the department underwent numerous changes. In 1948, the CPSU Central Committee was reorganized and the ID was renamed the International Relations Department *(Otdel Vneshnikh Snosheniy)*.[4] Two years later, for reasons not known in the West, the International Relations Department was replaced by a Foreign Policy Commission *(Vneshnepoliticheskaya Kommissiya)* and a Department for Cadres of Diplomatic and Foreign Trade Organs *(Otdel Kadrov Diplomaticheskikh i Vneshnetorgovykh Organov)*.[5] Six years after that, in 1955, the Foreign Policy Commission was again renamed, this time reverting to its original designation, the International Department.

These changes were usually accompanied by changes in the department's leadership or a refinement of its mission. While presumably headed at the outset by Andrey Zhdanov (who signed the announce-

[3]Two sources indicate that an "international" section existed within the CPSU Central Committee prior to 1943. In his memoirs, Alexandre Barmine, a former Soviet diplomat stationed in Athens during the late 1930's, notes that he telephoned someone in the foreign bureau of the Central Committee in January 1937 (*One Who Survived*, New York, G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1945, p. 309). Louis Fischer also mentions the existence of a CC bureau, run by Karl Radek, that supplied Stalin with information on the international situation. See his *Men and Politics: An Autobiography*, New York, Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1941, p. 434. These are the only sources I have found that indicate the presence of such a CC section before 1943.

[4]B.A. Abramov, "Organizational-Party Work of the Soviet Communist Party in the Years of the Fourth 5-Year Plan," *Voprosy istorii KPSS* (Moscow), March 1979, p. 64.

[5]Ibid.

Headquarters building on Old Square, in central Moscow, of the CPSU CC Secretariat.

—*Der Spiegel* (Hamburg), Feb. 20, 1984, p. 123.

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ment dissolving the Comintern),[6] the new department was reportedly first run by Dmitriy Manuil'skiy, then by Georgiy Dimitrov.[7] The ID's first deputy chief appears to have been Boris N. Ponomarëv who, having served as a Soviet representative on the Comintern's Executive Committee (1936–43),[8] brought to the position a wealth of experience in managing the international communist movement. The department's primary function during this formative stage was presumably to maintain the CPSU's links with the outside world through its contacts with foreign communists.

Three events in the late 1940's seem to have significantly enhanced Ponomarëv's career and, by extension, the political fortunes of the ID, of which he became chief in 1955: his appointment as first deputy chief of the newly established Communist Information Bureau (Cominform) in 1947;[9] the election of Mikhail Suslov to the Central Committee Secretariat the same year; and the sudden death of Zhdanov the following year, on August 31, 1948.[10] Under the tutelage of his new mentor, Suslov, Ponomarëv rose to prominence in the CPSU Central Committee and continued to benefit from Suslov's 35-year reign as a dominant figure in the formulation of Soviet foreign and domestic policy. Ponomarëv became a candidate member of the CC in 1952, a full member in 1956, and a secretary in 1961. Little is known about the department's status within the Soviet system or about its activities between 1949 and 1955, though Ponomarëv's writings during this period suggest that he was primarily concerned with the rise of West European socialists and with Tito's pursuit of an independent policy.[11]

Following the decisions of the 1957 Conference of World Communist Parties, the Cominform was disbanded, the journal *Problems of Peace and Socialism* founded, and the International Department's section

Vadim Zagladin, first deputy director of the CPSU's International Department, during an interview in Stockholm.

—Reportagebild.

that dealt with ruling communist parties split off to become a separate Central Committee Department—the Department for Liaison with the Workers' and Communist Parties.[12] The International Department retained responsibility for relations with nonruling communist

[6]Gunther Nollau, *International Communism and World Revolution: History and Methods*, London, Hollis and Carter, 1961, p. 212. Barton Whaley, in perhaps the earliest study discussing the International Department in detail, suggests that the department's original chief was Aleksandr Shcherbakov (1943–45), followed by Georgiy Malenkov, Zhdanov, perhaps Aleksey Kirichenko, and then Ponomarëv. See his *Soviet Clandestine Communication Nets*, Cambridge, MA, Center for International Studies, MIT, September 1969, p. 60. Recent studies by Werner Hahn and by Gavriel Ra'anan, however, indicate that Zhdanov was the original head of the ID. See Hahn's *Post-War Soviet Politics: The Fall of Zhdanov and the Defeat of Moderation, 1946–1953*, Ithaca, NY, Cornell University Press, 1982, pp. 219–20; and Ra'anan's *International Policy Formation in the USSR: Factional "Debates" during the Zhdanovshchina*, Hamden, CN, Archon Books, 1983, pp. 13, 25, 28.

[7]Milovan Djilas, *Conversations with Stalin*, New York, Harcourt, Brace and World, 1962, p. 24. See also Hough, loc. cit., p. 169.

[8]Biographical data on Ponomarëv present contradictory accounts of his whereabouts between 1944 and 1948. One source maintains that he was deputy director of the Institute of Marx, Engels and Lenin from 1943 to 1945, while also serving as deputy head of an unidentified CPSU CC department (1944–46). See Edward L. Crowley, Andrew I. Lebed, and Heinrich E. Schulz, *Prominent Personalities in the USSR*, Metuchen, NJ, Scarecrow Press, 1968. Another source has him as deputy director of the Marx, Engels and Lenin Institute from 1943 to 1944 and deputy head of a CPSU Central Committee department from 1944 to 1946 and again from perhaps 1948 to 1955. See Alexander G. Bahr, Compiler, "A Biographic Directory of 100 Leading Soviet Officials," trans. by Stelianos Scarlis, *Radio Liberty Research Bulletin* (Munich), Feb. 10, 1981, pp. 162–63. Interestingly, Hough places Ponomarëv as the first deputy head of the CC "international information department" (1944–46), citing as his source the Feb. 8, 1979, edition of *Kalininskaya pravda* (loc. cit., p. 169).

[9]Elizabeth Teague, "The Foreign Departments of the Central Committee of the CPSU," *Radio Liberty Research Bulletin*, Oct. 27, 1980, Supplement, p. 8.

[10]For an in-depth analysis of the political infighting between the Zhdanov and Malenkov factions and the circumstances surrounding Zhdanov's sudden death, see Ra'anan, op. cit. See also *Russkaya Mysl'* (Paris), Dec. 3, 1964, as cited by Michel Tatu, *Power in the Kremlin: From Khrushchev to Kosygin*, New York, Viking, 1969, pp. 202–03.

[11]Teague, loc. cit., p. 10.

[12]For more information on the division of labor between the two departments, see Hough, loc. cit., pp. 171–72; Petrov, loc. cit., pp. 824–27; and Wallace H. Spaulding, "The World Communist Movement and Its Allies," in Ralph M. Goldman, Ed., *Transnational Parties*, Lanham, MD, University Press of America, 1983, pp. 47–50.

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parties. As a result, the ID expanded its activities into what CPSU General Secretary Nikita Khrushchev saw as a new horizon in Soviet foreign relations, namely, the Third World.

Indeed, by the mid-1950's, the Soviet Union had reformulated its policy toward the Third World, revealing a willingness to send arms and economic aid to a large part of the world hitherto ignored by Stalin. But the Soviet bureaucracy was ill-equipped to deal with areas such as the Middle East, since it lacked even well-trained Arabic language specialists.[13] Furthermore, not all members of that bureaucracy were receptive to Khrushchev's courting of noncommunist leaders in Third World nations; thus, in some cases, Politburo decisions were not being implemented.[14] Following several changes in the leadership of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA)—long-time head Vyacheslav Molotov was replaced by Dmitri Shepilov, who was in turn replaced by Andrey Gromyko[15]—the International Department and the Department for Liaison with the Workers' and Communist Parties assumed greater responsibility for ensuring that party foreign policy directives were carried out by government organs.[16] This new role enabled these departments to become more active in the process of formulating and executing Soviet foreign policy.[17]

Organizational Structure

During the late 1950's, the US government estimated the staff of the International Department at between 100 and 150, a figure that is often still quoted today.[18] Owing to the considerable increase in the department's responsibilities since then, the ID may now have as many as 200 employees, but this is only conjecture. The composition of the department is never discussed in the Soviet press,[19] and the only officials ever mentioned are those of the highest rank, such as deputy chiefs or sector heads. Furthermore, to augment its staff, the department essentially functions as an "umbrella" organization, relying on the services of numerous other organizations, such as the research institutes of the USSR Academy of Sciences, the various branches of the Soviet intelligence services, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, international front organizations, and numerous bilateral friendship or cultural societies. Indeed, one specialist familiar with the department's inner workings notes that the ID "can request information on any subject from any government agency, invite for consultation any individual, and communicate directly with any revolutionary organization in the world."[20]

In terms of scope of responsibilities, the International Department has no counterpart in the United States. It incorporates some of the functions that come under the jurisdiction of the National Security Council, the Congressional intelligence and foreign relations committees, the CIA, and even the Departments of State and Labor. The ID is concerned only with political considerations, however; it does not decide military policy or other issues affecting the security of the USSR, as these are the preserve of the Ministry of Defense and the Defense Council.[21]

As the head of the department, Ponomarëv is no doubt more involved in high-level administration than he is in day-to-day supervision of operations. He spends a considerable portion of his time preparing for the weekly meetings of the Politburo and CC Secretariat (including helping to set the agenda),[22] conferring with his deputies on routine as well as pressing issues, and dealing with the heads of the KGB, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Defense, and various research institutes of the Academy of Sciences. He also must attend a variety of official and social functions, give speeches, and greet and see off CPSU as well as foreign dignitaries at the airport. Moreover, he seems to be endlessly consulting with foreign political leaders either abroad or in Moscow.

[13]Mohamed Heikal, *The Cairo Documents*, New York, Doubleday, 1973, pp. 124–25.

[14]Karen Dawisha, "The Limits of the Bureaucratic Politics Model: Observations on the Soviet Case," *Studies in Comparative Communism*, Winter 1980, p. 304.

[15]Ibid; see also Jerry F. Hough and Merle Fainsod, *How the Soviet Union is Governed*, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1979, p. 215.

[16]Dawisha, loc. cit., p. 304. A former CC apparatchik, Abdurakhman Avtorkhanov, disputes this view. He maintains that "the departments of the Central Committee do not have the right to issue instructions or directives either to the minister of foreign affairs or his colleagues on matters of foreign policy." See his *The Communist Party Apparatus*, Cleveland, OH, World Publishing Co., 1966, p. 347.

[17]The ID shared this responsibility with the Department for Liaison with Workers' and Communist Parties of Socialist Countries. See Dawisha, loc. cit., p. 304.

[18]Hough, loc. cit., p. 174.

[19]Ibid.

[20]Petrov, loc. cit., p. 826; and Steven A. Grant, "Soviet Americanists," *US International Communications Agency Research Report* (Washington, DC), R-1-80, Feb. 15, 1980.

[21]For Soviet policymaking on national security issues, see Michael Sadykiewicz, "Soviet Military Politics," *Survey* (London), Winter 1982, pp. 179–210; and Arthur J. Alexander, "Decision-Making on Soviet Weapons Procurement," in Douglas J. Murray and Paul R. Viotti, Eds., *The Defense Policies of Nations: A Comparative Study*, Baltimore, MD, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982, pp. 153–94.

[22]This was certainly likely during Brezhnev's tenure, since secretaries and department heads were required "as a matter of routine to send such information and recommendations to Brezhnev's personal secretariat." See Kenneth A. Meyers and Dimitri Simes, *Soviet Decision Making, Strategic Policy, and SALT*, Washington, DC, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Georgetown University, December 1974, p. 16; and Petrov, loc. cit., pp. 823–24.

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Responsibility for day-to-day affairs appears to have fallen to Vadim V. Zagladin, a full CC member and the department's first deputy chief, who functions as "acting chief" during Ponomarëv's frequent absences.[23] He is generally responsible for West European affairs and is himself a specialist on West Germany. Next in line are six deputy chiefs who are responsible for geographic regions and, in some cases, functional areas: Vitaliy Shaposhnikov (Scandinavian countries and international social organizations); Rostislav Ul'yanovskiy (South Asia; national liberation movements in Asia and Africa); Pëtr Manchkha (Africa); Ivan Kovalenko (Far East); Karen Brutents (Middle East and Latin America); and Anatoliy Chernyayev (North America and the United Kingdom). These men supervise the work of their respective sectors, coordinate this work with their counterparts in the Soviet government, task research institutes to conduct supportive work, receive foreign delegations, brief the Politburo and Secretariat, and oversee Soviet activity in their geographic and functional areas. (See Addendum 1 on pp. 68-74.)

Without exception, these men are experienced and highly qualified. Three (Ul'yanovskiy, Brutents, and Kovalenko) are former academics; the others are journalists[24] (see the biographical sketches in the Appendix). Most are active in organizations that do work in areas of interest to the department. Zagladin, for example, serves on the Board of the State Committee for Science and Technology (GNTK), which assists the Ministry of Foreign Trade and the State Committee for Foreign Economic Relations, as well as the KGB and the Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) of the Ministry of Defense, in determining what technology to procure from the West.[25] Though the acquisition of technology constitutes an important part of Soviet trade with Western Europe, Zagladin is not known to have scientific expertise. (His background is in journalism/propaganda.) Thus, his role is more likely that of a political dignitary familiar with the West and possibly a guide in directing the Soviet intelligence services on potentially cooperative sources where scientific and technical information may be procured most expeditiously from the West.

Ul'yanovskiy is another example. In addition to his responsibilities as department deputy chief, he is a deputy chairman of the Soviet Committee for Solidarity with Asian and African Countries (SKSSAA), the Soviet affiliate of the parent international front group, the Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Organization (AAPSO). The ID uses the Soviet contingent at SKSSAA central headquarters as a conduit to funnel money to AAPSO. The SKSSAA serves several other useful purposes as well: it acts as a buffer between dissident groups and the Soviet Union when these groups need arms or funds; functions as an "unofficial" welcoming committee for those groups to whom the Soviet government does not grant diplomatic recognition and which the CPSU wants to keep at a distance; and serves as a propaganda outlet for the Soviet Union in the Third World. The activities of the SKSSAA are in part overseen by Ul'yanovskiy and the section of the ID that deals with international front groups.

Below the deputy chiefs are numerous sectors organized along geographic-linguistic lines—for example, "Germanic Europe" or "Francophone West Africa"—or along functional lines, such as "International Social Organizations" or "Liaison and Protocol." Heading up these units are sector chiefs who supervise the work of "responsible workers" *(referenty)* and "instructors" *(instruktory)*.[26] (See Figure 1 for an organizational chart of ID personnel responsible for relations with Syria.) Responsible workers may in fact be senior analysts who head the country or functional desks and oversee the work of more junior colleagues. Instructors are apparently responsible for verifying that party decisions are implemented by government agencies (for example, the KGB and Ministry of Foreign Affairs), though they may also be responsible for issuing instructions or directives to pro-Soviet, nonruling communist parties.[27] The task of issuing instructions to Soviet government agencies may be done quite informally (perhaps by making a phone call) or through formal channels, such as sending a department directive to the agency in question.[28] It is through the work of the various sectors that the department maintains contact with nonruling communist parties and revolutionary groups; provides arms and funds to certain groups; oversees the Soviet government agencies charged with implementing policy de-

[23] See, e.g., Teague, loc. cit., p. 39.

[24] It is probably easier for journalists to join the ID given the rigorous screening process they must go through during their careers. Moreover, within the party hierarchy, international affairs journalists are considered more prestigious than academics. See Dimitri K. Simes, "National Security under Andropov," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), January–February 1983, p. 37.

[25] Oleg Penkovsky, *The Penkovsky Papers*, trans. by Peter Deriabin, London, Collins, 1965, pp. 69, 101–03; John Barron, *KGB: The Secret Work of Soviet Secret Agents*, New York, Readers Digest Press, 1974, p. 76; Miles Costik, "The Targets of Soviet Technological Espionage," *Current Analysis* (Washington, DC), Dec. 31, 1982, pp. 15–17; and Henri Regnard, "The Theft of Western Technology," *Journal of Defense and Diplomacy* (McLean, VA), April 1984, pp. 44–48, 64.

[26] Hough and Fainsod, op. cit., p. 422.

[27] Ibid.

[28] Lilita Dzirkals, Thane Gustafson, and A. Ross Johnson, *The Media and Intra-Elite Communication in the USSR*, R-2869, Santa Monica, CA, Rand Corporation, 1982, p. 20.

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Figure 1: Probable ID Chain of Command[1] for Operations in Syria



[1]There is no precise information on the lines of communication and authority between ID representatives abroad and personnel in Moscow.

[2]Although Matuzov has been positively identified as the ID desk officer only for Lebanon, it is likely that he is also responsible for Syria, since ID desk officers are usually responsible for more than one country.

[3]Given Sinel'nikov's prior service as ID representative in Egypt, it is quite likely that he has similar responsibilities in Syria. For a brief account of Sinel'nikov's activities in Egypt, see Addendum 2 by Wallace Spaulding, pp. 74-75; for a fuller account, see Vladimir Sakharov and Umberto Tosi, *High Treason*, New York, G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1980, pp. 248-52.

SOURCES: See Addendum 1, by Wallace Spaulding, on pp. 68-74; US Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Intelligence, *Directory of Soviet Officials: National Organizations*, August 1983, p. 13; and Syrian Arab Republic, Ministry of Foreign Affairs Protocol Department, *Diplomatic Corps in Damascus*, January 1983, p. 203.

cisions; and analyzes intelligence reports and puts them in a framework whereby policy recommendations can be made to the CC Secretariat and Politburo.

There are several sectors within the department, such as "Liaison and Protocol," formerly headed by Deputy Sector Chief Grant Akopov, about which even less is known. For example, there may be a special sector responsible for receiving and storing classified materials from the intelligence services as well as for keeping archives on nonruling communist parties.[29] There may also be a separate sector tasked to handle codes and communications.[30]

Complementing the ID's regular staff is a full-time consultants group, headed by Yuriy Zhilin, which is made up of academics from the research institutes of the USSR Academy of Sciences. Unlike the basic staff of the department, who have enough to do keeping up with the day-to-day developments in their areas, these consultants conduct in-depth research, carry out long-range studies, and help draft major doctrinal statements. They may also assist in writing major speeches.[31] In addition, there are numerous part-time consultants working on specific research projects. The precise number of full- and part-time consultants employed by the ID is not known in the West.[32]

Liaison with Foreign Communists

High-ranking International Department officials meet with representatives of the nonruling communist parties on a regular basis in an effort to coordinate policy, strategy, and tactics. These consultations may take place in Moscow, Eastern Europe, or locally. For example, in the summer of 1979, according to a CIA study of Soviet covert action and propaganda, the leaders of selected West European communist parties visited Moscow, where they were instructed by CPSU representatives (presumably of the International Department) to use their influence on the French and Italian communist parties in order to convince the leaders of those two parties to come into line with So-

[29]See, e.g., Veljko Micunovic, *Moscow Diary*, Garden City, NY, Doubleday, 1980, pp. 101-02.

[30]See Stefan Possony, *Defense and Foreign Affairs* (London), November 1975, p. 9. According to Possony, ID officials on foreign duty have their own system of codes and communications.

[31]Hough, loc. cit., p. 175.

[32]Within the department is a "Secretariat" about which little is known. According to one source, personnel assigned to this group make up the department's office staff or clerical help (Hough and Fainsod, op. cit., p. 422). It is not known whether they are attached to each sector or are part of an administrative affairs section. The "Secretariat" is headed by M.I. Kovalev.

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viet policy toward Western Europe.[33] Prior to this meeting, the CPSU Central Committee had sent a delegation to visit one West European communist party ostensibly to discuss vacations and schooling in the USSR for members of that party. The actual motive for the delegation's visit, according to the CIA study, was to provide the local party's senior officials with advance information and instructions regarding the Soviet position on SALT II and on the projected Carter-Brezhnev summit.[34]

Foreign communists also contribute generally to the Soviet intelligence-gathering effort, sending reports on a regular basis to Moscow on situations or events taking place in their countries. In a broad sense, this amounts to a sharing of intelligence and views. CPSU General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev admitted as much during his speech at the 26th Party Congress in February 1981:

We have regularly briefed fraternal Parties on our internal developments and our actions in the field of foreign policy.... Contacts with foreign communists enable our Party, too, to get a better idea of the situation in individual countries.[35]

There is no pretense, however, that all parties are equals in these exchanges. Indeed, in Moscow's view, the interests of a foreign communist party must be subsumed when necessary to the interests of the CPSU and the Soviet Union. In recent years, some communist parties have balked at the CPSU's application of this principle. For the most part, these have been legal communist parties, such as those in Italy, France, and Japan, whose status permits them to pursue a more independent stance vis-à-vis the CPSU. Illegal communist parties, however, are more reliant on the CPSU for financial and logistical support; hence, they are generally careful not to jeopardize their ties with their patron.[36]

The International Department controls the activities of foreign communists in several ways. One primary source of control, notes Elizabeth Teague, is financing, even if it is sometimes applied indirectly:

What may be a substantial source of revenues for non-ruling CPs is income derived from the large numbers of CP newspapers and journals that are imported by the USSR to be sold throughout the country. These are the only foreign-language Western sources of information freely and regularly available to the Soviet population, so they are assured a steady sale. Soviet displeasure can sometimes be expressed by withdrawing these newspapers from sale; this happened, for example, after the invasion of Czechoslovakia in August, 1968....[37]

Another means by which the department can subsidize foreign communist parties is through the use of trading organizations. According to the testimony of Soviet defector Stanislav Levchenko before the US Congress Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence on July 14, 1982, a foreign trading company will be permitted to import Soviet goods or export foreign goods to the USSR with the provision that 15 to 20 percent of the net profit be delivered to a certain political party.[38] In other cases, the trading company may be wholly owned by the local communist party, as was the case with the Tudeh party in Iran.[39] Finally, and particularly in the case of illegal communist parties, the International Department may use KGB officers

[33]US House of Representatives, Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, *Soviet Covert Action (The Forgery Offensive)*, Hearings before the Subcommittee on Oversight, Feb. 6, 19, 1980, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, p. 82. (Hereafter *Soviet Covert Action*.)

[34]Ibid. In another case, a delegation from a West European communist party met with ID officials in Moscow to discuss a new Soviet propaganda and political action campaign designed to woo the political Left in Western Europe away from NATO and the United States. Delegates were encouraged to open up a dialogue with local social democratic parties, the main target of the offensive, on the subject of disarmament.

[35]*Information Bulletin* (Toronto), April 1981, p. 9.

[36]An example of an illegal communist party that was heavily dependent on the USSR for financial and logistical support was the People's (Tudeh) Party of Iran prior to March 1979, which was forced by circumstances to bear the burden of the shifting trends in Soviet-Iranian relations. In 1959, the Soviet Union created in Baku the clandestine National Voice of Iran (NVOI) in order to lend support to the Tudeh party and to put forth the Soviet position in Iran. During the 1970's, however, another pro-Soviet clandestine radio station, Radio Peyk-i Iran, was closed down when Soviet-Iranian relations improved. And in December 1979, when the Soviet leadership recognized that religious leaders were going to succeed in overthrowing the Shah, Tudeh Secretary General Iraj Iskandari was suddenly removed for having previously gone on record that he would not cooperate with religious leaders "if the matter concerned the creation of a theocratic state." See *Al-Nida* (Beirut), Dec. 17, 1978. For a recent account of Soviet-Iranian relations, see Zalmay Khalilzad, "Islamic Iran: Soviet Dilemma," *Problems of Communism*, January–February 1984, pp. 1–20

[37]Teague, loc. cit., p. 15. According to former KGB Major Stanislav Levchenko, the ID provided foreign communist journalists in Moscow with a personal aide and a monthly stipend of 300 rubles. See John Barron, *KGB Today: The Hidden Hand*, New York, Readers Digest Press, 1983, pp. 60–61.

[38]US House of Representatives, Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, *Soviet Active Measures*, Hearings before the Subcommittee on Oversight, July 13, 14, 1982, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1982, p. 165. (Hereafter *Soviet Active Measures*.)

[39]US Central Intelligence Agency, *The Tudeh Party: Vehicle of Communism in Iran*, ORE 23–49, July 18, 1949 (declassified Apr. 7, 1975), pp. 12–13; and CIA, "Information Report: Historical Sketch of the Tudeh Party," June 30, 1952, (declassified Apr. 7, 1975), p. 5. According to Gholam Husayn Qa'empanah, a member of the Tudeh party's Central Committee, following the revolution in 1978–79, the Tudeh party used a commercial company as a cover to send information to the Soviets and, in turn, to receive financial, material, and other forms of aid from Moscow. See Tehran Domestic Television Service (in Persian), Oct. 10, 1983, trans. in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: South Asia*, Oct. 13, 1983, pp. I/3–19.

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Alvaro Cunhal, General Secretary of the Communist Party of Portugal, is welcomed to Moscow in February 1976: from left to right, Mikhail Suslov, Politburo member and party secretary; General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev; Cunhal; and Boris Ponomarëv, alternate member of the Politburo, party secretary, and "de facto" chief of the party's International Department.

—EUPRA.

stationed in Soviet embassies to transfer funds to local communist parties.[40]

Another service provided by the International Department is training. A local communist party selects for review by the ID certain candidates to receive training at the CPSU party schools.[41] If accepted, the names of the nominees are forwarded to the Organizational Party Work Department, which then places students in appropriate programs.[42]

Today, one of the chief means by which the International Department seeks to direct the international communist movement is the conference mechanism. These conferences may be bilateral, regional, or international in attendance, and may focus on either general or specific issues. They are invariably sponsored by one or more of the international communist front groups and are designed to bring together foreign communist parties and radical groups in order to achieve support for Soviet policies.[43]

The ID and Other Political Parties

By 1964, the International Department had assumed responsibility for handling the CPSU's relations with other political parties, revolutionary groups, and so-called national liberation movements.[44] This was done primarily in order to capitalize on the hostility toward the West prevalent in the Third World and to enable the Soviets to bring about the eventual acceptance by these countries of Marxism-Leninism. As Khrushchev told an Egyptian delegation visiting the USSR in 1959:

We are not going to push you to Communism, since we do not believe that people can be pushed into Paradise with a stick. You have liberated yourselves and are happy with what you call nationalism. But let me tell you, Arab nationalism is not the zenith of happiness. I don't want to force you into Communism, but I believe that some members of the delegation are go-

[40]According to KGB defector Stanislav Levchenko, during his years as a KGB operative in Japan (1975–79), the ID provided funds to Philippine Communists (presumably to members of the pro-Soviet Philippine Communist Party—PKP) on a regular basis, using KGB officers to deliver the money to that party's courier in Tokyo. See *Soviet Active Measures*, p. 166.

[41]Teague, loc. cit., p. 15.

[42]For an example of such cooperation, see *Pravda* (Moscow), Aug. 2, 1983, p. 4.

[43]Spaulding, "The World Communist Movement," pp. 39–52.

[44]Oded Eran, "Soviet Perceptions of Arab Communism and Its Political Role," in Michael Confino and Shimon Shamir, Eds., *The U.S.S.R. and the Middle East*, New York, Halsted Press, 1973, p. 117; and Bertil Haeggman, *Det Internationella Terroristnaetet* [Terrorism: Warfare in Our Time], Malmoe, Sweden, Berghs Foerlag, 1978, pp. 159-63.

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ing to become future Communists. Because life itself will impose Communism.[45]

Another reason why the ID was assigned this task concerns protocol. As a section of the CPSU, the ID represents the party, not the Soviet government. Thus, the International Department can receive delegations from such opposition or revolutionary groups without giving the impression that the Soviet Union is altering its policy toward the government in power. This also enables the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to continue to pursue "official" state-to-state relations with the nations in question.

The International Department is most active in receiving delegations from the Third World. These groups are not always communist, though they often employ similar political slogans. The utility of these meetings is twofold. On the one hand, they provide the ID with a forum to make a pitch for the virtues of a united front strategy; on the other hand, they enable department personnel to gauge the diversity within the international movement and direct their policies accordingly. Since the mid-1960's, when Soviet leaders first realized that Third World communist parties tended to be weak and controversial, the CPSU has encouraged "progressive" sections of the national bourgeoisie to cooperate with local communist parties in forming anti-imperialist (read anti-West and anticapitalist) fronts in order to achieve a firm power base.[46] In 1971, this issue was addressed by Rostislav Ul'yanovskiy:

Petty bourgeois ideology, which usually has a nationalistic and anti-imperialist spearhead with religious

[45]Heikal, op. cit., p. 152.

[46]Bhabani Sen Gupta, "An Approach to the Study of Soviet Policies for the Third World," in Roger E. Kanet and Donna Bahry, Eds., *Soviet Economic and Political Relations with the Developing World*, New York, Praeger, 1975, p. 122.

Politburo member and party secretary Mikhail Suslov, left, and party secretary Boris Ponomarëv, center, meet with Dang Kuang Minh, Permanent Representative of the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam in December 1968 in Moscow.

—TASS from SOVFOTO.

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overtones, dominates the masses in one form or another and will evidently do so for a long time to come.... A realistic revolutionary approach to the matter reveals that socialism must often be built not out of the ideal matter that an advanced working class alone can be, but of the poor material that objective reality puts at the revolutionary's disposal. The masses can gradually be led to an understanding of scientific socialism.[47]

Ul'yanovskiy terms those noncommunists who support the anti-imperialist front as either "national" or "revolutionary" democrats. So long as they pursue noncapitalist development and a foreign policy that coincides with Soviet goals, they can count on Soviet support.[48] Likewise, the ID deputy chief currently responsible for the Middle East and Latin America, Karen Brutents, notes that the 24th Congress of the CPSU (1971) called for the Central Committee (presumably through the International Department) to expand and strengthen its ties with the revolutionary democratic parties of the developing countries.[49] (Establishment of a network of ID representatives stationed in Soviet embassies for this and numerous other purposes had already begun at least by the late 1960's. See Addendum 2 on pp. 74-75.) This, according to Brutents, will help the CPSU attain one of its major goals with regard to revolutionary democratic parties, namely that of facilitating their transition to communism:

The existence and even widening of political schoolings and differences within revolutionary democracy should be connected with ... the continuing evolution of revolutionary democracy. This evolution is a peculiarity of peasant and petty-bourgeois democracy; a peculiarity manifesting the transitional character of revolutionary democracy itself as a political force.... The amplitude of revolutionary democracy's political dynamic can be illustrated in, ... on the one hand, the names of men who have become renowned Communists [and], on the other hand, the names of those who have degenerated....[50]

Owing to their general responsibility for supervising Soviet policy toward the Third World, Ul'yanovskiy and

Karen Brutents, deputy chief of the International Department of the CPSU Central Committee, photographed at an interview during his April 1984 visit to Lebanon at the invitation of the Progressive Socialist Party and the Lebanese Communist Party.

—*Monday Morning* (Beirut) No. 611, p. 37.

Brutents are concerned with the current and future directions of revolutionary groups. One can assume, however, that ensuring the formation of anti-imperialist fronts in the Third World is the CPSU's immediate goal; facilitating their transition to communism is a longer term ambition.

The International Department also maintains links with the socialist parties of Western Europe and Japan. This is due primarily to the Soviet leadership's recognition that social democrats in these countries wield considerable political power and, therefore, cannot be ignored.[51] Accordingly, ID officials have encouraged socialist-communist cooperation with a view to strengthening Soviet-West European relations and lessening the likelihood of an East-West confrontation.

The International Department's primary goal with

[47]Rostislav Ul'yanovskiy, "Marxist and Non-Marxist Socialism," *World Marxist Review* (Toronto), No. 9, 1971, pp. 118-27.

[48]Rostislav Ul'yanovskiy, *Socialism and the Newly Independent Countries*, Moscow, Progress Publishers, 1974, pp. 191–209.

[49]Karen N. Brutents, *National Liberation Revolutions Today*, Vol. 2, Moscow, Progress Publishers, 1977, p. 215.

[50]Ibid., p. 216.

[51]Soviet strategy with respect to West European social democrats, of course, has fluctuated throughout the years. During the 1930's, for example, German social democrats were denounced by Soviet leaders as "social fascists." See Ruth Fischer, *Stalin and German Communism: A Study in the Origins of the State Party*, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1948, pp. 655–56.

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regard to West European socialists since the 1970's has been to enlist their support in the Soviet campaign to block or delay the deployment of NATO's intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF).[52] To accomplish this task, the ID has relied to a considerable degree on bilateral consultations. In October 1979, for example, ID First Deputy Chief Zagladin participated in a major front group rally in Belgium, then met with members of the Dutch Parliament in The Hague.[53] Department Chief Ponomarëv summed up the value of such contacts in March 1981:

A number of personalities of social democratic parties observed that the peace initiatives put forward by the 26th CPSU Congress are contributing to the struggle against the conservative militarist forces inspired by the new U.S. administration. Members of the British Labour Party adopted a special resolution in support of the new peace initiatives of the Soviet Union. Many FRG [West German] Social Democrats and certain SPD [Social Democratic Party of Germany] personalities expressed a positive view of the Soviet proposals. SPD Chairman W. Brandt observed that the reaction to L. I. Brezhnev's report refutes the viewpoint of those who in past months have constantly claimed that a new stage in the arms race between East and West is absolutely inevitable.[54]

Bilateral consultations, however, provide only one means of influencing West Europeans. The Soviet Union has also made considerable use of both positive and negative propaganda ploys—granting interviews with high-ranking ID officials to West European newspapers,[55] on the one hand; disseminating forgeries of "official" documents and of Western periodicals, on the other—to garner support for its campaign against the INF deployment. Another ploy is the worldwide dissemination of the writings of Soviet foreign affairs specialists, which have been translated and published by the state publishing house, Progress Publishers. These articles are often written or commissioned by International Department officials and are highly propagandistic. The ID also supervises Soviet radio broadcasts to Western Europe, a responsibility it shares with the International Information Department of the CPSU Central Committee.[56] Finally, and perhaps most important, the International Department supervises the operations of 13 international front groups, which are used by the CPSU to co-opt communists and noncommunists alike into supporting programs and policies that serve Soviet interests.

International and Bilateral Fronts

One of the major functions of the International Department is acquiring international support for Soviet policy. To this end, the department has made extensive use of various front groups, especially those specifically tasked to promote "world peace."[57] These organizations typically have Soviet affiliates, which are directed and funded by the ID. In addition to directing such parent international front groups as the World Peace Council (WPC), the World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU), and the Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Organization,[58] the International Department operates a large number of bilateral front groups. Both types of front groups serve Soviet interests quite well. On the one hand, they invariably adopt policy stands that mirror Soviet perceptions. On the other hand, by being formally independent of the USSR and by minimizing the role that communists play in their activities, these organizations are able to attract far more adherents than if their leanings were explicitly articulated.

Historically, the Soviet Union has used front groups to mobilize those elements in foreign societies who are unwilling to join a communist party but are sympathetic to some of the principles such a party espouses. Typically, this group included individuals who are unwilling to commit themselves to party discipline or who support the USSR only on certain issues.[59] Today, international front groups attract essentially the same type of participants and serve the same functions. Originally under the direction of the Comintern,[60] these organizations are now administered

[52] Wynfred Joshua, "Soviet Manipulation of the European Peace Movement," *Strategic Review* (Washington, DC), Winter 1983, p. 10.

[53] *Soviet Covert Action*, p. 72.

[54] *Kommunist* (Moscow), No. 5, March 1981.

[55] These interviews are often conducted by the pro-Soviet communist media. For example, see the interview with Vadim Zagladin in *L'Humanité* (Paris), July 15, 1983, p. 5.

[56] *Kommunist*, No. 5, March 1981, pp. 6–7.

[57] For a comprehensive review of Soviet representation on the "presidential boards" and secretariats of the major front groups, see Wallace Spaulding, "Communist International Fronts in 1983," *Problems of Communism*, March–April 1984, pp. 52–61.

[58] The Soviets technically share control of AAPSO with Egypt; however, since Egypt altered its policies vis-à-vis the West and the Soviet Union, AAPSO activities have taken place outside of Egypt, in such countries as South Yemen, India, Cyprus, and Vietnam. This has effectively shut the Egyptian government out of the organization.

[59] US Department of State, "World Peace Council: Instrument of Soviet Foreign Policy," *Foreign Affairs Note* (Washington DC), April 1982, p. 2.

[60] The use of front groups by the CPSU dates back to the 1920's when Otto Kuusinen, a veteran Finnish communist who subsequently became a member of the CPSU, told a meeting of the Comintern Executive Committee that a "whole solar system of organizations and small committees around the Communist Party, working

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through the International Social Organizations Sector of the International Department,[61] which is overseen by Deputy Chief Vitaliy Shaposhnikov and headed by Grigoriy Shumeyko.[62]

Funding for international front groups is apparently handled in several ways. While these organizations do take in donations and earnings from publications, evidence strongly suggests that they receive the bulk of their operating expenses from the USSR[63] (see Table 1). According to Ruth Tosek, a former senior interpreter for several Moscow-controlled front groups:

all funds of these organizations, in local and hard currency, are provided above all by the Soviet Union, and also by other East European satellite countries on the basis of set contribution rates, paid by the governments of these countries, through various channels.[64]

In the case of the WPC, funding goes from the International Department to Oleg Kharkhardin of the Soviet Committee for the Defense of Peace, then to a Soviet representative at WPC headquarters in Helsinki. Until 1979, according to a US interagency intelligence study, Soviet control of WPC finances in Helsinki was handled by Aleksandr Lebedev.[65] Presumably his replacement, Tair Tairov, handles this function today.[66]

The Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Organization was set up in Cairo in 1957 as a jointly run Soviet-Egyptian front group. Today, it is nominally based in Egypt,

under the influence of the Party, although not under its mechanical leadership" should be created. (See Ian Greig, *The Assault on the West*, Petersham, England, Foreign Affairs Publishing Co., 1968, p. 39.) Two years later, Willi Münzenberg, a German citizen doing organizational work for the Comintern, eleborated upon this idea, stressing, among other things, that front groups could be a means "to arouse the interest of apathetic and indifferent workers, who were not interested in Communist propaganda and have to be attracted in new ways [and] to act as bridges for those who sympathise with Communism but have not taken the final step and joined the Party" (ibid., p. 40).

[61] US State Department, "World Peace Council," p. 3.

[62] US Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Intelligence, *Directory of Soviet Officials: National Organizations*, August 1982, p. 13.

[63] US State Department, "World Peace Council," pp. 2–3.

[64] From a letter in the *New Statesman* (London—Oct. 17, 1980), quoted in ibid., p. 2, n. 1.

[65] *Soviet Active Measures*, p. 39.

[66] CIA, *Directory*, August 1982, p. 280.

Table 1: Estimates of Soviet Financial Support of Front Organizations

		Soviet funding					
Organization	Staff	Salaries	Administration	Travel	Publications	Public meetings	In-house meetings
World Peace Council	45	$600,000	$150,000	$230,000	$11,000,000	$31,400,000	$6,000,000
International Institute for Peace	20	100,000	50,000	10,000	100,000	—	—
World Federation of Trade Unions	30	450,000	100,000	225,000	2,800,000	2,800,000	3,000,000
International Union of Students	25	400,000	75,000	100,000	30,000	200,000	100,000
World Federation of Democratic Youth	30	450,000	100,000	75,000	100,000	500,000	350,000
Women's International Democratic Federation	15	50,000	10,000	50,000	30,000	150,000	100,000
International Association of Democratic Lawyers	10	50,000	10,000	10,000	10,000	10,000	10,000
World Federation of Scientific Workers	10	50,000	10,000	10,000	10,000	10,000	10,000
International Organization of Journalists	15	50,000	10,000	25,000	100,000	200,000	100,000
International Federation of Resistance Fighters	10	30,000	5,000	10,000	20,000	50,000	10,000
Christian Peace Council	10	75,000	15,000	10,000	20,000	40,000	50,000
Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organization	27	500,000	200,000	100,000	10,000	300,000	150,000
International Radio and Television Organization	5	15,000	10,000	10,000	5,000	5,000	5,000
Totals	253	2,845,000	745,000	865,000	13,345,000	35,365,000	9,885,000
GRAND TOTAL							$63,050,000

SOURCE: This table is reproduced from an untitled table in "CIA Study: Soviet Covert Action and Propaganda," Appendix I in US House of Representatives, *Soviet Covert Action (The Forgery Offensive)*, Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Oversight of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, February 6, 19, 1980, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1980, p. 79. The estimates are characterized as "minimum" annual Soviet funding.

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though most of its activities take place in Cyprus, Vietnam, or Geneva. Funding in this case, as noted earlier, is extended by the International Department through AAPSO's Soviet affiliate, the Soviet Committee for Solidarity with Asian and African Countries, to a Soviet representative at the parent organization, either S. I. Kalandrov or Anatoliy Sofronov.[67] The Soviet affiliate, in each case, functions as a subsector of the ID, thereby insulating financial transactions and policy directives from the CPSU as a whole.

Another way in which the CPSU funds international front groups is by holding congresses in the USSR. All expenses are paid for by the front's Soviet affiliate, including air fare.[68] These subsidies are usually provided through a so-called public foundation—the Soviet Peace Fund—which receives "donations" from Soviet workers (some of whom contribute as much as a day's wages), from Soviet recipients of international awards (such as the Nobel prizes), and from a portion of the gate receipts from Soviet sports competitions.[69] In this way, the Soviet Peace Fund functions as a branch of the International Department.

As noted, the CPSU uses its affiliates as unofficial welcoming committees for foreign delegations that the party or government has chosen not to receive. This tactic has been used to receive such individuals as Nayif Hawatimah of the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP) when officials of other groups that have higher status, such as the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), are also visiting at the invitation of the party or government.[70]

Soviet affiliates may also be used as buffers between the CPSU/Soviet government and revolutionary groups or national liberation movements. For instance, a visiting delegation may make a request for arms or training. The Soviet affiliate sends this request, which presumably has first been screened and cleared by the International Department, to the CC Secretariat or Politburo for review. Once the deal is approved, the ID makes arrangements with the Soviet General Staff to provide whatever is required.[71]

In addition to the international front groups, there are roughly 80 bilateral "friendship" or "cultural" organizations throughout the world.[72] Like the larger, international fronts, the governing bodies of these organizations include Soviet operatives, who report to the ID's International Governmental Organizations section,[73] and foreigners sympathetic to the CPSU. Membership rolls usually include not only staff of the local Soviet embassy, who frequently serve as honorary or ex officio members, but also members and fellow travelers of the local communist party.[74] In some cases, these friendship societies provide a convenient cover for CPSU representatives, who can use their positions to maintain close ties with local communists and dissidents, conduct Soviet intelligence operations,[75] and distribute propaganda material.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs

The International Department's relationship with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is presumably close and cooperative. Analysts from both organizations could be expected, in the interest of efficiency, to communicate with one another on a regular basis and work together coordinating and drafting policy recommendations for the Central Committee and Politburo.[76] Indeed, in many regards the two are natural allies. For example, both might have an institutional interest in seeing that Soviet policy in one area does not jeopardize Soviet relations in other areas. Thus, writes a Soviet émigré with knowledge of this subject, "on many policy issues, representatives of the International Department ... may find their positions more closely attuned to those of the Foreign Ministry ... than to those of the Department for Liaison with Ruling Workers' and Communist Parties, ... [which] in turn, might look for support outside the party apparatus...."[77]

Nonetheless, in theory at least, the International Department appears to have a more important role in the process of foreign policy formulation than does the MFA, especially as regards policy toward the Third World. For one thing, senior ID personnel such as Zagladin, Brutents, and Ul'yanovskiy have established

[67] *Soviet Active Measures*, p. 160.

[68] Ibid.

[69] Ibid.

[70] Nayif Hawatimah of the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP) was recently in Moscow as a guest of SKSSAA, while concurrently Faruq Al-Qaddumi, chief of the PLO's Political and International Department, arrived as a guest of the Soviet government. This fits well with Soviet diplomatic policy, since the USSR accords quasi-diplomatic status to the PLO, but considers the DFLP only a political/paramilitary organization, albeit pro-Soviet. For Hawatimah's visit, see TASS International Service (in Russian), July 12, 1983, trans. in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Soviet Union*, July 12, 1983, p. H/1.

[71] *Soviet Active Measures*, p. 160.

[72] *Soviet Covert Action*, p. 82.

[73] The International Governmental Organizations Sector is headed by Aleksey Legasov. Beneath him are Mikhail Andreyev and V. G. Savel'yeva, who is the only woman known to work in the department. See CIA, *Directory*, September 1978, pp. 22–24; and Teague, loc. cit., p. 37.

[74] *Soviet Covert Action*, p. 83.

[75] Ibid.

[76] Dev Murarka, "Soviet Foreign Policy—An Unknown, Efficient Mechanism," *Suomen Kuvalehti* (Helsinki), No. 39, Sept. 25, 1981, p. 2; and Meyers and Simes, op. cit., p. 19.

[77] Meyers and Simes, op. cit., p. 23.

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reputations as experts in their fields. For another, the ID acts as a filter through which information on the developing world and capitalist countries is funneled to Soviet leaders: recommendations on policy issues, based upon inputs from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Soviet intelligence services, and the Ministry of Defense, are made by the International Department and sent to the general secretary's aides who assist in preparing the agenda for Secretariat (and Politburo) meetings.[78]

During these weekly Secretariat meetings, if necessary, selected specialists from a variety of quarters may be invited to provide further information.[79] Proposals are then approved, rejected, or returned to the International Department for further study. The Secretariat may approve a recommendation either outright or provisionally, stipulating in the second instance that it be presented to the Politburo for final approval. In essence, however, matters are usually decided at the Secretariat level or even within the International Department before they reach the Politburo.[80] According to one source, "the Secretariat *frames* policy decisions, and by the time the issue is presented to the Politburo, the framework for the decision is usually [pre]determined."[81] Thus, the MFA's views on foreign policy represent only a portion of the information upon which party leaders base their decisions.

In practice, of course, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs may have considerably more influence in this process, especially given Andrey Gromyko's rise to prominence after the recent succession from Yuriy Andropov to Konstantin Chernenko. Previously, Gromyko's input was through the initial proposals and information sent by the MFA to the International Department or, in the final stage, after the Secretariat had submitted its findings to the Politburo, where Suslov's commanding presence presumably prevailed in foreign policy matters. Thus, had Gromyko disagreed with the Secretariat's proposals, his only means of countering them was to persuade the other Politburo members that the Secretariat's analysis and recommendations were faulty—which might have been quite difficult since half of the Politburo members concurrently belong to the Secretariat.[82] Now, however, in the absence of Suslov it seems highly unlikely that Gromyko's input or preferences on any foreign policy issue would go unheeded, particularly in such areas as Soviet-American relations or arms control.

Relations with the KGB

In addition to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the International Department deals extensively with the Soviet intelligence services, particularly the KGB. This relationship essentially exists on two levels—the analytical and the operational. On the one hand, the ID receives KGB reports and recommendations based upon both raw and evaluated intelligence, which in turn form the backdrop for policy proposals submitted by the department to the CC Secretariat and Politburo. On the other hand, the International Department enlists KGB operatives to carry out special projects on the party's behalf.

One of the major ways in which the two agencies interact is through the sharing and evaluation of intelligence. Prior to the 1970's, political/economic intelligence gathered in or about foreign countries was funneled through the information department of the KGB's First Chief Directorate. There, intelligence was evaluated, distilled, assembled, and distributed to policymakers, including those in the International Department.[83] While attempts were made to verify the authenticity and accuracy of the information gathered, only minimal analysis was done by the KGB's information department.[84] The task of analyzing and producing polished intelligence reports appears to have been left to the International Department.[85] This was an enormous undertaking, as the ID simply lacked the staff to handle the work.

In an effort to cope with the ever-increasing glut of information, the International Department drew more and more upon the research institutes of the USSR Academy of Sciences.[86] Selected academics were given access to varying amounts of foreign literature and possibly diplomatic reports.[87] International Department analysts, however, still bore the burden of

[78]See, e.g., Petrov, loc. cit., pp. 823–24.

[79]Ned Temko, "Who Pulls the Levers of Power in the Soviet Machine," *The Christian Science Monitor* (Boston, MA), Feb. 23, 1982, p. 12.

[80]Dawisha, loc. cit., p. 322, n. 42.

[81]Temko, loc. cit., p. 13.

[82]By at least one account, rendered *before* Gromyko's recent ascendance, the MFA's position vis-à-vis the International Department was not "affected substantially by Gromyko's promotion to the Politburo" in April 1973. See Dawisha, loc. cit., p. 322, n. 42, where she recounts a statement to this effect of an MFA sector chief.

[83]Cord Meyer, *Facing Reality: From World Federalism to the CIA*, New York, Random House, 1980, p. 314; and Barron, *KGB Today*, pp. 446–47.

[84]Barron, *KGB: Secret Work*, pp. 76–77; and idem, *KGB Today*, p. 446.

[85]Meyer, op. cit., p. 324.

[86]Jerry F. Hough, *The Soviet Leadership in Transition*, Washington, DC, The Brookings Institution, 1980, p. 123; Ronald Russell Pope, "Soviet Foreign Affairs Specialists: An Evaluation of Their Direct and Indirect Impact on Soviet Foreign Policy Decision-Making Based on Their Analysis of Cuba, 1958–1961, and Chile, 1969–1973," Ph.D. diss., Philadelphia, PA, University of Pennsylvania, 1975, pp. 12–14; and Meyers and Simes, op. cit.

[87]Petrov, loc. cit., p. 843.

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Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs Andrey Gromyko, center, is seen off to the September 1982 session of the United Nations General Assembly; among those at the airport are Mikhail Gorbachëv, left, and Boris Ponomarëv, right.

—TASS from Sovfoto.

having to integrate classified material into the work of academics. As the Soviet Union became more active in the Third World during the late 1960's, greater demands were placed upon the information-channeling system, and it is unlikely that the Soviet leadership was able to make effective use of all the information at its disposal.

To help alleviate this problem, during the early 1970's, the CPSU upgraded the status of the KGB's information department to that of Service I[88] and expanded its role to include more intelligence analysis.[89] It now publishes a classified summary of daily events and regularly produces forecasts of world developments for use by the Soviet leadership.[90] According to a recent source, Service I makes "a conscientious, scholarly effort" to give the Politburo and other clients objective and accurate analysis.[91] Even though Service I has been able to alleviate part of the International Department's analysis burden, leaving the latter greater freedom to explore policy responses, it still is unable to digest, analyze, and disseminate all the information made available from Soviet resources.[92] Thus, the KGB continues to work closely with the International Department in order to produce intelligence reports that provide the framework for Soviet policy toward the noncommunist world.

In addition to coordinating intelligence analysis with Service I, the International Department also interacts with other branches of the KGB. It frequently enlists the KGB's Active Measures Service (known as Service A), which is responsible for conducting disinformation and propaganda operations abroad. Service A, in close collaboration with the relevant CC departments, including the ID, has been very active during recent years in disseminating forgeries of Western documents, planting bogus or misleading articles in the foreign press, spreading rumors and false reports, and using clandestine radio stations to spread disinformation.[93]

The idea for a propaganda campaign, according to John Barron, may originate within the Politburo, the International Department, Service A itself, or the KGB *Residentura* (Residency) abroad.[94] Operations that are of a particularly sensitive nature must be approved by either the Politburo or the CC Secretariat.[95] Important campaigns are then monitored by the various

[88] *Soviet Covert Action*, p. 61.

[89] Barron, *KGB Today*, p. 446. As a result of this expanded role, Service I is now the third-largest section within the KGB's First Chief Directorate.

[90] Ibid.

[91] Ibid.

[92] Ibid.

[93] *Soviet Active Measures*, p. 10.

[94] Barron, *KGB Today*, p. 447.

[95] Ibid.; Meyer, op. cit., p. 312; and *Soviet Covert Action*, p. 65.

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agencies and departments involved through a "top secret" bulletin published by Service A.[96]

Making up Service A are about 200 staff officers, most of whom operate out of KGB headquarters ("the Center"), which is located just outside Moscow.[97] Service A does not station personnel abroad, and it must rely on KGB staff officers assigned to the *Residenturas* to implement a propaganda or disinformation campaign abroad. In those operations involving the use of foreign communists, the International Department plays a supportive, perhaps even supervisory, role, since the KGB usually must obtain the department's approval before embarking upon such operations.[98]

The ID also appears to be involved in directing the KGB in covert operations of economic destabilization. According to one account, these include:

setting up dummy companies to take out loans from local banks and defaulting on them, buying into local banks and companies themselves, recruiting local businessmen and contractors by throwing business their way or through bribery, buying interest in technology-oriented Western companies through a third country, and buying real estate the same way.[99]

Research Institutes

Since the mid-1960's, the International Department has increasingly drawn upon the research institutes of the USSR Academy of Sciences in order to support its work. These institutes proliferated during the Khrushchev years, and under the Brezhnev leadership conducted studies more relevant to policymaking. Consequently, as noted above, the ID now employs numerous full- and part-time scholars to conduct research projects that provide background material for classified studies ordered by the department. Selected experts may also take part in ad hoc committees, made up of department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and KGB personnel, that study particular problems or monitor important events.[100] However, this is the exception rather than the rule, since it is the institute directors or deputy directors who are usually involved in these activities.

The extent to which the International Department controls these organizations is uncertain; what is clear, however, is that research institutes are playing an increasingly important support role in the ID's efforts to keep Soviet policymakers informed of world events. Secretary Ponomarëv stressed the value and role of the research institute in his keynote address before the Oriental Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences (IVAN) when it was presented with the Order of the Labor Red Banner in 1980.

Emphasis is rightly being placed here on the combination of fundamental research with an analysis of current events on the practical day-to-day plane.... IVAN's scientific collective should analyze the ongoing changes in depth, comprehensively and in good time, in order that it might always be on top of matters and completely ready to provide a scientific answer to the questions posed by life and not only correctly spot what is new, but also skillfully forecast the development of events.

Serious demands are being made of Soviet oriental science by the prospects of the Soviet Union's political, economic and cultural cooperation with the oriental countries.... The tasks confronting you, comrades, are big and difficult, as you can see.... The party and Soviet people expect of orientalists fundamental works collating the new phenomena and trends in the struggle of the oriental peoples and also a prompt analysis of current events.[101]

Other research institutes also regularly conduct studies for the International Department, including the Institute of the International Workers' Movement (IMRD), the Institute of World Economics and International Relations (IMEMO), the Far East Institute (IDV), the Africa Institute (IA), the Latin American Institute (ILA), and the Institute of the United States of America and Canada (ISShAK).[102] Each of these think tanks publishes its own journal, except for the Oriental Institute and the Africa Institute which copublish *Narody*

[96]Barron, KGB Today, p. 447.

[97]*Soviet Active Measures*, p. 10.

[98]Meyer, op. cit., p. 312.

[99]Vladimir Sakharov and Umberto Tosi, *High Treason*, New York, G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1980, p. 249.

[100]Jiri Valenta, "From Prague to Kabul: The Soviet Style of Invasion," *International Security* (Cambridge, MA), Fall 1980, p. 122, n. 13.

[101]*Narody Azii i Afriki* (Moscow), No. 1, 1981, pp. 4–13.

[102]To facilitate the conduct of policy-relevant works, specialists are given access to "white" and "red" TASS bulletins. White TASS gives a limited review of foreign newspapers and the wire services for each day and is supplemented by brief analysis. Red TASS reprints lengthy passages from articles and commentaries in the foreign press. See Leonid Vladimorov, "Problems of a Soviet Journalist," *Conflict Studies* (London), April 1975, p. 6. The function performed by TASS in translating and providing limited analysis of the foreign news media is apparently very similar to the job done by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) and the Joint Publications Research Service (JPRS) of the US government with the exception that anyone may subscribe to FBIS and JPRS publications.

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The Institute for the Study of the USA and Canada and its director, Georgiy Arbatov.

—TASS from SOVFOTO.

Azii i Afriki (Peoples of Asia and Africa) and *Aziya i Afrika Segodnya* (Asia and Africa Today). The International Department helps monitor the political tone of the articles published in these journals by having ID personnel sit on the various editorial boards. For example, Karen Brutents, the department's deputy chief for the Near East, serves on the editorial board of *Aziya i Afrika Segodnya*, as does the Near East sector chief, Yuriy Gryadunov; moreover, Zagladin, Brutents, and Nikolay Mostovets, the sector chief responsible for North America, are members of the editorial staff for ISShAK's publication, *SShA: Ekonomika, Politika, Ideologiya*.

Although employed essentially as support research staff of the International Department, foreign ministry, and the Soviet intelligence services, the institutes' scholars are also used to disseminate Soviet propaganda to the general Soviet populace, as well as to foreigners. They may be called upon to soften the impact of unpopular or potentially unfavorable policies, such as the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, by providing "scholarly," pro-Soviet versions of the events in question. Moreover, quite frequently, the ID will use institute specialists to prepare articles for *Pravda*, *Novoye Vremya* (New Times), or *Aziya i Afrika Segodnya* on specific issues, such as the political motivations behind NATO's deployment of a new generation of nuclear missiles in Western Europe. These articles may be written independently, or under the direction of the department representative on the journal's staff. Research institute specialists also contribute to the intelligence-gathering effort aimed at foreigners and their countries. As the Soviet citizens most likely to come in contact with foreigners, both in the USSR and abroad, they are in the best position to garner information on the backgrounds of their foreign counterparts, to compile biographic sketches that may be of some intelligence value, and to assess prevailing moods in foreign countries. Their position as "academics" enhances this capability, as foreigners are more apt to speak freely with professional colleagues than they would with officials of either the party or the state.[103]

It must be emphasized that only a select few of the research institute staffers do work for the International Department. Despite the attention that these institutes are given in the West, they may actually have very little impact on Soviet foreign policy formulation. Indeed, according to one informed source, most of the work done by ISShAK for Central Committee departments winds up in the wastepaper basket.[104] Nevertheless, although their precise role in Soviet foreign policy remains uncertain, the institutes do appear to provide, upon request, background material for department studies and serve as training facilities for party cadres.

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[103]US Central Intelligence Agency, "The Institute of the U.S.A. and Canada—U.S.S.R. Point of Contact for Americans," in *Soviet Active Measures*, p. 70. According to Galina Orionova, a former ISShAK researcher who defected to the West, when foreigners visited the institute, the staffers had to fill out two forms: one on where the visitors went; the other on their personal lives and background. This information was sent to Dr. Rodimir Bogdanov, a KGB officer assigned to the institute. See Nora Beloff, "Escape from Boredom: A Defector's Story," *The Atlantic Monthly* (Boston, MA), November 1980, pp. 46-47.

[104]Beloff, loc. cit., pp. 46-47. For a different view, which sees the institute's influence as growing, see Tyrus Cobb, "National Security Perspectives of Soviet 'Think Tanks,'" *Problems of Communism*, November–December 1981, pp. 51–59.

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The Soviet Press

An important domestic function of the International Department is its general supervision of the Soviet media's coverage of party policy toward communist and radical movements in nonbloc countries. Even here, however, lines of institutional authority are somewhat complex. According to a former Soviet editor, whose views were cited in a recent Rand Corporation study:

The International Department keeps an eye on all ... journals [in its policy area], but the general direction is determined by the Propaganda Department. It's a complicated system. The Propaganda Department can make no decision about a given journal or its specific subject matter: it checks up on basic facts, clears up specific problems. The other is done by Ponomarëv's office. He has constant charge of the kitchen. He determines the political line, the content, and everything else. But the article could not be published without the Propaganda Department because the Propaganda Department leads in all matters of ideology. The Propaganda Department can influence an article from the point of view of general directions.[105]

The handling of information on foreign affairs is not the domain just of the Central Committee apparat, however. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs also exercises a degree of control over the Soviet press, as does the KGB. But the foreign ministry's influence in this area is not as great as was once thought by Western Soviet specialists. For example, Barron claims that only 30 percent of the articles appearing in the foreign affairs weekly *Novoye Vremya* are written or arranged by the journal's own staff; the bulk of the material is written by staffers of the ID (30 percent), the KGB Service A (20 percent), and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (20 percent).[106]

The International Department also supervises the work of the international communist journal, *Problems of Peace and Socialism (PPS)*, which is published in Prague. The journal, published in 37 languages and distributed in 145 countries, was founded in 1958, a year after the Cominform was dissolved, in an effort to reinvigorate the international appeal of communism. Originally intended to serve as an open forum for discussion, *PPS* has increasingly become a means of putting forth the CPSU line.[107] Nonetheless, those communist parties that produce their own national editions, such as the Communist Party of Canada which publishes the North American English edition of *PPS* under the title of *World Marxist Review*, exercise editorial control over the material that appears in their journals, often editing or omitting articles as they see fit.

The International Department has relied on both direct and indirect means to control the publication of *PPS*. On the one hand, high-ranking ID figures such as Ponomarëv, Zagladin, Shaposhnikov, and Ul'yanovskiy openly exert their considerable influence when necessary;[108] on the other hand, ID personnel routinely serve on the editorial board and journal staff. Moreover, the journal's chief editor is a Soviet citizen, Yuriy A. Sklyarov, who succeeded another Soviet citizen, Konstantin Zaradov, who died in early 1982. Sklyarov was formerly *Pravda*'s deputy chief editor and is an alternate member of the CPSU Central Committee. International Department officials maintain an active role in *PPS*, writing articles and heading CPSU delegations to its conferences.[109]

It is quite difficult to determine how political lines of control run in the USSR. While the International Department appears to have primacy in editorial control over publications concerning Soviet policy toward the Third World, the foreign ministry probably exercises control of articles dealing with the United States, SALT, and Soviet diplomatic relations.[110]

Conclusion

The International Department of the CPSU Central Committee is a subject worthy of scholarly attention. For one thing, as shown throughout this article, the ID seems to play an important role in the formulation and implementation of Soviet foreign policy; for another, its leaders are both interesting and accomplished. Yet, very little is known about the actual operations of the ID. This study has attempted to bridge this gap by showing the ID in its institutional role, that of bringing

[105]Cited in Dzirkals, Gustafson, and Johnson, op. cit., p. 21.

[106]Barron, *KGB Today*, p. 82.

[107]Wallace Spaulding "New Head, Old Problems of Peace and Socialism," *Problems of Communism*, November–December 1982, pp. 57–58.

[108]For example, Arab Communists responded to the crackdown on Sudanese Communists in May 1971 by airing their differences with Moscow. The secretary general of the Lebanese Communist Party, Nicholas Shaoui, wrote in *World Marxist Review* (September 1971) that the working class should form the nucleus of the "united front." Ul'yanovskiy responded by writing a critique of this view in the same journal. See Ul'yanovskiy, "Marxist and Non-Marxist Socialism." For more background on this exchange, see Robert O. Freedman, *Soviet Policy Toward the Middle East since 1970*, 3rd ed., New York, Praeger, 1982, pp. 65–67.

[109]See Spaulding, "New Head, Old Problems." For more information on *PPS*, Sklyarov, and the death of Konstantin Zarodov, see *Radio Liberty Research Bulletin*, RL 171/82, Apr. 22, 1982; and RL 225/82, June 2, 1982.

[110]Dzirkals, Gustafson, and Johnson, op. cit., p. 22.

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together, for the purposes of policymaking and policy implementation, the activities of various Soviet government and party organizations responsible for covering foreign affairs.

The ID is an institution without parallel in the United States and appears to lend itself uniquely to communist bureaucracy. Like most organizations, its strength is dependent upon both the personalities of its leaders and the scope of its operations. Consequently, its influence with the Politburo has no doubt varied over the years. Some analysts might argue that the ID's influence has waned since its heyday during the 1960's when Ponomarëv and Ul'yanovskiy were younger and more dynamic. Yet today, with Zagladin and Brutents as its key figures, the ID probably does its best work on Western Europe, the Middle East, and Latin America, despite the inherent constraints the Soviet Union faces in these regions. The ID has been in existence in one form or another for over 40 years, and regardless of the fluctuations in its influence on policymakers in the CC Secretariat or in the Politburo, it will continue to play a major role in Soviet policy. This article has attempted to gain perspective on the International Department's place within the Soviet system. It is my hope that it will stimulate further research.

* * *

Appendix: Biographical Sketches

Boris N. Ponomarëv

Ponomarëv is believed to function as "de facto" chief of the ID. According to Soviet biographies, Ponomarëv was born on January 17, 1905, in Zaraysk. In 1919, at age 14, he joined the Red Army and served on the Eastern Front. That same year he joined the Communist Party, serving on the Zaraysk Military Revolutionary Committee. His first assignments were in the Komsomol where he worked from 1900 to 1923. After finishing his education at Moscow State University in 1926, he served as a member and then deputy chief of a party propaganda group operating in Turkmenistan. Two years later, he returned to Moscow where he lectured at various universities. In 1932, at age 27, Ponomarëv joined the history faculty of the Moscow Institute of Red Professors, where he also served as deputy director. It was probably during his stay there that he befriended his lifelong mentor Mikhail Suslov, who was also on the institute's faculty. Between 1934 and 1936, he transferred to the Moscow Institute of History, becoming its director, and taught Party History at the Higher Party School and in the Academy of Sciences. In 1936, he was appointed to the Executive Committee of the Comintern, serving in that capacity until 1943, the year the Comintern was disbanded. Ponomarëv then returned to academic work, as deputy director of the Marx-Engels-Lenin Institute. One year later, he was made the first deputy chief of the ID.

At various points during these years, Ponomarëv was closely associated with Karl Radek, Otto Kuusinen, Dmitriy Manuil'skiy, Georgiy Dimitrov, Andrey Zhdanov, and Mikhail Suslov. He appears to have survived during the Stalin era by avoiding the limelight and subordinating his ambitions to other, more influential figures. Through his mentors' successes he managed to stay in favor, becoming in 1952 a candidate member of the CPSU Central Committee.

Ponomarëv continued to operate in the Central Committee apparat after Stalin's death in 1953, and in 1955 was made chief of the International Department. Quite uncharacteristically, he later became an "institutional" source of opposition to Nikita Khrushchev's "opening" to Third World nationalist leaders. While a degree of Ponomarëv's dissidence can be attributed to the post-Stalin "thaw," it is likely that he was following the lead of his mentor, Mikhail Suslov, who had emerged as a powerful figure in Kremlin politics. Ponomarëv expressed skepticism over Khrushchev's receptiveness to such noncommunists as Egypt's Gamal Abdul Nasser and Indonesia's President Sukharno—a policy he and Suslov saw as inconsistent with CPSU ideology and thus detrimental to the advancement of communism in the Third World.

Often characterized as an ideologue, a Stalinist, and, as Khrushchev termed him, "a relic of the Comintern," Ponomarëv has shown himself to be politically adept and an ideological chameleon. Despite Khrushchev's disdain for him, between 1950 and 1966, he was made a full member of the CPSU Central Committee, a Central Committee secretary, chairman of the Council of Nationalities' Foreign Affairs Commission of the Supreme Soviet, and the chairman of the editorial board that supervised the rewriting of the official *History of the CPSU*. Also, in 1958, he was made a corresponding member of the USSR Academy of Sciences, and in 1962, became a full member of that prestigious organization. In 1972, Ponomarëv was made an alternate member of the CPSU CC Politburo, a position he holds today.

In the past 20 years, Ponomarëv has traveled extensively, visiting such places as Austria, Bulgaria, Canada, China, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Egypt, Finland, France, the German Democratic Republic, Great Britain, Romania, Syria, the United States, and Vietnam.

On Ponomarëv see: Alexander G. Bahr, Comp., "A Biographic Directory of 100 Leading Soviet Officials," trans. by Stelianos Scarlis, *Radio Liberty Research Bulletin* (Munich), Feb. 10, 1981, pp. 162–63; Oded Eran, "Soviet Perceptions of Arab Communism and Its Political Role," in Michael Confino and Shimon Shamir, Eds., *The USSR in the Middle East*, Jerusalem, Israel Universities Press, 1973, pp. 114–16; Michael Tatu, *Power in the Kremlin: From Khrushchev to Kosygin*, New York, Viking Press, 1969, pp. 202–03; and Abdurakhman Avtorkhanov, *Stalin and the Soviet Communist Party*, New York, Praeger, 1959, pp. 19–24.

Vadim V. Zagladin

As first deputy chief, Zagladin probably handles the day-to-day activities of the department. He is also responsible for most of Western Europe. He was born on June 23, 1927, and attended the Moscow State University Institute of International Relations (MGIMO). He was graduated in 1949 along with such notables as Georgiy Arbatov and Nikolay Inozemtsev, and has similar ties to a number of mid-level bureaucrats. His connections at ISShAK and IMEMO have enhanced the status of these institutes and have influenced the focus of the research conducted there. After graduation he remained at MGIMO, doing graduate work until 1952 and lecturing until 1954, at which time he took a position on *Novoye Vremya*'s editorial staff. He helped found the journal *Problems of Peace and Socialism (PPS)* in 1958 and served as the liaison between *PPS* and the International Department. In 1957, he became the acting head of the editorial division of *Novoye Vremya*, serving in this capacity until 1960, when he moved to Czechoslovakia

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to carry out his duties for *PPS* at its headquarters in Prague. In 1964, he returned to Moscow and joined the International Department staff as a senior official. Three years later, in 1967, he became a deputy chief of the department; and in 1969, after the death of D. P. Shevlyagin, he formally took over responsibility for Western Europe.

Zagladin became first deputy chief of the department in October 1975 and has served as the party's principal specialist on Western Europe since then. In 1976, Zagladin was elected an alternate member of the CPSU CC and his heightened status during the late 1970's facilitated his becoming a full CC member in 1981. He has traveled extensively in Western and Eastern Europe, both as a CPSU official and as chairman of the Foreign Affairs Commission of the Supreme Soviet's Council of the Union and as a deputy chairman of the USSR Parliamentary Group. He also is a board member of the State Committee for Science and Technology. Zagladin is said to be quite intelligent and is particularly knowledgeable on West German affairs.

On Zagladin see: Teague, loc. cit., p. 39; CIA, *Directory*, August 1982, pp. 9, 13, 180, 206, 207; Borys Lewytzkyj and Juliusz Stroynowski, Eds., *Who's Who in the Socialist Countries*, New York, K.G. Saur, 1978, p. 693; and Steven A. Grant, "Soviet Americanists," *USICA Research Report* (Washington, DC), R-1-80, Feb. 15, 1980.

Karen N. Brutents

Brutents is the department deputy chief generally responsible for the Near East and Latin America. He was born on July 3, 1924, and is Armenian by nationality. He was educated in Soviet Azerbaydzhan and attended the University of Baku, graduating with a degree in history just after World War II. He then attended the Higher Party School in Moscow, after which he went on to the Institute of World Economics and International Relations, where he received a postgraduate degree in history. He apparently remained at IMEMO as a researcher, in which capacity he probably began doing part-time consultancy work for the ID. By 1966, he had become a full-time consultant, and by 1976 was promoted to the position of deputy chief.

In this capacity, he assumed the responsibilities of the elderly Rostislav Ul'yanovskiy for the Middle East, and has handled Latin American affairs in recent years. It appears that Brutents was close to the late head of IMEMO, Nikolay Inozemtsev, and possibly shared his less doctrinaire view of the world. He has also maintained close ties to the Oriental Institute and its head, Yevgeniy Primakov. While good relations with the Oriental Institute have probably helped Brutents in his work, there is no doubt that this has served to antagonize Deputy Chief Ul'yanovskiy, who is not particularly well-disposed to either Primakov or his institute.

Brutents has traveled to Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, Kuwait, Iraq, Morocco, Angola, and South Yemen, as well as to Mexico, Venezuela, Colombia, Panama, and throughout Eastern Europe. He serves on the editorial board of *Aziya i Afrika Segodnya* and *S.Sh.A*, and is a regular participant on the Moscow television program "Studio 9."

On Brutents see: Jerry F. Hough, "The Evolution of the Soviet World View," *World Politics* (Princeton, NJ), July 1980, p. 529, fn 19; idem, "Soviet Policy Making Toward Foreign Communists," *Studies in Comparative Communism* (Los Angeles, CA), Autumn 1982, pp. 174, 179; Elizabeth Teague, "The Foreign Departments of the Central Committee of the CPSU," *Radio Liberty Research Bulletin* (Munich), Supplement, Oct. 27, 1980, pp. 29-30.

Anatoliy S. Chernyayev

Chernyayev is the department chief responsible for North America and the United Kingdom. He was born on May 25, 1921, and was graduated from Moscow State University (MGU) in 1947 with a degree in history. He remained at MGU as a lecturer until 1953 at which time he left to join a Central Committee department, presumably the International Department. However, from 1958 to 1961, he was attached to the editorial staff of *Problems of Peace and Socialism*. In 1961, he returned to the International Department, working his way up to deputy chief in October 1970. In 1981, Chernyayev was appointed as an alternate CC member. He has traveled to London and Belfast, as well as to Australia and Jamaica.

On Chernyayev see: Teague, loc. cit., p. 30; and US Central Intelligence Agency, *Director of Soviet Officials: National Organizations*, Washington, DC, August 1982, p. 13.

Ivan I. Kovalenko

Kovalenko is the deputy chief of the department responsible for Far Eastern affairs. He was born on February 13, 1918, and received a postgraduate degree in history from IMEMO. A specialist on Japan, Kovalenko served as chief of the Far East Department of the State Committee for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries prior to his appointment as the chief of the ID's "Asian" sector in January 1968. Concurrent with this new position, Kovalenko also served as a vice-president of the USSR-Japan Society. He apparently has close ties to the Far East Institute, and he is known to have traveled to the United States, Vietnam, and Japan. In 1977, he was attached to IMEMO where he served as head of the Non-Governmental Organizations Department while working on his doctorate. Kovalenko is said to be aggressive. He sometimes writes under the pseudonym Ivkov.

On Kovalenko see: Teague, loc. cit., p. 32; CIA, *Directory*, August 1982, p. 13, and September 1978, p. 22; and Tampere Peace Research Institute, *International Détente and Disarmament: A Collection of Articles by Finnish and Soviet Scholars*, Helsinki, 1977, p. 261.

Pëtr I. Kutsobin

Kutsobin is the sector chief responsible for South Asia. Little is known of his background except that he was born in December 1917 and apparently worked as a correspondent for *Pravda* sometime prior to becoming a sector chief in 1968. He appears to be a specialist on India and has contributed articles in *Narody Azii i Afriki*, and *Mirovaya Ekonomika i Mezhdunarodnyye Otnosheniya*, the journal of IMEMO. In March 1982, according to the CIA's *Directory of Soviet Officials*, he was identified as a deputy chief of the ID. He probably works extremely closely with Ul'yanovskiy, and will most likely replace the latter upon his death or incapacitation.

On Kutsobin see: CIA, *Directory*, August 1982, p. 13; and Richard Remnek, *Scholars and Soviet Foreign Policy*, Durham, NC, Carolina Academic Press, 1975, pp. 230, 326-27.

Pëtr I. Manchkha

Manchkha is the deputy chief presumably responsible for Black Africa. He was born on June 12, 1914, and became chief of an unidentified sector (Africa?) of the ID in October 1970. He was publicly named a deputy chief of the department in July 1978. Little is known about his background or his duties, although he is reputed to be a journalist. He is rarely mentioned in the Soviet press, which could mean either that he is involved strictly with clandestine activities or that he is not particularly influential. He also may share with Ul'yanovskiy responsibility for the ID's dealings with Africa.

On Manchkha see: Teague, loc. cit., p. 34; CIA, *Directory*, August 1982, p. 13.

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Vitaliy S. Shaposhnikov

Shaposhnikov is the deputy chief responsible for the Scandinavian countries, as well as for overall supervision of international front groups. Nothing is known of his background except his birthdate, which is September 3, 1921. By August 1970, he was being identified in the West as a department deputy chief. He is known to have traveled to Eastern Europe and has probably visited Finland and other Scandinavian countries. He is a member of the World Peace Council Presidium, and appears to supervise that body's activities.

On Shaposhnikov see: CIA, *Directory*, August 1982, p. 13.

Rostislav A. Ul'yanovskiy

Ul'yanovskiy is the department specialist for national liberation movements in Asia and Africa. He was born in Vitebsk on March 26, 1904, to a family of "white collar" workers. In 1930, he was graduated from the Indo-Afghan section of the social-political and diplomatic department of the Oriental Institute in Moscow (MIV). He remained at MIV as a lecturer and deputy director of scientific studies. In 1932, he joined the International Agrarian Institute, which conducted research for the Comintern, as deputy director of the Asian Department. During this period, he contributed a number of articles on India, under the pseudonyms O. Roslavlev and Yuriy Rozaliev, to Soviet academic journals. It was also at this time that he probably became acquainted with Boris Ponomarëv, who was lecturing and teaching at academic and research establishments prior to his appointment to the Comintern's Executive Committee in 1936.

Sometime after he joined the International Agrarian Institute, Ul'yanovskiy was arrested and spent 21 years in prisons and camps. He was known to be suspicious of Third World nationalists, and he may have been imprisoned for criticizing Stalin's policy toward India. He may have joined the staff of the Comintern some time after 1934 and subsequently got caught up in the purge of Karl Radek and his protégés. At any rate, he edited, and wrote the preface for, a 1979 book entitled *The Comintern and the East*.

After Stalin's death in 1953, he was released from prison and probably worked as a consultant to the International Department. In 1956, at the 20th Party Congress, he supposedly presented a paper, dealing with prospects for revolution in the Third World. He was later made deputy director of the Oriental Institute.

Ul'yanovskiy concurrently served as the deputy editor-in-chief of the journal *Contemporary Oriental Studies* (1957) and as a member of the Academic Council of the Oriental Institute and IMEMO, and the Institute of Social Sciences of the CPSU Central Committee. In 1961, he left the Oriental Institute, possibly to take a full-time position as consultant with the International Department. Indeed, Ul'yanovskiy was identified as a deputy chief of the department in March 1966.

The present relationship between Ul'yanovskiy and certain staff members of the Oriental Institute—most notably, Nodari Simoniya, Aleksey Levkovskiy and Lev Reisner—appears to be one of great antagonism, owing to policy differences. He apparently also seems to have had a similar distaste for the late head of IMEMO, whose work he strongly criticized in 1982.

Today, Ul'yanovskiy serves as the elder statesman of Soviet Third World policy, receiving foreign delegations and writing articles in the Soviet press on India, Iran, and Afghanistan. His precise duties are unknown to outside observers, however. It is unclear whether he has retained operational responsibilities for the Middle East (Turkey, Iran, Afghanistan) or whether his interests in this region and other areas are connected with his role as an elder statesman. He continues to be listed as a deputy chief of the Soviet Committee for Solidarity with Asian and African Countries, though again he may only nominally retain this position.

Ul'yanovskiy is known to have traveled to North Korea, India, Egypt, and Algeria; however, his foreign travels have rarely been mentioned in the Soviet press. Unlike Brutents, he shuns publicity, though he has been a prolific writer during the past 30 years, publishing numerous books and articles in the Soviet press. He apparently serves on the editorial board of *Narody Azii i Afriki* and has, on occasion, used his old pseudonym, Yuriy Rozaliev.

On Ul'yanovskiy see: Oded Eran, *Mezhdunarodniki* (The Internationalists), Ramet Gan, Israel, Turtledove Press, 1979, pp. 175, 179; Mohamed Heikal, *The Sphinx and the Commissar*, New York, Harper & Row, 1978, p. 76; Robert G. Kaiser, *Russia: The Power and the People*, New York, Atheneum, 1976, pp. 191, 382; C.D. Miliband, *Bibliograficheskiy slovar' sovetskikh vostokovedov* (Bibliographic Dictionary of Soviet Orientalists), Moscow, Chief Editorial Board of Oriental Literature, 1975, pp. 565–66; Remnek, op. cit., pp. 3, 143; and idem, *Social Scientists and Policy-Making in the USSR*, New York, Praeger, 1977, p. 104.

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ADDENDA ON THE INTERNATIONAL DEPARTMENT

As a supplement to Robert Kitrinos's survey of the International Department of the CPSU CC, Wallace Spaulding, a retired colonel in the US Army Reserves and longtime Washington-based observer, has kindly agreed to provide the latest available breakdown on the officials and structure of the ID in Moscow and an assessment of the system of ID representation in Soviet embassies abroad.—**Eds.**

Addendum 1: Officials of the ID and Their Responsibilities



*The ordering here is arbitrary, to conform with the geographic divisions used in Richard F. Staar, Ed., "Checklist of Communist Parties in 1983," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), March–April 1984, pp. 41–51, and is not meant to suggest how the ID itself divides the world.—**Eds.**

[1]On Zagladin's supervisory role for Greece and Cyprus see *Pravda* (Moscow), Jan. 24, 1979 and Dec. 14, 1979; for Germanic Europe, ibid., Apr. 7 and May 6, 1983; for Latin Europe, ibid., Oct. 23, 1982, July 13, 1983; for the US, *Der Spiegel* (Hamburg), Dec. 6, 1971, p. 108, and *Sovetskaya Rossiya* (Moscow), Nov. 17, 1983; for disarmament, *Sovetskaya Rossiya*, Nov. 17, 1983, and NRC Handelsblad, Nov. 4, 1983, trans. in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Soviet Union* (Washington, DC—hereafter *FBIS–SOV*), Nov. 9, 1981, p. A/1. Note also that Zagladin has had a history of involvement with the Palestine Liberation Organization, but apparently with no other Middle Eastern organization (*Pravda*, Apr. 6 and Aug. 30, 1977, July 12 and Dec. 22, 1979, and Aug. 12, 1982).

[2]On Chernyayev's supervisory role for Canada, ibid., Oct. 7, 1983; for the UK/Ireland, ibid., Oct. 6, 1981, *Sovetskaya Litva* (Vilnius), Aug. 24, 1982; for Australia, *Pravda*, Oct. 7, 1973; as secondary supervisor for Germanic Europe, ibid., July 27, 1982; as secondary supervisor for Latin Europe, ibid., Nov. 29, 1983.

[3]On Shaposhnikov's supervisory role for Scandinavia, see ibid., Feb. 24, 1982, June 9, 1983; and for the "peace" function (he sits on the Presidential Committee of the World Peace Council), *New Perspectives* (Helsinki), No. 6, 1983, p. 2; as secondary supervisor for Latin Europe, *Pravda*, July 15, 1981, Apr. 28, 1983.

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Leaders of Sector and Desks

Chief (or deputy)	Sector/desk	Parties having relations with the CPSU[8]
	GEOGRAPHIC SECTORS	
	(Africa and Middle East)*	
Andrey Y. Urnov[9] Yevgeniy K. Denisov (dep.)[9]	**Black Africa Sector[9]**	
Boris G. Petruk[10]	Angolan/Ethiopian Desk	*Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola/Party of Labor* Commission for Organizing the Party of the Working People of Ethiopia
B.V. Yegorov[11]	Cape Verdean/Guinean/ Guinea-Bissau Desk	African Party for the Independence of Cape Verde Guinean Democratic Party *African Party for the Independence of Guinea (G-Bissau)*
Yevgeniy N. Korendyasov[12]	Congolese/Malian Desk	Congolese Labor Party Democratic Union of the Mali People
Eduard V. Kapskiy[13]	Mozambican/Sao Tome and Principean Desk	Mozambique Liberation Front (Frelimo) Movement for the Liberation of Sao Tome and Principe
Vladimir I. Sharayev (?)[14]	Tanzanian Desk[14]	Revolutionary Party of Tanzania
	Other desks (?)[15]	Benin People's Revolutionary Party Unity and National Progress Party (Burundi) Communist Party of Lesotho Congress Party for Madagascan Independence (AKFM) Party of the Vanguard of the Malagasy Revolution[16] Southwest African People's Organization (Namibia) Socialist Working People's Party (Nigeria) Independence and Labor Party (Senegal) Seychelles People's Progressive Front All People's Congress of Sierra Leone African National Congress (South Africa) South African Communist Party United National Independence Party (Zambia) Zimbabwe African National Union—Patriotic Front[17]
Yuriy S. Gryadunov[18] Sergey A. Kuzmin (dep.)[18]	**Middle East or Arab Affairs Sector[18]**	
Andre Kuzmin (?)[19]	Algerian/Libyan Moroccan/Tunisian Desk	Algerian National Liberation Front General People's Congress of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriyah Independence Party (Istiqlal—Morocco)[20] Party of Progress and Socialism (Morocco) Socialist Union of Popular Forces (Morocco)[21] Tunisian Communist Party
Aleksandr S. Guskov (?)[22]	Bahrainian/Yemeni Desk	Bahrain National Liberation Front Yemeni Socialist Party

*On Brutents's supervisory role for Latin America, see ibid., Aug. 15, 1981, June 22, 1983; for the Middle East, ibid., Jan. 17, 1983, Oct. 4, 1983.

[5]Since his promotion from chief of the "Black Africa" sector to the post of ID deputy chief—at some time between mid-1976 and mid-1978—Manchka has been noted only once in contact with a Black African or any other foreign political party. On his promotion, see *Bakinskiy Rabochiy* (Baku), July 12, 1978.

[6]Ul'yanovskiy's supervisory role for Black Africa continued even after the sector's chief had been promoted to an ID deputy chief (see *Pravda*, Sept. 24, 1982, Mar. 17, 1983). On Ul'yanovskiy's responsibility for South Asia, ibid., July 14, 1983, Apr. 10, 1984; for the Afro-Asian function (at least as of 1976 he was a vice president of the Soviet Committee for Afro-Asian Solidarity), *Bakinskiy Rabochiy*, May 15, 1976. Note also that Ul'yanovskiy supervised Southeast Asia (ibid., Feb. 5, 1980) and Japan (ibid., Nov. 4, 1979) prior to Kovalenko's 1980 assumption of an ID deputy chieftanship (see below).

[7]On Kovalenko's supervisory role for Southeast Asia, see *Izvestiya* (Moscow), Dec. 9, 1981; for Japan, *Pravda*, Feb. 10, 1984.

[8]Unless otherwise sourced, the relationship with the CPSU is evidenced by attendance at its 26th Congress, in February–March 1981.

[9]The area of this sector is defined by the scope of activities of its former chief, Pëtr Manchka (*Zarya Vostoka* [Tbilisi], May 23, 1976; *Pravda*, Jan. 5 and May 25, 1971; *Izvestiya*, Oct. 31, 1970), and of its present deputy chief, Yevgeniy Denisov (*Sovetskaya Latviya* [Riga], Dec. 24, 1982; *Leningradskaya Pravda*, June 12, 1982). Urnov was identified as a sector chief in the ID in connection with his trip to Harare for the Second Congress of the Zimbabwe African National Union—Patriotic Front (*FBIS-SOV*, Aug. 9, 1984, p. J/1).

[10]*Sovetskaya Moldaviya* (Kishinëv), May 14, 1983; *Pravda*, Aug. 10, 1982.

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Chief (or deputy)	Sector/desk	Parties having relations with the CPSU[8]
Grigoriy N. Nechkin (?)[23]	Egyptian/Iraqi/ Jordanian/Sudanese Desk	Egyptian Communist Party National Progressive Unionist Party of Egypt Iraqi Communist Party Communist Party of Jordan Sudanese Communist Party
Nikolay B. Slepov[24]	Israeli Desk	Communist Party of Israel
Vyacheslav N. Matuzov (?)[25]	Lebanese/Palestinian/ Syrian Desk	Lebanese Communist Party Progressive Socialist Party (Lebanon) Palestinian Communist Party[26] Palestine Liberation Organization[1] Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine[27] Arab Socialist Renaissance (Baath) Party of Syria Syrian Communist Party
	(The Americas)*	
Mikhail F. Kudachkin[28]	**Latin American Sector[28]**	
Aleksey N. Mineyev[29]	Argentinian/Colombian/ Panamanian Desk	Communist Party of Argentina Communist Party of Colombia People's Party of Panama
Dmitriy A. Pastukhov[30]	Brazilian Desk	Brazilian Communist Party
Vladimir Y. Tikhmenov[31]	Chilean/Peruvian/ Uruguayan Desk	Chilean Socialist Party Communist Party of Chile MAPU Worker-Peasant Party of Chile Peruvian Communist Party Communist Party of Uruguay
Konstantin N. Kurin[32]	Costa Rican/Dominican/ Mexican/ Nicaraguan Desk	People's Vanguard Party (Costa Rica) Dominican Communist Party Unified Socialist Party of Mexico Sandinista National Liberation Front (Nicaragua)
Pëtr I. Nikolayev[33]	Ecuadoran Desk	Communist Party of Ecuador
Yuriy K. Kozlov[34]	Honduran/Venezuelan Desk	Communist Party of Honduras Communist Party of Venezuela
	Other desks (?)[35]	Communist Party of Bolivia Communist Party of El Salvador[36] Guatemalan Party of Labor[36] Unified Party of Haitian Communists Paraguayan Communist Party

[11] *Zarya Vostoka*, Sept. 10, 1982; *Sovetskaya Kirgiziya* (Frunze), Oct. 24, 1978.

[12] *Izvestiya*, Aug. 13, 1983; *L'Essor* (Bamako), Mar. 30, 1979.

[13] *Pravda Vostoka* [Tashkent], Nov. 23, 1980; *Sovetskaya Litva*, May 25, 1983.

[14] Tentative identification; Sharayev was a mid-level member of a CPSU delegation to Tanzania but not specifically stated to be member of the International Department (*Daily News* [Dar-es-Salaam], Aug. 7, 1982).

[15] The African parties listed at the right have relations with the CPSU, but no ID official has been identified for any of them.

[16] *Pravda*, Feb. 14, 1984.

[17] Ibid., Nov. 30, 1983.

[18] This sector has been publicly identified by name, with Gryadunov as its chief (*Al Nida* [Beirut], Jan. 21, 1982; *Al Bayane* [Casablanca], May 14, 1982), and with Sergey Kuzmin as its deputy chief (*Al Nida*, Mar. 30, 1984).

[19] Tentative identification; Andre Kuzmin has only been identified with Morocco (*Al Bayane*, Mar. 25, 1983).

[20] *Pravda*, May 21, 1982.

[21] Ibid., July 11, 1984.

[22] Tentative identification; Guskov only identified with South Yemen (*Rabochiy klass i sovremennyy mir* [Moscow], No. 1, 1979, p. 91).

[23] Tentative identification; Nechkin only identified with Egypt and Iraq—and only as of October 1972 (Elizabeth Teague, "The Foreign Departments of the Central Committee of the CPSU," *Radio Liberty Research Bulletin* [Munich], Oct. 27, 1980, Supplement, p. 36).

[24] *Pravda*, Feb. 10, 1981. Inclusion of Israel in the Middle East Sector is based purely on logic.

[25] Tentative identification; Matuzov has been reported for Lebanon only (*Al Nida*, Mar. 30, 1984).

[26] *Pravda*, Feb. 14, 1984.

[27] Radio Moscow, May 11, 1984, trans. in *FBIS–SOV*, May 15, 1984, p. H/1.

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Chief (or deputy)	Sector/desk	Parties having relations with the CPSU[8]
Nikolay V. Mostovets[37]	**USA-Canadian Sector[37]**	
Unknown	Canadian Desk	Communist Party of Canada
Unknown	Caribbean Desk	New Jewel Movement (Grenada)[37] People's National Congress (Guyana) People's Progressive Party (Guyana) People's National Party of Jamaica Workers' Party of Jamaica Puerto Rican Communist Party[37]
Igor V. Mikhaylov[38]	USA Desk	Communist Party, USA
	(Asia and the Pacific)*	
Aleksey I. Senatorov[39]	**Japan Sector[39]**	
Yuriy D. Kuznetsov[40]	Japan Desk	Japan Communist Party Socialist Party of Japan[41]
Pëtr V. Kutsobin (?)[42]	**South Asian Sector (?)[42]**	
Unknown	Afghani/Iranian Desk	People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan People's Party of Iran (Tudeh)[43]
Unknown	Bangladeshi/Sri Lankan Desk	Communist Party of Bangladesh National People's Party of Bangladesh Communist Party of Sri Lanka
Unknown	Indian Desk	Communist Party of India Communist Party of India/Marxist[44]
Vladimir G. Tolstikov (?)[45]	**Southeast Asian Sector (?)[45]**	
Aleksandr F. Malov[46]	Burmese/Filipino Desk	Burmese Socialist Program Party[47] Philippine Communist Party (PKP)

[28]This sector and its chief were identified by name in *Oposición* (Mexico City), Aug. 9, 1981; Kudachkin was identified as chief of an unidentified sector in *Asi Es* (Mexico City), Aug. 12–18, 1983.

[29]*Leningradskaya Pravda*, June 28, 1979; *Sovetskaya Latviya*, Jan. 4, 1983; *Voz Proletaria* (Bogota), Nov. 6–12, 1980.

[30]*Sovetskaya Litva*, Aug. 6, 1982.

[31]Ibid., Nov. 14, 1972; *Kommunist* (Yerevan), June 15, 1972; Teague, loc. cit., p. 38. In view of the early dates of these references, it is not at all certain if Tikhmenov still holds this position.

[32]*Asi Es*, Aug. 12–18, 1983; *Sovetskaya Litva*, Mar. 5, 1983; *Pravda Vostoka*, Nov. 26, 1975; *Barricada* (Managua), July 14, 1984.

[33]*Pravda*, Nov. 27, 1981.

[34]*Tribuna Popular* (Caracas), Aug. 1–7, 1980; Teague, loc. cit., p. 32.

[35]The Latin American parties listed at the right have relations with the CPSU, but no ID official has been identified for any of them.

[36]Had representatives at the 60th anniversaries of the October Revolution (in 1977) and of the founding of the USSR (in 1982). See *Pravda*, Oct. 31, 1977, and Dec. 19, 1982.

[37]This sector, with Mostovets as its chief, was identified by name in the *Canadian Tribune* (Toronto), Jan. 14, 1980. Both Mostovets and a colleague, Dmitriy D. Murav'yëv, have been identified with activities vis-à-vis Jamaica and Guyana (*Pravda*, Sept. 22, 1977, Sept. 21, 1978, and Aug. 11, 1982; *Guyana Chronicle* [Georgetown], Aug. 4, 1976); Murav'yëv has also been identified with Canada (Radio Yerevan, July 14, 1971, trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, July 16, 1971, p. G/3) and the United States (*Bakinskiy Rabochiy*, Oct. 21, 1979). Grenada is included in this sector by force of logic; Puerto Rico (less confidently) by analogy with the French "overseas departments."

[38]*Kommunist* (Yerevan), Sept. 9, 1978.

[39]*Pravda*, Nov. 17, 1982. The small scope of this sector argues for its being combined with that of Southeast Asia, but Senatorov has only been noted as dealing with Japan. He was most recently identified as a sector chief (without specification of the sector) in *Pravda*, July 9, 1984.

[40]Moscow TASS, Apr. 25, 1984, trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, Apr. 26, 1984, p. C/1.

[41]*Pravda*, Feb. 10, 1984.

[42]The scope of this sector is tentative; Kutsobin has been noted as dealing only with India (*Sovetskaya Rossiya*, Feb. 6, 1968; *Pravda*, Mar. 21, 1982). The sector's apparent overseer, Ul'yanovskiy, has been noted as dealing with Afghanistan, Sri Lanka, and Iran (*Pravda*, July 14, 1983, Oct. 18, 1979; *Kommunist* [Moscow], No. 10, July 1982, p. 106), as well as with India (*Pravda*, July 27, 1980).

[43]The Tudeh was prevented by the Iranian government from attending the 1981 CPSU Congress (Radio Baghdad, Mar. 5, 1981, trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, Mar. 9, 1981, p. P/4). However, *Pravda* of Mar. 6, 1981, did publish a message to that congress from the Tudeh.

[44]*Mundo Obrero* (Madrid), Feb. 3–9, 1984.

[45]Existence of this sector is open to doubt. It was identified in 1968, but with Japanese specialist Ivan Kovalenko as chief (Hanoi, VNA, Dec. 17, 1968, trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, Dec. 17, 1968, p. A/5). This implies that it might have been combined then or subsequently with the Japan Sector listed above. On the other hand, Vladimir Tolstikov, who was identified as chief of an unidentified International Department sector as well having had dealings with the Congo at the time that Pëtr Manchkha was "Black Africa" sector chief (*Leninskoye Znamya* [Moscow], July 7, 1984), was last noted as dealing with the Philippines (Radio Manila, Dec. 19, 1981, trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, Jan. 13, 1982, p. E/1).

[46]*Leningradskaya Pravda*, Oct. 19, 1974; *Krasnaya Zvezda* (Moscow), Mar. 25, 1978.

[47]*Leningradskaya Pravda*, Oct. 19, 1974.

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Chief (or deputy)	Sector/desk	Parties having relations with the CPSU[8]
Unknown	Indonesian/Kampuchean Desk	Communist Party of Indonesia Kampuchean People's Revolutionary Party
	(Western Europe)*	
Dmitriy N. Mochalin[48]	**Germanic Europe Sector[48]**	
Yuriy D. Koshelev[49]	Austria/Luxembourg/ Netherlands (?) Desk[49]	Communist Party of Austria Communist Party of Luxembourg Communist Party of the Netherlands
Viktor V. Tyutonov[50]	West Berlin Desk	Socialist Unity Party of West Berlin
Vsevolod D. Yezhov[51]	West German Desk	German Communist Party
Boris M. Pyshkov (?)[52]	**Greece-Cyprus-Turkey Sector[52]**	
Karl A. Shemenkov[53]	Cypriot/Greek Desk	Progressive Party of the Working People (Cyprus) Communist Party of Greece Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK—Greece)[54]
Unknown	Turkish Desk (?)[55]	Turkish Communist Party
Yuriy I. Zuyev[56]	**Latin Europe Sector[56]**	
Dmitriy Y. Moisenko-Yelikiy[57]	Belgian/Swiss Desk	Communist Party of Belgium Swiss Party of Labor
Vitaliy S. Gusenkov[58]	French Desk	French Communist Party
Nikolay N. Komin[59]	French Overseas Depts. Desk (?)[60]	Guadeloupe Communist Party Martinique Communist Party Réunion Communist Party
Vladimir V. Pertsov[61]	Iberian Desk	Communist Party (Spain)[62] Communist Party of Spain Spanish Socialist Workers' Party[63] Portuguese Communist Party (?)[61]
Unknown[64]	Italian Desk	Italian Communist Party Communist Party of San Marino

[48]The area of this sector is defined by the scope of activities of its chief (*Pravda*, Dec. 13, 1972, Feb. 28, 1974, June 3, 1975, Apr. 30, 1976, Jan. 25, 1977). Mochalin was last noted as a sector chief in ibid., Mar. 10, 1983.

[49]Ibid., May 8 and Oct. 28, 1980. Koshelev's apparent predecessor, A.D. Popov, dealt with the Netherlands as well (see *Morgenbladet* [Oslo], May 15, 1963; *Volkstimme* [Vienna], Jan. 18, 1974).

[50]*Die Wahrheit* (West Berlin), May 16, 1981.

[51]*Pravda*, Jan. 19, 1982.

[52]Pyshkov was reported most recently as a sector chief dealing with Greece (*Pravda*, June 2, 1981), and no other sector chief has been noted as dealing with Greece, Turkey, or Cyprus. Though Pyshkov was twice noted in 1977 as dealing with "Latin Europe" (Teague, loc. cit., p. 36), he has not been reported so since. Moreover, Yuriy Zuyev has been reported as the sector chief dealing with "Latin Europe" consistently before, during, and after 1977 (see *Pravda*, July 23, 1975, June 5, 1977, and May 4, 1981).

[53]*Kharavgi* (Nicosia), Apr. 24, 1974; *Leningradskaya Pravda*, May 5, 1983.

[54]Radio Bratislava, May 10, 1984, trans. in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Eastern Europe* (Washington, DC), May 10, 1984, p. D/5.

[55]The rationale for placing Turkey in this sector is that the Turkish Communist Party is apparently regarded as a European rather than Middle Eastern party (e.g., it took part in the conference of European communist parties in June 1976—see *Information Bulletin* [Prague], No. 12, 1976, p. 5—and has not been noted as taking part in any meeting of strictly Middle Eastern communist parties).

[56]The area of this sector is defined by the scope of activities of its chief (*Pravda*, May 4 and Oct. 21, 1981, May 22 and July 13, 1983) and of his predecessor, Yuriy N. Pankov (ibid., June 13, 1973; and *Leningradskaya Pravda*, Oct. 30, 1974).

[57]*Le Drapeau Rouge* (Brussels), Apr. 3, 1979; *Voix Ouvrière* (Geneva), May 26–June 1, 1983.

[58]*Pravda Vostoka*, July 23, 1980.

[59]Komin does Martinique *Uustice* [Fort de France?], Apr. 17, 1980) and presumably also handles Guadeloupe and Réunion.

[60]The rationale for inclusion of this desk in this sector is that Moisenko-Yelikiy handled at least Martinique and Guadeloupe prior to taking over responsibilities for Belgium and France (see *Pravda*, Dec. 14, 1975, and Nov. 12, 1977).

[61]It is clear that Pertsov covers Spain (*Mundo Obrero*, Dec. 23–29, 1983); he presumably also covers Portugal.

[62]Ibid., Feb. 3–9, 1984.

[63]Moscow TASS, Aug. 5, 1983, trans. in *FBIS–SOV*, Aug. 9, 1983, p. G/2.

[64]The former desk chief, Sergey Mironov (*L'Unità* [Rome], Apr. 1, 1979), was posted to Rome as first secretary in late 1983 or early 1984.

[65]The area of this sector is defined by the scope of activities of its chief (*Pravda*, June 6, 1968, Nov. 11, 1977, Apr. 12, 1978, May 11, 1983; *Leningradskaya Pravda*, Mar. 12, 1975).

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Chief (or deputy)	Sector/desk	Parties having relations with the CPSU[8]
Ivan P. Rozdorozhnyy[65]	**Scandinavia Sector[65]**	
Vladimir S. Savko[66]	Danish Desk	Communist Party of Denmark
Stepan V. Smirnov[67]	Finnish Desk	Communist Party of Finland Finnish Center Party[68] Finnish Social Democratic Party[69]
Vasily K. Fadin (?)[70]	Norwegian Desk	Communist Party of Norway[71]
Yevgeniy A. Vorozheykin[72]	Swedish Desk	Communist Workers' Party (Sweden) Party of the Left—Communists (Sweden)
Dzavad A. Sharif[73]	**UK-Ireland Sector[73]**	
Yevgeniy S. Lagutin[74]	Irish Desk	Communist Party of Ireland
Unknown	Maltese Desk	Communist Party of Malta
Unknown	UK Desk	Communist Party of Great Britain
Unknown[75]	Other desks (?)[75]	Socialist Party of Australia (?)[75] Socialist Unity Party (New Zealand) (?)[75]
	FUNCTIONAL SECTORS	
Yuliy F. Kharlamov[76]	**"Peace" Sector**	
Grigoriy V. Shumeyko[77]	**"Afro-Asian/Trade Union" Sector**	
Aleksey I. Legasov[78]	**"Friendship Associations" Sector**	
Unknown[79]	**"Travel" Sector[80]**	
Unknown[81]	**Other fronts (?)[81]**	

[66] *Bakinskiy Rabochiy*, Sept. 5, 1980.

[67] *Pravda Vostoka*, Nov. 14, 1981.

[68] *Pravda*, May 1, 1982.

[69] Ibid., Nov. 8, 1981.

[70] *Friheten* (Oslo), Nov. 5–10, 1973. In view of the early date of this citation, it is not at all certain if Fadin still holds this position.

[71] *Pravda*, Oct. 18, 1981.

[72] *Sovetskaya Estoniya* (Tallinn), Feb. 20, 1982.

[73] The area of this sector is defined by the scope of activities of its chief (*Pravda*, Dec. 4, 1980, Oct. 6, 1981, and May 25, 1982).

[74] Ibid., Feb. 24, 1979.

[75] Australia and New Zealand would logically be handled either by this sector or a separate one. International Department Deputy Chief Chernyayev apparently overseas Australian matters (ibid., Oct. 7, 1973) as well as those for the United Kingdom (ibid., Oct. 6, 1981), Ireland (ibid., Feb. 26, 1979), and Canada (ibid., Feb. 20, 1982). However, *neither Australia nor New Zealand were specifically mentioned in the title of the sector in its 1980 identification (see fn 30).*

[76] Identified as ID sector chief in World Peace Council, "Special Session of the World Peace Council in Berlin, Feb. 2–5, 1979," *Bulletin* (Helsinki), No. 3, n.d.; and *Vedomosti Verkhovnogo Soveta RSFSR* (Moscow), No. 22, Dec. 3, 1982, p. 447. Identified with World Peace Council in World Peace Council, op. cit.; World Parliament of the Peoples for Peace, *Preliminary List of Participants*, n.d., p. 97; World Assembly for Peace and Life, Against Nuclear War, *List of Participants*, n.d., p. 170. In these latter two citations, Kharlamov was listed as a "member of the Scientific Council of Research in Problems of Peace and Disarmament."

[77] Identified as a "sector chief" in *Literaturnaya Gazeta* (Moscow), No. 40, 1975, p. 1; and as an ID sector chief in *Moskovskaya Pravda*, Jan. 16, 1982. Identified as participant in the Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organization (AAPSO) in AAPSO, *Tenth Meeting of the AAPSO Presidium*, Cairo, 1982, p. 149; and as participant (as an "advisor of the USSR") in the World Federation of Trade Unions' Tenth World Trade Union Congress (see *List of Participants*, n.p., n.d., p. 60).

[78] Identified both as an ID sector chief and as dealing with friendship associations in *Pravda Ukrainy* (Kiev), Dec. 9, 1973, and *Leningradskaya Pravda*, Jan. 22, 1982.

[79] Grant Akopov was deputy chief of such a sector prior to his 1974 appointment as undersecretary for the League of Red Cross Societies in Geneva (*Leningradskaya Pravda*, June 5, 1973).

[80] Escorts foreign party delegations around the USSR.

[81] Assumed to exist by analogy with the "Peace" Sector.

[82] *Pravda*, July 27, 1981, June 21, 1983.

[83] *Leninskoye Znamya*, Sept. 12, 1982; Rykin was recently noted as simply an employee of the ID dealing with Germany (*Unsere Zeit* [Dusseldorf], May 26, 1984).

[84] *Leninskoye Znamya*, May 30, 1980; *Pravda*, June 28, 1979.

[85] *Sovetskaya Estoniya*, Mar. 5, 1982; *Moskovskaya Pravda*, Sept. 11, 1980.

[86] *Pravda*, May 4, 1981.

[87] *Unclassified US Department of State cable, Moscow-1557*, Feb. 8, 1984.

[88] Radio Moscow, June 17, 1983, trans, in *FBIS–SOV*, June 20, 1983, p. AA/3; Moscow, APN, Jan. 14, 1982, trans. in Joint Publications Research Service, *USSR Report: Political and Sociological Affairs* (Washington, DC), No. 1221, JPRS No. 80146, Feb. 22, 1982, p. 17.

[89] *Leninskoye Znamya*, Sept. 28, 1979.

[90] *Izvestiya*, Apr. 14, 1981.

[91] *Mirovaya Ekonomika i Mezhdunarodnyye Otnosheniya* (Moscow), No. 4, 1980, p. 31; Joint Publications Research Service, *USSR Report: Political and Sociological Affairs*, No. 1043, JPRS No. 75943, June 26, 1980, p. 17.

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MISCELLANEOUS UNITS

Consultants Group	Specialty:
Yuriy A. Zhilin, Chief[82]	Portugal and Spain
Viktor S. Rykin[83]	Germany
Vadim K. Sobakin[84]	France
Oleg Ivanitskiy[85]	Italy
Genrikh P. Smirnov[86]	Italy
Stanislav M. Menshikov[87]	US and economics[88]
Venyamin V. Midtsev[89]	Africa[90]
Yuriy A. Krasin[91]	Ideology (?)[92]
Aleksey P. Kozlov[93]	Ideology (?)
Nikolay A. Koval'skiy[94]	Ideology[95]

M.I. Kovalev[96] **Secretariat**

[92]He is a pro-rector of the CPSU Central Committee's Academy of Social Sciences (Elizabeth Teague, "CPSU Spokesmen Criticize New Internationalism," *Radio Liberty Research Bulletin*, RL 262/81, July 1, 1981.

[93]*Leninskoye Znamya*, Oct. 28, 1982.

[94]*Bakinskiy Rabochiy*, Feb. 26, 1982.

[95]In 1973, Koval'skiy was deputy director of the Institute of the International Workers Movement (*Moskovskaya Pravda*, Apr. 26, 1973).

[96]*Vedomosti Verkhovnogo Soveta RSFSR*, No. 52, Dec. 28, 1978, p. 1070.

NOTE ON SOURCES AND METHODOLOGY: This chart is a revision and update of work previously done by the author and appearing in Ralph M. Goldman, Ed., *Transnational Parties: Organizing the World's Precincts*, Lanham, MD, The University Press of America, 1983, Appendix C, pp. 329–55. The existence of most sectors and all desks is derived from the activities of the individuals identified, except where direct public confirmation has been found (in the case of the name of several sectors). When an individual deals with several countries, the latest reference for each country is provided. On foreign party attendance at the 26th CPSU Congress in 1981, see ibid., Appendix A, pp. 305–19.

Addendum 2: ID Representatives Abroad

Many accounts appearing over the last 17 years seem to indicate that the ID had by the mid-1960's begun to send abroad its own representatives, who served in Soviet diplomatic missions. These representatives were engaged in party rather than governmental work and enjoyed a degree of independence from normal embassy control. The top such figure usually operated at the counselor or first secretary level.

In 1967, American journalist C.L. Sulzberger identified Vladimir Fedorov, a Soviet embassy counselor in Helsinki, as a "political action agent" reporting directly to the ID. The only evidence cited was that Fedorov had once been a "deputy [sector?] chief in the International Section."[1] Manfred Geist in the November 1, 1975, issue of *Die Welt* (Bonn) quoted "a Western diplomat" as having observed that by the end of the 1960's there was a new breed of Soviet embassy counselor or first secretary that had no normal diplomatic function but that could also not be proved to be in intelligence work. The diplomat reportedly stated that it had gradually become clear that these men were representatives of the ID and that they had a separate channel for reporting back to Moscow.[2] A year later, British scholar Leonard Shapiro stated: "there is also some evidence which suggests that the International Department (ID) has representatives in foreign embassies whose job it is to collect information about political parties and groupings, to assess the political situation of the country concerned, and to establish contacts with progressive organizations and individuals. . . . it is said to enjoy a virtually independent status in the embassy."[3]

More recently, Soviet KGB defector Vladimir Sakharov has written that ID representatives began to be stationed abroad in 1967 and that as of 1969 Counselor Vadim Sinel'nikov headed a six-man ID section in the Soviet embassy in Cairo. (Sinel'nikov had been posted to the embassy in 1965.) Sakharov added that Sinel'nikov in this capacity coordinated and controlled the overt and covert actions of Soviet diplomats, intelligence operatives, and military officials in the conduct of political, economic, and ideological warfare. Sakharov claimed that the recruitment of local politicians was a part of this activity and that, as a result, the Soviets had coopted Ali Sabri, chairman of the Arab Socialist Union (ASU—Egypt's ruling, and sole legal party at the time).[4] Although Sakharov's story cannot be confirmed directly, it seems plausible in light of what happened in Egypt. In early 1965 the Egyptian Communist Party dissolved itself, allowing many of its members to join the ruling Arab Socialist Union.[5] In mid-1971, a year after Gamal Abdul Nasser's death, an allegedly communist "socialist vanguard" organization within the ASU was suspended, and then Ali Sabri was arrested—Anwar al-Sadat accusing both

[1]*The New York Times*, Sept. 13, 1967.

[2]See Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Soviet Union* (Washington, DC), Nov. 7, 1975, p. R/8.

[3]"The International Department of the CPSU: Key to Soviet Policy," *International Journal* (Toronto), Winter 1976–77, p. 43.

[4]Vladimir Sakharov and Umberto Tosi, *High Treason*, New York, G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1980, pp. 209, 237–42.

[5]See Edith Wyden's section on the United Arab Republic (Egypt), in Richard F. Staar, Ed., *Yearbook on International Communist Affairs, 1972* (hereafter cited as *YICA* with the relevant year), Stanford, CA, Hoover Institution Press, 1972, p. 301.

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of having conspired to overthrow his government.[6] Sakharov's description of Sinel'nikov's functions while in Cairo fit the "political action agent" term that Sulzberger used to characterize Fedorov's role in Helsinki.

One can also piece together from admittedly circumstantial evidence some picture of the ID's representation in the Soviet embassy in Paris. The aforementioned *Die Welt* article stated that the newly appointed Minister-Counselor Yuriy Pankov was the ID "deputy" in the Soviet mission in Paris. That city's *Le Point* on November 1, 1976, concurred, adding that Pankov was the Soviet contact man for the French Communist Party (PCF). For eight years prior to his 1975 posting to Paris, Pankov had headed the ID sector dealing with Latin European countries.[7] Paris's *Liberation* of April 6, 1983, alleged that a three-man team in the local Soviet embassy—Counselor Yuriy Rubinskiy, Counselor Oleg Krivonogov, and Third Secretary Yevgeniy Kristoradov—was charged with handling relations with the PCF. Unlike the case of Pankov, we know nothing of any ID background for Rubinskiy, but the latter's arrival in Paris at some time between January and October 1978 would have provided a convenient and logical overlap with the tour of Pankov (which ended in early 1979). Krivonogov's background is also unknown, but his arrival in Paris sometime between October 1978 and April 1979 would have also provided a useful overlap with the tour of Counselor Vitaliy Gusenkov, who departed sometime between October 1979 and July 1980 to become an ID official in Moscow dealing with French affairs,[8] the implication being that he may have been representing the ID in Paris as well. The *Liberation* article notes that Kristoradov is a specialist in youth affairs, but we have no other information on either him or whom he replaced in Paris.

Most evidence of ID activity abroad has been circumstantial and implicit—basically information on officials of the ID in Moscow having come from or gone to positions in Soviet embassies abroad. One of the best examples is Yuriy Kuznetsov, noted as a "responsible worker" of the ID both just before and after his 1974–80 tour as counselor in the embassy in Tokyo.[9] While Kuznetsov was in Japan, the Moscow ID Japan Desk man was Aleksey Senatorov,[10] who had been first secretary in the Tokyo embassy in 1970. When Kuznetsov returned to take over the Japan Desk in 1980, Senatorov was moved up to Japan Sector chief.[11]

Another example is Oleg Ivanitskiy, who returned from his post as counselor of the embassy in Rome in 1968. Though we have no information on him during the next 12 years, he was cited as an ID consultant in 1980.[12] This in itself would not be too revealing (because of the time lapse), except for the fact that Genrikh Smirnov returned from his 1968–72 tour as first secretary in Rome to become a "responsible worker" and then a consultant in the ID.[13] Smirnov seems to have followed Ivanitskiy in career progression. The present ID official in Rome, incidentally, appears to be First Secretary Sergey Mironov, who in 1979 (before his Rome posting) was listed as an ID official.[14]

The Paris accounts imply nothing more regarding the ID representatives concerned than their function of overt or semi-overt party contact. Either we lack inside information on more extensive activities; or perhaps the comparative sophistication, internal strength, and long history of the PCF made impractical an operation such as Sinel'nikov's against the ASU in Egypt. Yet, British analyst David Peck raises the interesting point that Pankov's tour in France did coincide with Soviet efforts to deflect the PCF's Eurocommunist line, which was just surfacing.[15] Certainly, Pankov departed just as the French party was more or less beginning to swing back toward the Soviet line.[16]

The French case is suggestive of the kinds of considerations underlying CPSU appointment of ID chiefs at the minister-counselor level. In a perhaps similar appointment Viktor Yakunin took up his post as minister-counselor in New Delhi shortly after having been described as an ID official.[17] If he was ID chief in New Delhi, his assignment may have been justified by the size of the Indian communist movement and the trouble it was giving the Soviets at the time because of its split into two major parties. By 1980 the more anti-Soviet Communist Party of India (Marxist) had begun to cooperate with the Communist Party of India, and by 1981 it had begun to support the Soviets on key foreign policy issues.[18] Yakunin was still in New Delhi as of mid-1982.

Earlier, from 1965 to 1967, Mikhail Kudachkin (since at least 1970 chief of the ID Latin America sector),[19] served as minister-counselor in Santiago, Chile. During his stay, the pro-Soviet and "legal struggle"–oriented Chilean Communist Party (PCCh) increased its membership by 60 percent and its voting strength by approximately 10 percent in spite of an ongoing disagreement with its pro-Cuban and violence-oriented ally, the Chilean Socialist Party. In fact, by 1967 the PCCh was cited as perhaps the most influential communist party in Latin America.[20] Again, Kudachkin's role as an ID representative is only circumstantial here, but in light of a continued PCCh policy of limited cooperation with the government of Eduardo Frei—which complemented Soviet diplomatic initiatives at the time (strong Socialist Party pressures to the contrary)—and his subsequent ID appointment, one could infer his role in Santiago and the possibility that it had been regarded as at least mildly successful.

From this admittedly fragmentary evidence, we may surmise that ID officials are sent abroad at the minister-counselor level to work on important political problems which, from the Soviet party's perspective, have been in a number of cases alleviated significantly during or just following their tours.

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[6] Ibid., pp. 301–02.
[7] *Pravda* (Moscow), Oct. 23, 1976; *Leningradskaya Pravda*, Aug. 3, 1974.
[8] *Pravda Vostoka* (Tashkent), July 23, 1980.
[9] See *Leninskoye Znamya* (Moscow), Mar. 27, 1974, and *Pravda*, Dec. 4, 1980.
[10] *Leninskoye Znamya*, June 24, 1975.
[11] *Pravda*, Oct. 25, 1980.
[12] *Moskovskaya Pravda*, Sept. 11, 1980.
[13] *Pravda*, Sept. 11, 1975, and May 4, 1981; *L'Unità* (Rome).
[14] *L'Unità*, Apr. 1, 1979.
[15] See Peck's "Moscow and Eurocommunism," *Soviet Analyst* (London), Apr. 2, 1980, pp. 5–7. The article gives no details to support its author's conjecture.
[16] See Nicolas Tandler's selection on France in Richard F. Staar, Ed. *YICA 1981*, pp. 386–87.
[17] *Sovetskaya Estoniya* (Tallinn), July 23, 1976.
[18] See Walter K. Anderson's section on India in Richard F. Staar, Ed., *YICA 1982*, pp. 185–86.
[19] *Izvestiya* (Moscow), Dec. 11, 1970.
[20] See the sections on Chile in Milorad Drachkovitch, Ed., *YICA 1966*, pp. 193–96; and in Richard V. Allen, Ed., *YICA 1968*, pp. 91–92.

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Notes & Views

Transboundary Television

George H. Quester

WHILE THERE IS great uncertainty in the world about the impact of television on political, intellectual, and ordinary life, few would deny that this impact is important. The general trend of broadcast technology, with some exceptions, is to make transboundary transmission of television programming easier, reinforcing Western inclinations toward free viewer choice and a free flow of information. Yet communist responses to the transboundary broadcasting that has already occurred suggest that important political conflicts lie ahead.[1] This essay will attempt to survey the impact that transboundary television signals have had on the communist world to date, and then to project some possibilities for the future.

Unable to deliver a full array of printed materials past communist borders, the West has strived for decades to reach audiences there through radio transmissions,[2] with the communist regimes investing substantial resources in trying to cut off such transmissions by electronic jamming. Just as radio became to some extent a substitute for the printed word in Western homes, it became an even more indispensable substitute in communist-governed countries, since the local press had so little real news in it. More recently, television has in turn largely replaced radio in many countries, by dint of its greater entertainment appeal and more graphic presentation of news and information.[3] If Western radio broadcasts could perhaps beat communist radio broadcasts in audience appeal, communist *television* programming might thus have greater appeal in competition against anyone else's radio. Given the grip that television signals have displayed around the world, reaching to the peoples in countries dominated by communist parties may now become more of a task for television.

Just as they have been on their guard against radio, communist governments, particularly that of the USSR, have been vehemently opposed to the new possibilities of penetration by transboundary television. This Soviet-American conflict intersects interestingly with concerns in some democratic states—for example, Canada, Sweden, and West Germany—about American television penetration.[4] These countries are not in the slightest worried that American television programming might bring in news that has been withheld from their peoples; rather, they are concerned about the entertainment aspects of the television medium, which could become absorbingly addictive, put local entertainers out of work, get viewers excessively accustomed to American lifestyles, and perhaps even threaten the local language in the face of an onslaught of English.

The Soviet government, in questioning the legitimacy of uncontrolled international television and radio

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[1]Earlier disputes between the United States and the Soviet Union about the legitimacy of international broadcasting as opposed to jamming are discussed in Francis S. Ronalds, "Voices of Americas," *Foreign Policy* (Washington, DC), Spring 1979, pp. 154–60. See also Thomas C. Sorensen, *The Word War*, New York, Harper and Row, 1968.

[2]For a discussion of the earlier pattern of US radio activity, see Maury Kisann, *Broadcasting to the Soviet Union: International Politics and Radio*, New York, Praeger, 1975; and Sig Mickelson, *America's Other Voice: The Story of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty*, New York, Praeger, 1983. For an early UNESCO endorsement of unhampered international broadcasting, see George A. Codding, *Broadcasting without Barriers*, Paris, UNESCO, 1959.

[3]The replacement of radio, and of newspapers, as the major source of news for Americans is outlined in Austin Ranney, *Channels of Power*, New York, Basic Books, 1983.

[4]For an extended discussion of the disagreements between the United States and some other democracies on this issue, see Herbert I. Schiller, *Mass Communications and American Empire*, Boston, MA, Beacon Press, 1971. See also Kaarle Nordenstreng and Herbert I. Schiller, Eds., *National Sovereignty and International Communication*, Norwood, NJ, Ablex, 1979.

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signals, has not been above exploiting these cultural concerns in the advanced industrial democracies and in the Third World. In discussing television penetration of the communist world, it is important to recall such wider ramifications of disputes about transboundary television; at the same time, one must remember that communist authorities tend to be concerned much less about cultural impact and much more that their populations not hear and see news that reflects badly on the communist form of government.

The possibility of transboundary television leakage that might upset Marxist regimes is not merely hypothetical, for we already have a number of real-life cases to list. Among the instances that have already occurred are the following:

- West German (and Danish and Swedish) television reaching East Germany;
- Finnish television reaching Estonia;
- Austrian and West German television reaching Czechoslovakia;
- Austrian television reaching Hungary;
- US television reaching Cuba;
- Costa Rican and Honduran television reaching Nicaragua;
- Polish television reaching the Byelorussian and Ukrainian SSR's;
- Romanian television reaching the Moldavian SSR.

To be sure, normal terrestrial television broadcasts have typically been tunable only about 100 miles from their origin (a bit farther across bodies of water). But penetrations by an outside signal are likely to be facilitated by the onward march of technology, so that their impact thus far may be only a foretaste of the future—as improved terrestrial transmission techniques, or television programs beamed down from direct broadcast satellites (DBS), or the proliferation of video cassette recorders (VCR's) make more viewer choice possible even within the Soviet Union and other communist states.[5] And, while the distribution of television sets across the Marxist-governed world varies widely, it is already large enough in some countries to create a significant potential audience for programs received from the outside (see Table 1). Moreover, in the communist country with the highest percentage of television sets per capita, East Germany, existing technology already makes it possible to tune in a wide array of programming from nearby, noncommunist transmitters.

Table 1: Concentration of Television Sets in Marxist Societies, 1980[1]

(sets per 1,000 population)

East Germany	342
Soviet Union	303
Czechoslovakia	280
Hungary	258
Poland	224
Yugoslavia	192
Bulgaria	186
Romania	167
Cuba	129
Nicaragua	65
Vietnam	10
Albania	4
China	4
Mongolia	3
North Korea	1
Kampuchea	0
West Germany	*337*
United States	*624*

[1]Figures on West Germany and US provided for purposes of comparison.

SOURCES: *UNESCO Statistical Yearbook 1982*, Paris, UNESCO, 1982, Sect. 11.4; *World Radio-Television Handbook*, Vol. 34, London, Billboard Limited, 1980; and *TV Factbook 1980*, Washington, DC, Television Digest, 1980.

The East German TV Audience

Does East Germany have a free press? "Of course not," most would answer. Yet East Germans can each evening get a lengthy account of happenings in their country by watching West German television, an account by journalists who speak the same language and are very interested in the country.[6] It remains something of a mystery why the East German communist leadership at the beginning of the 1950's chose technical standards for television compatible with those of West Germany and West Berlin, rather than those used throughout the other Comecon countries. An enterprising East German could always, of course, have overcome differences in channel wavelengths by getting someone to build him an adaptor, as is now not unusual in Czechoslovakia and Hungary, but this obstacle helps keep the number of Western-television watchers in those countries down to a distinct minority. East Germans, by contrast, do not have to arrange for the acquisition of such gimmicks, but can simply

[5]An overview of the array of new technological modes of transmitting television signals, opening up many more channels, is provided in Stuart M. DeLuca, *Television's Transformation: The Next Twenty-Five Years*, San Diego, CA, S. Barnes and Company, 1980.

[6]The East German audience for West German television is discussed in David Marks, "Broadcasting Across the Wall: The Free Flow of Information Between East and West Germany," *Journal of Communication* (Philadelphia, PA), Winter 1983, pp. 46–55.

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tune their sets to the channels used by western transmitters.

This early East German decision to standardize on the same technical specifications as West Germany might be attributed to a continued commitment in the east, as in the west, to the prospect of German national reunification, which was renounced only much later by the communist authorities. Each side was reluctant to admit that no reunification would ever occur, since that would have alienated the large number of Germans on both sides who aspired to it. Had East Germany launched a television system incompatible with the west, it would have suffered a short-term loss in arousing those who accused it of being intent on permanent partition. Yet, the long-term gain might have been worth it, in keeping the great majority of East German homes from having such direct and captivating access to news and entertainment from the west.

There was a period when the East German authorities deputized the Freie Deutsche Jugend (FDJ) communist youth organization to go from house to house insisting that television antennas be turned away from West Berlin or West German transmitters, to face instead only toward East German transmission towers. Television receiving antennas are inherently directional, thus sometimes giving away the location of the station any home is tuned in on. But this was a most unpopular policy, and a thankless policing task, given the fact that West Berlin is in the middle of East Germany, so that its transmitters are in the same direction from many homes as communist transmitters.

As a belated effort to get out of technological step with the west, the East German *color* television system was made incompatible with that of West Germany, but the same as that purchased for all of Eastern Europe (the SECAM system, purchased, incidentally, from France, whose television for long was totally incompatible with that of its neighbors).[7] East Germans determined to watch the news (or anything else) in color would thus have to stop watching the signal from the west. If West German interest in an East German audience were not obvious enough, the Federal Republic has now invested in some transmitters capable of sending color signals in SECAM, rather than in the PAL system used in the west. Viewers on either side of the border can tune in SECAM programming in black and white, but the East Germans will not even have to forgo color reception when tuning in to these western programs—while West German viewers would have to be content with black and white, or tune in a different transmitter. Since not that many East Germans have as yet acquired color receivers, this surely amounts to some planning ahead by the West German authorities.

Transboundary television watching along the border between the two Germanys is a two-way street, of course. East Germans value such leakage through the border for news, for additional popular entertainment programs, and simply for the choice offered by having additional channels to suit one's mood. West German watchers would rarely, if ever, tune to East German transmissions as their sole source of news, but might still wish to watch the East German rendering of the news, because this rendering itself was news. West Germans would also certainly be able to find a fair number of high-culture offerings on East German television, including opera and ballet, and might also welcome the very fact that there were additional choices available.

By the 1980's, the East German regime seemed largely resigned to the fact that most of its people would watch West German television. The corner of southeastern East Germany around Dresden was the one portion of the GDR that could not tune in a West German television signal, and, not coincidentally, the regime encountered a serious reluctance by people to be relocated there. Even ardent communist party workers, when asked to list their preferences for assignments within East Germany, tended to list Dresden as their bottom choice; when pressed to explain the unpopularity of this location, the answer was typically the fewer television channels that could be received. As a way of being more equitable, or of removing an obstacle to economic efficiency and labor mobility, the GDR regime began installing a cable television system in 1983 for the Dresden area that would include West German transmissions.[8]

Suspicious observers will wait to see whether every last Federal Republic news program is allowed to get through on this cable system, or whether such news broadcasts might not be "blacked out" when a particular news day is too embarrassing for the GDR or its Soviet patrons. Perhaps the ideal policy for the GDR regime would be to allow total laissez faire here, winning some confidence among East Germans in its claim that it had nothing to hide. But perhaps a more astute policy would be to let West German (sometimes American in origin) entertainment programs filter through, while cutting out West German news.

Some difficult choices, for anyone who yearns for the spread of more liberal institutions throughout

[7] On the PAL–SECAM competition, see Rhoda J. Crane, *The Politics of International Standards*, Norwood, NJ, Ablex, 1979.

[8] James M. Markham, "TV Brings Western Culture to East Germany," *The New York Times*, Feb. 13, 1984. See also William Drozdiak, "Two Germanys Slacken Ties After Allies Voice Unease," *The Washington Post*, June 1, 1984.

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Eastern Europe, arise in this connection. Could it be that the East German authorities might have traveled farther by now down the road taken by Hungary, tolerating more discussion and personal freedom at home, had it not been for the constant threat of destabilization and ferment posed by television contact with West Germany? Could it be that this special window on the outside world has kept the GDR regime from feeling free to open any other windows, lest the total become unmanageable? Westerners might be quick to applaud when people are given an opportunity to hear the truth about the world. Yet everything in life has its price. It is conceivable that the East Germans have been accorded less personal freedom precisely because there is an alternative Germany to the west, a Germany to which they are so well connected each evening as they tune in the news.

Information is a very important part of freedom, but it is not all of freedom. The average East German has good access to a reliable source of news in West German television, but this has not yet in any noticeable way loosened the grip of the communist authorities on life in the GDR. Still, the intrusion of information is clearly not something communist authorities welcome, or to which they are indifferent. The Soviet Union, in its vehement opposition to direct broadcast satellite television transmission into the USSR or Eastern Europe, shows this all too well. Moreover, some television penetrations that have already taken place using existing technologies have had political repercussions.

Other TV Penetrations

Foreign Inflows. Although East Germany presents the most clear-cut case of transboundary television transmissions involving the communist world, there have been other interesting cases that can be briefly outlined here. The impact of Finnish television on nearby Estonia, where the closely related Finnish language is widely understood, has not been trivial.[9] Unlike Swedish or Norwegian television, the Finnish system includes some commercial advertising. This may be irritating for those in Helsinki who would have liked all air time to be allocated to entertainment or news, but commercials may be just as interesting as the news for an Estonian viewing the same signals in Tallinn. Soviet newspapers have at times felt a need to denounce the implicit propaganda of these commercial messages, claiming, for example, that the goods shown were not really available in Finland except for the very rich.

In a more serious form of impact, Finnish news coverage of the Polish Solidarity labor movement probably helped inspire Estonian workers to try launching a similar noncommunist labor organization, taxing the resources of the KGB to head off this most dreaded of developments.[10] It is no accident, to use Marxist parlance, that this reported emulation of the Polish model occurred in a region with reliable access to Western news coverage.

As another window on the West, an undetermined but probably substantial number of German-speakers in westernmost Hungary spend most of their television time tuned to Austrian signals. This involves directing the antenna westward, and somehow getting someone to build an adapter to overcome the difference in transmission standards, but it is tolerated by the Hungarian regime.[11] Television repairmen will typically know how to adapt a set to pick up signals on wavelengths different from those to which it was originally tuned. Working for a state agency in the daytime, such people will not be above earning some extra money "moonlighting" in the evening, adapting sets for fellow citizens requesting this service, so long as the state is not so panicked by the prospect that it deploys secret police to clamp down on the practice.

The Hungarian regime has succeeded by being basically permissive on many matters since 1956, adopting the slogan of "who is not against us is with us."[12] Given the added barrier of language, there is little danger that the majority of Hungarians would become restless because of the influence of a German-speaking minority tuned in on Austrian television. Also, even among those viewers, entertainment may well be at least as important as ideology in attracting an audience for Western television. A sample of such forbidden fruit in this westernmost region of Hungary is thus easily manageable by the state. If, however, that region were one day to become imbued with any combination of Germanic irredentism and anticommunism, the attitude of the government in Budapest would surely be different.

Large numbers of television sets in Czechoslovakia, too, have been adapted to receive Austrian and West German television signals, giving viewers a taste of the news and entertainment programs of the West. A knowledge of German is required, of course, a knowl-

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[9]V. Stanley Vardys, "The Role of the Baltic Republics in Soviet Society," in Roman Szporluk, Ed., *The Influence of East Europe and the Soviet West on the USSR*, New York, Praeger, 1976, p. 165. See also idem, "Polish Echoes in the Baltic," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), July–August 1983, pp. 21–34.

[10]*The Washington Post*, Apr. 20, 1983.

[11]Malcolm W. Brown, "Austrian TV a Hit With Hungarians," *The New York Times*, Feb. 2, 1975.

[12]For a fuller analysis of the Kádár regime, see the article by Rudolf Tőkés in this issue of *Problems of Communism*.

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edge possessed by a fair number of older and some younger people. While the sale of ordinary Austrian newspapers is not allowed in Czechoslovakia, the ban does not apply to the Austrian Communist Party newspaper, *Volksstimme*. This newspaper, as dull as what any communist party publishes anywhere, nonetheless has had surprisingly large sales in Czechoslovakia, because it carries what is not otherwise available: program listings for Austrian television![13] With the barrier of language differences serving as one filter, and the relative shortage of moonlighting technical talent serving as another filter, the regimes in both Hungary and Czechoslovakia do not have to worry as much as the East German regime about being undermined in this fashion.

And where would Cuba fall on this scale? In the spring of 1982, the press reported that Fidel Castro had given an interview to Ted Turner, owner of the satellite-transmitted Cable News Network (CNN), disclosing that Castro regularly watched CNN himself to round out his world news picture[14]—his government having presumably equipped itself with a satellite receiving antenna. But one wonders what would happen to ordinary Cubans who tried to install a satellite antenna in their backyards, or even an ordinary high-sensitivity TV antenna, straining to pick up "terrestrial" signals from Miami or Key West.

One also wonders, in light of US government plans to add new radio broadcasts to Cuba on Radio Martí, whether thought was given to going instead to that much more powerful of media, television. Since Cuban television uses exactly the same wavelengths and standards as the United States, it should not be impossible to pump out a signal from Key West (or from a barrage balloon moored above Key West), filling out one of the regular VHF channels not used by the Cuban regime with a mixture of late-model Hollywood entertainment and fair-minded Spanish-language news coverage, appealing to any Cuban television set owner whose dial settings were not being continually monitored.

In Nicaragua, whose government still tolerates some diversity of opinion, television has not yet gone the route of Cuban or Soviet television in expunging all traces of capitalist influence. Major League baseball and some other entertainment programs are still brought in directly from the United States. News coverage can hardly be described as pluralistic or free any more, but it is not as much in lockstep with the party line as is Soviet or Cuban television. Part of this may be explained by the incomplete nature of the Sandinista political takeover, or by a more relaxed Nicaraguan attitude on these matters. Another part, however, can be attributed to the potential competition from transboundary leakage of television signals, as well as radio signals, at least along the borders with Costa Rica and Honduras.[15]

Another interesting example of penetration is the case of China, where some heavily populated portions—such as metropolitan Guangzhou (Canton)—might have been reached by normal, over-the-air television signals from nearby Hong Kong. British authorities there at first decided to confine local television to a cable system, for fear of offending the Beijing regime. It was more than a decade later, after the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution had spent itself, that those authorities at last felt free to add a set of UHF stations, with the entire array of television programming in the British Crown Colony eventually shifting to an over-the-air mode of transmission.[16] The earlier "impact" of noncommunist television on China was thus nonexistent. More recently, Chinese television authorities have actually moved more toward the opposite pole on the television penetration spectrum, signing a contract with the American CBS network to broadcast 64 hours of sports specials, documentaries like "60 Minutes," and even some commercials over a year beginning in December 1984.[17]

Intracommunist TV Penetration. Even within the communist world, there is a penchant for trouble in transboundary television. Television wavelengths are standardized (with the exception already noted of East Germany) throughout Eastern Europe and the USSR. A triumph for Soviet domination, one might conclude at first look. Yet, as with all technical decisions that shape subsequent cultural and political trends, second thoughts may be in order.

For example, when Polish television gave extensive coverage to the visit of the Pope in 1979, the programs of transmitters in eastern Poland were required to trim back on this coverage, lest viewers just across the Soviet border in Ukraine, Lithuania, or Byelorussia be exposed to too large a dose of the Polish national-

[13] Hans Fantel, "Austrian Network a Door Opening West to East," *New York Times*, May 31, 1984.

[14] *The Washington Post*, Feb. 21, 1982.

[15] T.D. Allman, "Television: Sandinista Style," *Channels* (New York), September–October 1983, pp. 49, 51.

[16] On the evolution of television transmission practice in Hong Kong, see John A. Lent, *Broadcasting in Asia and the Pacific*, Philadelphia, PA, Temple University Press, 1978, pp. 74–87; and Rodney Hobs, "Battle of the Air Waves," *Far Eastern Economic Review* (Hong Kong), Feb. 27, 1981, pp. 73–74. Another report notes that television antennas capable of receiving Hong Kong transmissions have occasionally been outlawed in China; see Liang Heng and Judith Shapiro, *Intellectual Freedom in China After Mao*, New York, The Fund for Free Expression, 1984, p. 182.

[17] *The Montgomery Journal* (Rockville, MD), July 23, 1984.

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ism and religious fervor implicit in the entire event.[18] Even the little that was shown apparently stirred enough interest in Soviet areas close to the border to cause concern. Polish television time allotted to debates about, and to spokesmen for, Solidarity caused even more of a stir.

Similarly, Romanian national television can be viewed in the Moldavian SSR, which was part of Romania between the two world wars, and most of whose inhabitants still speak Romanian today. The propaganda message of the Romanian television system will hardly be explicitly irredentist or anti-Soviet. Yet, it certainly will show signs of the independence in international alignment that Nicolae Ceauşescu has sought for his regime, and its very language and tone will fortify the ethnic feelings of Romanians across the Soviet border.

Why did these communist states, under Moscow's leadership, decide to standardize television transmission signals, when these countries still maintain stringent border controls among themselves? (Everyone knows that barbed wire and other obstructions characterize the borders between the communist states and those of the noncommunist world; it is perhaps less well known that similar barriers run between Poland and the USSR or Czechoslovakia, indeed between any two communist countries.) Perhaps the Soviet regime, in an earlier time, saw itself pumping persuasive television propaganda into its Warsaw Pact allies, and therefore sought the wavelength standardization. Perhaps it was rather the prospect of economies of scale, whereby the same set produced for one communist country would work well in any of them (except East Germany), thus cutting the costs of manufacture and perhaps creating a market for Soviet exports. Or perhaps the decision was simply a more mindless pursuit of standardization and communications and togetherness—the same attitudes that led Canadians, in a move they may have later regretted, to adopt American television wavelength standards. Yet, just as the East German regime may regret the earlier technical choices that opened up easy television leakages from West Germany, the Soviet government must now have mixed feelings about sharing the television signals emanating from its communist neighbors.

"Outflow" Problems. One could easily imagine complaints from behind the Iron Curtain not just about television messages leaked in, but also about Western use of signals that leak out. In terms of making a point about the news, the visual image of a television signal monitored from outside Poland just before the imposition of martial law, or from outside China during the Cultural Revolution, could be quite dramatic,[19] much as the drama provided by live American television coverage of the Vietnam war played a major role in eroding the American commitment to that war.

Communist countries equip themselves with a powerful educational and ideological tool when they commit resources to television. But, in the process, they open up a certain flow of information to the outside world, for many of these countries are within range of some television antennas in the noncommunist world. If the technical standards differ so that Poles cannot easily tune in on, say, nearby Danish television, it would still be no problem for a Western news service to equip itself with a Polish-standard receiver on the Danish island of Bornholm—just as earlier monitors in Austria were tuned in on Czechoslovakia. The imagery here can be as multi-edged as it is dramatic. Official telecasts of the Polish authorities are presumably managed with a view to serving their own interests. But they can also be used to illustrate the message of Western news services very critical of those authorities; imagery can be harnessed to conflicting purposes, as the picture remains the same and the commentary is changed.

Communist spokesmen would attack all such uses of their signals as serving the self-interest of the capitalists, since any criticism of communism, they say, must be based on greed. As a minor illustration of what could indeed be a "greedy" use of such television monitoring, some American baseball teams apparently hired a Spanish-speaking scout to sit in Key West, Florida, tuning in on Cuban baseball telecasts, making note of the star players who might be hired by an American team if they could only escape the country, or if some kind of détente with Castro's regime made it possible one day for them to leave freely. When several such players showed up among the wave of refugees allowed to leave Cuba after the embassy sit-in of 1979, the payoff for this Western "exploitation" of Cuban airwaves went to the teams who had hired the scout's services.

In a more serious, reverse illustration of abuse of television information, the East European television organization OIRT requested large quantities of the West European television network material on the Prague uprising and Soviet occupation of 1968, as part of the regular commercial exchange of program materials between the two halves of Europe. Rather than being

[18] Paul Lendvai, *The Bureaucracy of Truth*, Boulder, CO, Westview, 1981, p. 99. See also Vardys, "Polish Echoes in the Baltic," p. 22.

[19] For an illustration see Ernest Eugster, *Television Programming Across National Boundaries*, Dedham, MA, Artech House, 1983, p. 194.

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slated for showing on the evening news around Eastern Europe, however, these films were apparently scoured to identify dissidents and troublemakers, perhaps with a view to future arrests.[20]

Susceptibility to Penetration

Generally speaking, the susceptibility of communist societies to penetration by outside television programs appears to be a function of three major factors: control of television reception, competition for audience appeal, and continual developments in broadcast technology.

Much will depend, first, on who controls not just overall signal reception, but even the individual television dial. As communist regimes differ on so many other things, they also differ in how the ownership and distribution of television sets is managed. In the relatively affluent communist countries, such as those of Eastern Europe, and even in the USSR, separate family ownership of such receivers has gradually become the norm. Families may well relish the privacy of watching a screen in their own homes.

In other communist countries, by contrast, television sets are community property, to be watched only as part of a total of persons larger than the family. Sheer economic stringency might be the most common explanation for such communal solutions, along with an ideological distrust of what atomistic family units might elect to do if they were not continually making decisions on a larger community basis. As the first reason to keep communal television recedes, however, the second, more ideological reason may be overwhelmed. For, if the government of China, or Vietnam, or Cuba ever wishes to let its population feel that some prosperity is being attained, the individual family television set could well become the tangible evidence of economic progress. The individual family automobile (in place of the bus) might be another such benchmark, but it is of course not materially attainable as rapidly as television.

But once communist regimes begin tolerating individual ownership and tuning of television sets, they may face a new political problem, wherever the airwaves present some choice for the viewer. This remains an important problem in East Germany, and could become a broader problem for other communist regimes in the future. At that point, the quality (or at least the attractiveness) of local as opposed to foreign programming could become a critical factor.

How good or how bad in general is the communist-regime television against which signals from the outside world might compete for an audience?[21] Its news coverage is indeed terrible, closely tailored to the needs of the regime, and hence not very informative or interesting. Its productions of high-culture items, such as ballet and opera, are conversely first-rate. Some of what is offered is as mindlessly entertaining as Western television at its worst: quiz shows and jugglers, etc. The ratio of high-brow culture to low-brow entertainment is "better" than that of the American networks, which are heavily governed by competition and viewer ratings, but not as much "better" as is Scandinavian television programming.

Past experience has apparently taught Soviet television authorities that heavy-handed televised lectures about the evils of capitalism or the accomplishments of socialism do not win audiences but merely alienate them. The films and other forms of entertainment that can be shown are, of course, carefully limited, with very few Hollywood or other Western products ever making it to the screen, and these typically being films that reflect unflatteringly on the capitalist way of life. Yet Soviet television, far more than Scandinavian television, for example, seems (like that of the United States) heavily geared to being relaxing and entertaining, rather than galvanizing and mobilizing.[22]

Larger cities in the USSR have four channels, all operated by a single authority, but nonetheless offering Soviet viewers more choice than most television set owners in Western Europe had until the 1970's. It is interesting to speculate about this Soviet decision to offer a choice of four distinct television services (admittedly with not all of them on the air for more than a few hours a day), as compared with the limited offerings of the East European communist networks, or the decision of Castro's regime to reduce Cuban television from five or six stations down to two (or the decisions of freely-elected governments in Norway and Denmark to have only a single television offering). The high cost of preparing programming in the smaller countries may play a role in restricting offerings, with the sheer size of the USSR making larger scale operations possible.

Soviet television for a time applied the same "anti-slalom" strategy that has been adopted in two-

[20]Timothy Green, *The Universal Eye: The World of Television*, New York, Stein and Day, 1978, p. 176.

[21]For general background on the comparison between communist and Western television, see Wilson P. Dizard, *Television: A World View*, Syracuse, NY, Syracuse University Press, 1966.

[22]The nature of Soviet television programming, and some concerns expressed about its impact on Soviet society, are discussed more extensively in David E. Powell, "Television in the USSR," *Public Opinion Quarterly* (New York, NY), Fall 1975, pp. 287–300. See also Ellen Proper Mickiewicz, *Media and the Russian Public*, New York, Praeger, 1981; and Burton Paulu, *Radio and Television Broadcasting in Eastern Europe*, Minneapolis, MN, University of Minnesota Press, 1974.

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channel Sweden, i.e., setting non-entertainment shows side-by-side in various time slots, so that the viewer can not always escape culture or education or propaganda by finding something "light." But Soviet viewers apparently were not happy about this kind of scheduling, which was then changed to allow viewers more of a choice—again most probably with the result that many viewers switch from channel to channel to find entertainment each and every hour. More educated viewers tend to be less attached to entertainment programs, just as in the United States; but the mass of ordinary workingmen steer away from educational programs or panel shows, picking light entertainment at every opportunity.

Of related interest, for the American observer, are the Soviet concerns expressed about the impact of television, remarkably similar to many of those expressed within the United States. The totals of hours spent watching television, by adults and by children, are almost as high as those reported for the United States. Soviet educators and psychologists, much like some of their American counterparts, have voiced concern about the impact on student performance, family conversation, and so on.

But one interesting difference from the United States, hardly so surprising in light of the nature of Soviet news coverage, is that the very most educated viewers, those with university training, apparently are less interested in what passes for Soviet news and documentary programs than are viewers with just a middle-school education. To have been to university in the USS apparently works to convince one that there is little to be learned about the world from the Soviet version of the evening news.[23] It is to this segment of the audience that foreign television broadcasts might most usefully be directed.

In any attempt to fill the "information gap" by appealing to such viewers from the outside, much will also depend, finally, on the latest technologies by which television signals are relayed. These may open up new choices, but in a few cases might allow regimes to clamp down. As noted in the case of the Dresden cable system, this is one new form of television communications technology that (unlike DBS and VCR) may lend itself to more rather than less state control. If the economic costs could be borne, the communist regimes would undoubtedly relish an environment where all signals traveled by cable rather than through the atmosphere, thus killing off all transboundary penetrations, deliberate or inadvertent. In general, though, technological developments are likely to generate greater possibilities for outside television penetration, as the following section will explore.

New TV Technologies

Direct Broadcast Satellites. Television signals can be transmitted much farther than before from satellites, which are already being extensively used to relay signals within countries, between countries, and even between continents. There has been a great deal of speculation about what might yet be technologically possible with such satellites, and about the political implications of these technological possibilities.[24]

Some of us might have assumed that such satellites could be used only with the very large ground antennas (some 30 to 60 feet in diameter) of the sort that government and private telecommunications authorities and private cable companies have erected. These antennas are so large that they are easy enough for governments to control if they are of a mind to do so. At the opposite limit of what is imaginable, popular science magazines have often enough speculated about what might be the extreme of direct broadcast satellite television transmissions, requiring no new antennas or tuners at all; instead, they would beam signals down to antennas already in place for ordinary "terrestrial" television reception, using exactly the same wavelengths of existing television sets. An "invader" transmitter from outer space could thus reach people on, say, Channels 3 or 24, where the local regime had been using Channels 2 or 26, with no technological interference between the two rival transmissions, and with the local regime having no simple way of controlling who was tuning in on the foreign signal (i.e., quite analogous to the current situation in East Germany).

On closer examination, few technical experts would now anticipate this kind of DBS, because the wavelengths of UHF and VHF do not lend themselves well to signals from orbit, so that a tremendous source of electric power would be required on board the satellite. What is rather envisaged for commercial or state-operated DBS systems involves a different set of wavelengths, requiring a tuner-adapter and a new dish-shaped antenna—but perhaps one only some three feet across.

DBS systems will thus reach homes directly, eliminating the large-antenna ground stations and cable links that give a central distributing authority control. Yet such DBS systems would still require an addi-

[23]Powell, loc. cit., p. 292.

[24]See, e.g., Michael Schrage, "How to Freak the Russians: Beam Them Barbara Walters," *The Washington Post*, Mar. 28, 1982.

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tional antenna and tuner, thus still posing some barrier between any new broadcaster and what would otherwise have been a ready-made audience using existing television sets.

Several important points need to be made to round out this picture. The ingenuity of electronic engineering is such that what once seemed impossible has again and again become possible. Many existing transmissions of television signals from satellites to state or commercial ground stations have already become de facto DBS signals, without ever having been intended as such, since what used to require a 30-foot antenna now requires an antenna only some seven feet across. Approximately 250,000 Americans are thought to have purchased such antennas for their own homes, and a fair number of Canadians have done the same, to tune in directly on signals legally intended only for cable systems within the United States.[25] Similarly, the size of the antenna required for *planned* DBS systems will almost certainly also shrink as the relevant technology improves. A three-foot diameter may be normal at the outset, but a much smaller antenna, perhaps the size of a roof slate, is possible for the future. New breakthroughs in satellite reception might yet achieve the extreme of DBS envisaged in popular science magazines, with signals tunable through the antenna already on everyone's roof, using UHF or VHF wavelengths tuned by existing television sets.

Under what circumstances could one expect penetration of the Soviet bloc by DBS? Two possibilities come in mind, one still highly speculative and very unlikely for the 1980's, but the second considerably more real.

If the United States were determined to get its television signals into the Soviet Union, it could presumably design and invest in a huge satellite parked over the Indian Ocean, perhaps powered by a nuclear reactor on board, beaming down entertainment and news for Soviet viewers to tune in simply by turning over their channel selectors a single click. Yet such a system is unlikely to come into operation for quite some time, if only because such large amounts of transmission power would be required to generate a signal receivable at the surface without special tuner-adapters and antennas—and also because such an innovation would violate the current rules and frequency assignments of the International Telecommunications Union.

A more likely penetration of Eastern Europe and the USSR would come instead as a spinoff from DBS systems intended as commercial or cultural ventures for audiences in Scandinavia or Germany or elsewhere in Western Europe, with little or no ideological motive behind them, but with possibilities of a powerful political impact nonetheless.[26] These would be DBS operations requiring tuners and dish antennas, rather than enormously powerful satellites seeking to fill conventional channels. Yet, just as what was never intended to be DBS in the United States came to be tuned by several hundred thousand backyard antennas, so what originally was to require a three-foot dish for subscribers in Denmark or West Germany might after a time be tunable by a clandestine one-foot antenna in Poland.

French and German transmissions intended for their own domestic markets may thus spill over into other countries. So might British and Italian transmission from a competing satellite transmitter, and so especially will signals officially intended for Luxembourg or Switzerland. The Scandinavians, too, are considering a system that will reach from Finland to Iceland, and thus, unavoidably, even farther.

Will none of these signals spill over into the Soviet Union? If the earliest signals require a large receiving antenna, will they not soon be improved so that they can be brought in with much less of an apparatus? Will not some enterprising TV "hams" in the western Soviet Union begin pulling in the forbidden fruit of Western television, amid Soviet efforts to stamp out the practice and perhaps Soviet diplomatic complaints about the violation of sovereignty? If the West Europeans begin to deploy a DBS system intended only for their own nationals' use, they cannot meaningfully assure East European regimes that no signal will be tunable inside the communist world, i.e., beyond the "signal footprint" on the surface area officially intended to receive the broadcasts. All that can be assured is that the antennas used outside this footprint will have to be some multiple in size of the antennas of intended receivers; yet some small multiple of a roof-tile is still not something that the Polish or Soviet secret police will always be able to detect.

The "domino" linkages in the future spread of transboundary television are intriguing. Countries like West Germany and France may not really need direct broadcasting of television signals from satellites to homes, since they already have terrestrial transmitters and cable lines sufficient to deliver all the variety of television programming that the national authorities desire. Countries like Nigeria or India or Brazil, how-

[25] On American and Canadian ingenuity in erecting satellite television receiving antennas, see Lydia Dotto, "The Great Satellite-dish Drama," *Toronto Globe and Mail*, Dec. 8, 1980; and Jay Arnold, "Dishing Up a System from the Sky," *The Washington Post*, Feb. 17, 1984.

[26] See "Look Out for Footprints," *The Economist* (London), Dec. 29, 1979, pp. 37–38, for a discussion of plans for West European DBS systems.

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ever, may really need DBS systems, as the only affordable way of bringing the alleged advantages of television to the many villages beyond the reach of wire and transmitters. Because the West European countries do not want to be left out of the possible market for filling African, Asian, and Latin American needs, they plan to deploy their own DBS systems. But since the signal can never be confined just to West Germany or France, it will leak across borders—to be greeted with relative equanimity by other West European governments, but with much less enthusiasm by the communist regimes.

Those regimes, naturally, could always forbid the installation of any antenna capable of receiving Western DBS signals. But the East Germans and the Soviets also do not want to be left out of the running for servicing the future satellite communications needs of Third World countries, and are thus talking of putting up their own DBS satellite. This will offer Soviet-bloc programming to West European audiences who could not have tuned in on it before, which makes relatively little difference. But, since Soviet and East European consumers will then have a legitimate excuse to install home satellite dishes, it will become much more difficult for police to keep such equipment from tuning in instead on West European transmissions—and the last of a strange string of dominoes will have fallen.

Well before the United States or anyone else begins trying to send television signals directly from a satellite into the Soviet Union or Eastern Europe, we will probably see such orbital satellites used instead to transmit shortwave or other *radio* broadcasts. Such a venture is technologically far easier, and does not involve the setting of nearly as much of a precedent, since the radio spectrum is already used by all the powers in trying to penetrate each other's airspace. The US may wish to use satellites because they offer better transmission conditions, or because the retention of appropriately located surface transmitter towers at times entails a political price.

It is sometimes argued, therefore, that the reason the United States resists a ban on DBS *television* transmissions is precisely because this could be used as the entry vehicle for delegitimizing and banning the direct broadcast of radio signals from space, and then perhaps banning all shortwave broadcasts not approved by the recipient country. Slippery slopes are a notorious problem in politics, and nations do well to be on their guard against them.

Video Cassette Recorders. DBS may open up more television choice tomorrow, but the video cassette recorder is already significantly expanding such choice today. Millions of such tape recorders have been sold in the United States, in Japan (where most of them are produced), and in Western Europe. Interestingly, the sales in Western Europe have been greatest where the choice on the government's over-the-air television service is narrowest, with a far larger fraction of homes having VCR's in Scandinavia than, say, in Italy.[27] In Iceland, where the state shuts down television on Thursdays and for the whole month of August, and otherwise keeps down the amount of Hollywood entertainment that is broadcast, the VCR offers the television fanatic an easy way out, with entire apartment complexes sometimes using a single VCR on an inside-the-building cable system to screen American movies every evening.

If video cassette recorders are thus a threat to a paternalistic national television policy in places like Iceland, they would be much more of a menace in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. *Time* magazine estimated that there were already as many as 50,000 such recorders inside the USSR at the end of 1982.[28] One wonders how the figure could possibly be that high, or why the Soviet authorities would tolerate the presence of any such recorders, given the uses to which they could be put. Indeed, press reports earlier in the year indicated that the KGB was clamping down on the private possession of VCR's, amid police raids and confiscations, as part of a general tightening up on communications that also included the suspension of direct telephone service from homes in the USSR to the West. The presence of some VCR's is explainable by their use in schools, laboratories, and factories. But given the corruption endemic in the USSR, and the tremendous appeal of television, it was inevitable that some such recorders would slip into private rather than public use. Some recorders have apparently been bought in the West by Soviet diplomats or their families and then slipped back into the USSR.

Aside from rescheduling the existing offerings of Soviet television, which the regime might regard as harmless enough, what are the other uses of such equipment? One obvious possibility is to show videotapes of Western movies. Smuggled in more easily than a bulky recorder, some such tapes have apparently also gotten by Soviet customs. A few are undoubtedly pornography (and the Soviet authorities, in announcing confiscations, have been careful to emphasize such morally suspect items), but of more enduring appeal have been such Hollywood products as

[27] Data on the sales of VCR's in different countries can be found in *Home Video and Cable Yearbook*, White Plains, NY, Knowledge Industry Publications, 1982.

[28] "VCR's Go on Fast Forward," *Time* (New York), Dec. 13, 1982, p. 78.

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Apocalypse Now and *The Deer Hunter* and *Star Wars*. As with other movies never shown in Soviet theaters or on Soviet television, the appeal of such contraband must be tremendous, and the political message carried along (whatever the message intended by the American producers) will be worrisome for the KGB and the Soviet regime as a whole. Even a left-leaning film could be a problem, since the Western creature comforts obvious in such films might look very good to the average Soviet citizen.

Videotape recorders are so useful in education and industry that the Soviet Union is now making plans to produce its own. Yet such recorders also lend themselves to usage for entertainment and information, and can get diverted to private use easily enough. And video recorders, it should be stressed, lend themselves to easy reproduction of tapes; a tape, once smuggled into the USSR or Eastern Europe, will be difficult to confiscate and stamp out, as its clones emerge all too rapidly. It might in fact prove easier to make multiple copies of an entertaining (but subversive by Soviet standards) videotape than to find a printing press to reproduce subversive literature. And, if the Soviets are like most people all around the globe, it may prove easier to get them to watch a Hollywood movie than to read a subversive tract.

Political Implications

For more than a decade now, the Soviet Union has vehemently opposed any DBS television lacking the consent of the recipients' government, and has been assiduously mobilizing the votes and opinions of other states behind proposals to ban such transmissions.[29] As noted earlier, Third World countries and many advanced industrial democracies (including Canada and Sweden) have been inclined to fear the "cultural imperialism" possibilities of the television medium, even when they do not share Moscow's aversion to the open dissemination of news. Yet, with one group of countries fearing the appeal of Hollywood, and the communist group fearing the free press, the result has been some very one-sided votes at the United Nations and elsewhere—with the United States almost alone in insisting on the right of television broadcasting from orbit and across boundaries, as is the existing practice with shortwave radio transmissions.[30] The communist authorities, by contrast, apparently prefer a situation in which only the domestic signal can be received, whether because of distance from foreign transmitters, differing technical standards, a "New International Information Order," or effective secret police surveillance.

In addition to the "cultural protectionism" argument advanced by communist spokesmen, technical considerations could conceivably be invoked to limit international freedom of the airwaves. In the extreme case, signals from abroad would somehow electronically drown out those transmitted domestically, so that local viewers could receive *only* the foreign message. This hypothetical possibility would be tailor-made to illustrate what opponents of international broadcasting claim to fear. Because of the inherent advantages of shorter transmission distances for clarity and power of electronic signal, however, such a situation is technologically very unlikely.

Another objectionable case is one in which the foreign signal would interfere with the domestic signal, so that *neither* could be clearly received, as each in effect would jam the other. This is a possibility to which Americans, too, would generally object. The United States can point to the great deal of technological effort it has devoted to prevent this from happening, continually devising new techniques to eliminate incompatibilities, crowding, or technological conflict.[31] In practice, Washington has always accepted the need to consult with foreign governments, including nondemocratic governments, about the technical assignment of radio and television frequencies. The US does not therefore reserve to itself the right to broadcast into Eastern Europe on every frequency. Yet it has insisted on the right to broadcast on *some* frequencies, and it has resisted attempts to limit what will be broadcast.

The communist states are hardly so consistent about avoiding the kinds of behavior they condemn. Opposed to the crossing of their own boundaries by Western radio and television signals, these regimes nevertheless transmit such signals outward. Radio Moscow has long beamed shortwave programs around the world in many languages, transmitting what most reasonable people would style propaganda for the Soviet system. Other communist regimes, especially Castro's Cuba, do the same. When the USSR launched Sputnik, the world's first earth satellite, in 1957, the Soviet announcement was that this innovation would facilitate the transmission of television sig-

[29]The debates about DBS are surveyed in Wilson P. Dizard, "The U.S. Position: DBS and Free Flow," *Journal of Communication*, Spring 1980, pp. 157–68. See also Frank Stanton, "Will They Stop Our Satellites?" *The New York Times*, Oct. 20, 1972.

[30]For a view questioning whether foreign concerns about US use of DBS are well-founded, see Ithiel deSola Pool, "Direct Broadcast Satellites and Cultural Integrity," *Society* (New Brunswick, NJ), September–October, 1975, pp. 47–56.

[31]On the US contribution to making more channels of communication available, see Philip N. Whittaker, "To Beat the Band," *Foreign Policy* Spring 1979, pp. 160–64.

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nals around the world.[32] Soviet television signals have at times been transmitted to Finland in Finnish, and to Norway in Norwegian.[33] East German television signals reach West Germany just as the West German signals reach East Germany, and some East German news commentators make no bones about their interest in a West German audience.

Even the new posture adopted in Moscow, denouncing in particular the threat of direct television broadcasting from satellites, has not precluded the USSR from engaging in a de facto form of DBS itself. The Soviet double standard is evident right now in the Caribbean Basin, as satellites beam Spanish-language communist propaganda programming down with a strength of signal greater than that of any other satellite transmissions to the region. While perhaps officially intended for Cuba and Nicaragua, such signals are quite easy to tune in with a small satellite-receiving dish in El Salvador and Guatemala, and virtually anywhere else someone cares to try.[34]

If the Soviet Union is nevertheless inclined to argue against the legitimacy of such transmissions, several possible explanations can be offered. First, Moscow must sense how it has been losing in any open exchange of signals. East Germans watch western signals with much more interest than West Germans watch those from the east. For whatever audience communist signals have captured in Latin America or Africa, Radio Free Europe, Radio Liberty, the Voice of America (VOA), and the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) have probably captured a much more important audience in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. Some viewers in Finland and northernmost Norway may have found Soviet telecasts interesting, but this is surely nothing compared to how fascinated viewers in Leningrad or Moscow would be with similar television signals from the West. It is to this prospect of expanded individual choice that the communist regimes truly object, albeit for reasons not always presented so frankly.

Just as the Soviet authorities have largely given up on monitoring or punishing listeners to VOA, they would find it very difficult to monitor who was watching the best of Hollywood or network news dubbed into Russian. Efforts might be made at jamming, but this, too, might be an uphill battle, consuming electricity, disrupting ordinary Soviet television reception, and reducing whatever influence television had given the Soviet state, and whatever gratification television gives the Soviet masses.

Second, as mentioned earlier, Moscow has undoubtedly noticed that some other countries are resisting American television penetration; this stems from concerns of a less political and more cultural nature, but these concerns can still leave the United States on the defensive. Hollywood, and Coca-Cola, and American blue jeans are a nuisance in the eyes of many national governments around the world for reasons differing from those that influence Moscow, but offering the Soviets an easy alliance. Where the outside signal is too attractive, or too clever as entertainment or propaganda, the local regime might argue that this signal was in fact somehow addictive, making the possibility of choice technically but not psychologically or culturally real. In effect, where Hollywood has been too good at what it does, the local product might never make it to the screen.

But here the issue is joined as clearly as it could be. Most Americans would regard it as an obnoxious distortion if the greater appeal of Western newscasts, or of Western entertainment sources, were somehow equated with the material disruptions of electronic jamming. Such arguments trivialize and patronize the choices made by individuals unable to "vote with their feet," but still able to vote with their radio dials and television channel selectors.

Americans are likely to stick to their principles on the international issue of freedom of information, because that freedom is so central to American core values. The United States will be reinforced in this determination by many of the trends in the relevant technology, which will very probably expand rather than contract choice. At least for now, time may be on the side of those who believe in a free flow of images through the electronic spectrum.

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[32]The Soviet commentary on television broadcasting directly from Sputnik is quoted in Kathryn M. Queeney, *Direct Broadcast Satellites and the United Nations*, Alphen aan den Rijn, The Netherlands, Sijthoff and Noordhoff, 1978, p. 13.

[33]The general range of Soviet electronic transmissions to other countries is described in Paulu, op. cit., pp. 196–221. On television transmissions specifically, see p. 199.

[34]For discussions of the variety and strength of signal of Soviet satellite transmissions to Central America and the Caribbean, and to other corners of the globe, see Stephen Birkill, "Gorizont High Power at 4 GHZZ," *Satellite Orbit International* (New York, NY), February 1984, pp. 12–14; and *Coop's Satellite Digest* (Fort Lauderdale, FL), September 1982, pp. 65–66.

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Moscow's War Propaganda and Soviet Public Opinion

Vladimir E. Shlapentokh

SINCE 1980, official Soviet domestic information media have conveyed a new, alarming assessment of the dangers of nuclear war *and* of the possibility of the Soviet Union's involvement in such a destructive conflict. This marks a sharp shift from the sense of confidence in the possibility of avoiding such a conflagration that had been fostered in the years since Stalin's death in 1953.

In this brief note, no attempt is made to assess *why* Soviet officialdom has adopted this line, nor to determine precisely *to whom* the message is actually adressed (whether West European public opinion, the American electorate, or the Soviet public itself). All that can be concluded—based on past research by the author into the way that the Slavic majority of the Soviet public responds to such official image-building, and on some admittedly impressionistic contemporary reports—is that the Soviet public is currently experiencing a serious "war scare."

Such drastic shifts in the official line on the prospects for peace or war are relatively rare in Soviet history (two of the most dramatic reversals occurred in 1939 and 1941 with, first, the Soviet-German pact and, then, the terrible defeats suffered by Soviet forces in the face of the 1941 German invasion). Usually, Soviet officialdom attempts to modify public images gradually, in the belief that continuity tends to strengthen the legitimacy of Soviet rule.

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The Public and Foreign Policy Images

In reflecting on Soviet pronouncements regarding the danger of war and the possibilities of the Soviet Union's surviving war, it is important to realize that the bulk of the Soviet population tends to be more accepting of the official line on international developments than they are on domestic issues. A survey the author helped take when he was still working in the USSR indicated that Soviet newspaper readers are four to six times as likely to be critical of articles on domestic problems as they are to be of articles on international relations.[1]

Four intertwined factors seem to account for this penchant: patriotism, fear of the authorities, restrictions on information, and absence of personal involvement. Traditional Russian patriotism reinforced by constant reminders of shared hardships during the Great Fatherland War tends to reduce normal popular skepticism regarding official Soviet media messages on international matters. To some extent, this patriotism is also fueled by pride in the frightening might accumulated by the Soviet state. The quickness of the government to label critics as enemies of the motherland or agents of foreign adversaries tends to intimidate those who might question official interpretations of foreign events. Then there is the control exercised by the government over the mass media, a monopoly on information that is only partly offset by foreign radio broadcasts and other sources of independent information. Finally, whereas Soviet citizens tend to

[1] See V. Shlapentokh, Ed., *Chitatel' i gazeta* (Reader and Newspaper), Moscow, Institut Konkretnykh Sotsial' nykh Issledovaniy, 1969, Vol. 1, p. 114, and Vol. 2, p. 27. See also B. Grushin and L. Onikov, *Massovaya informatsiya v sovetskom promyshlennom gorode* (Mass Information in a Soviet Industrial City), Moscow, Politizdat, 1980, p. 254.

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measure each domestic policy against their own needs and to become emotionally involved in such issues, they usually see no direct connection between Soviet foreign policy and such immediate concerns as their standard of living.

Together, these factors contribute to an attitude of deference to the state, which is considered better equipped to make decisions concerning national defense. Surveys of Soviet public opinion in the late 1960's and early 1970's led me to the conclusion that in the Slavic part of the population (about 71 percent of the country in 1979) attitudes toward Soviet foreign policy were distributed as follows:

Strong critics—3 to 8 percent
Mild critics—15 to 20 percent
Supporters—50 to 70 percent
Neutral or indifferent—10 to 25 percent.

(This is only an approximate picture of the structure of Soviet public opinion; if the non-Slavic population had been taken into account, the distribution would doubtless have shifted toward more critical attitudes.)[2]

Survey data, too, showed that a considerable portion of the population holds generally negative opinions about the West. In the late 1960's, Boris Grushin surveyed residents of Taganrog, a typical Soviet industrial city, regarding their feelings about foreign countries. Only 2 percent of the respondents considered the level of democracy in the United States to be "very high" (the figure for Great Britain was 3 percent); by contrast, 60 percent viewed Bulgaria and 34 percent viewed East Germany as models of democracy. Only 2 percent thought living standards were "very high" in the United States, France, and Great Britain; the figures for Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria were 63 percent and 49 percent.[3] Similarly, a nationwide survey in 1977 showed respondents ranking the Soviet Union at four on a five-point scale regarding quality of life, compared to an average ranking of only two for countries of the West.[4]

At the same time, such surveys may not reflect other segments of the population—e.g., young people attracted to the Western style of living and envious of Western political freedoms, or non-Slavs—who are more critical of Soviet policy. Then, too, one must not overlook the public's wariness concerning all official pronouncements. It is common wisdom that the Soviet public is accustomed to look for the real meaning and intent behind official propaganda. The more educated the citizen, the greater the skepticism. In a survey of readers of *Izvestiya* in 1966, we found that 33 percent of those with higher education (compared to 22 percent of those with secondary education) demanded improvement in information on the capitalist countries.[5] Another survey, of *Literaturnaya Gazeta* readers, found that *Inostrannaya Literatura* (which publishes foreign novels and stories) is read by only 8.5 percent of elementary school graduates compared to 22 percent of those with higher education.[6]

Sometimes, to be sure, the Soviet leadership seeks to communicate its intentions regarding foreign policy in direct terms. But often such communication is complicated by the need of Soviet leaders to justify policy in ideological ways, and by the necessity of speaking to foreign governments, international public opinion, or foreign communist parties at the same time. This breeds a public skepticism with respect to all government communications that doubtless extends in some measure to the current "war scare."

Shifting Images of the Danger of War

Over the years, official propaganda about the danger of war and about the likely impact of any war on the Soviet population has shown considerable variety. Throughout Stalin's reign, with the exception of the brief period from the 1939 signing of a pact with Nazi Germany until Hitler's 1941 invasion, the international situation was painted in very pessimistic tones. The threat of war remained a theme right up to Stalin's death in March 1953. At that point his successors radically changed course and began to base their propaganda on the importance of averting a new war.

Whatever the line on the external threat, however, the invincibility of the Soviet state was always asserted. Typical factors cited to support the optimism have included: (1) the likelihood that world revolution or at least positive attitudes on the part of the proletariat of any country attacking the Soviet Union would help the USSR; (2) the might of the Soviet army; (3) the devotion of the Soviet people to the cause of revo-

[2]See V. Shlapentokh, Ed., *Sotsiologiya pechati* (The Sociology of the Press), Novosibirsk, Nauka, 1970, Vol. 2; and B. Grushin, *Mir mnenii i mneniye o mire* (The World of Opinion and Opinions About the World), Moscow, Politizdat, 1967.

[3]*Massovaya informatsiya . . .*, p. 306.

[4]Results of this survey, in which the author participated, have not been fully published in the Soviet Union.

[5]See Shlapentokh, *Chitatel' i Gazeta*, p. 28.

[6]Ibid., p. 161. A more recent study carried out by sociologists from Moscow University asked readers of *Literaturnaya Gazeta*—three-fourths of whom have higher education—how they preferred to see foreign information presented. Some 26 percent declared that they simply wanted the newspaper to reprint materials from the foreign mass media without comment, while 14 percent preferred articles by Soviet authors with references to Western sources (the traditional approach). See I. Fomicheva, Ed., *"Literaturnaya Gazeta" i yeyë auditoriya (Literaturnaya Gazeta* and Its Audience), Moscow, Izdatel'stvo Moskovskogo Universiteta, 1978, p. 57.

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lution and communism; (4) the strength of Russian patriotism; (5) support for the Soviet Union by peace-loving people throughout the world. However, the combination and weighting of these factors have varied over time.

In 1927, the danger of "counterrevolutionary war" against the USSR was seen as coming from Great Britain, and it was the forces of world revolution that were seen as succoring the Soviet State.[7] In 1930, war was still supposedly imminent, but now world revolution had given way to "solidarity of the workers and toilers of the capitalist countries and the colonies" and the military capacity of the Soviet state itself as grounds for confidence that the USSR might survive it.[8] By 1934, Stalin spoke of the military might of the Soviet state as being prepared to "strike a crushing blow" at any aggressor, citing the Soviet people and the many friends of the Soviet working class in Europe and Asia as additional props in the Soviet defense.[9] By 1939, Stalin was staring at a real upcoming war, and his emphasis was again on Soviet might and support of the system by Soviet people at home, and on peace-loving forces abroad. With the onset of war, Soviet propaganda relinquished all traces of revolution or international proletarian solidarity and focused on the purely nationalistic theme of "Death to the German invaders!"[10] And in the postwar period, Soviet propaganda continued to anticipate a third world war which, as Georgiy Malenkov stated at the 19th CPSU Congress in 1952, would "cause the collapse of the world capitalist system."[11]

Throughout the Stalin era, there was no serious information in the mass media about the military strength of other countries. In prewar novels and films, e.g., Nikolay Shpanov's *Pervyy Udar* (The First Strike) published in 1939, the Red Army was depicted as crushing the enemy. And during the war, Soviet propaganda systematically ignored the capacities of German weapons and soldiers. Indeed, private discussions of the real power of the German army led to arrest in many cases.[12] With victory, the idea of the Soviet army being the strongest in the world came to the fore. The anti-cosmopolitan campaign of the late 1940's encouraged this perception, presenting Russian genius as the source of all major discoveries including those related to military capabilities. At the same time, discussion of the true capabilities of the most devastating of arms—nuclear weaponry—remained taboo in the mass media.

Very soon after Stalin's death, the Soviet system moved from one of mass repression to one of more limited repression, as the party leadership played down the role of violence in foreign as well as domestic policy. Indeed, one of the principal accusations leveled against Vyacheslav Molotov, Georgiy Malenkov, and Lazar Kaganovich at the 20th CPSU Congress was their "opposition to the Leninist course of the peaceful coexistence among states with different social systems."[13] Molotov in particular was singled out for having impeded the conclusion of the treaty with Austria, having objected to the normalization of relations with Japan, and having argued against the possibility of averting new wars.[14] While Khrushchev continued to denounce the capitalist countries, by 1961 he was even mentioning "the possibility of excluding world war from social life."[15] It is perhaps instructive in this context to recall that at the time of the 1962 Cuban missile crisis Soviet mass media generated considerably less fear abut the prospects for war than did the press in the West. Given the general atmosphere, the Soviet public apparently did not even take very seriously the alarming tone of the Soviet media during the brief anti-American campaign of Oct. 22–30.[16]

There is some evidence to show how profoundly the optimistic post-Stalin assessment of the prospects for averting war had affected the Soviet public. In 1960, Boris Grushin—in one of the first sociological surveys in the USSR—asked a nationwide sample: "Will mankind manage to avert a new world war?" Ninety-

[7] *KPSS v resolyutsiyakh i resheniyakh s"yezdov, konferentsii i plenumov TsK* (The CPSU in Resolutions and Decisions of Congresses, Conferences, and Central Committee Plenums—hereafter *KPSS v resolyutsiyukh*), Moscow, Politizdat, 1953, Vol. 2, pp. 242–43.

[8] Ibid., pp. 555–56.

[9] J. Stalin, *Voprosy Leninizma* (Problems of Leninism), Moscow, Politizdat, 1952, pp. 468, 474.

[10] See e.g., idem, *On the Patriotic War of the Soviet Union*, Moscow, Foreign Language Publishing House, 1945.

[11] G. Malenkov, *Report to the 19th Party Congress on the Work of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union*, Moscow, Foreign Language Publishing House, 1952, p. 46.

[12] Only in 1984 did the editor of a Soviet literary magazine, Vladimir Karpov, himself a veteran of the last war, dare to write in his novel devoted to the Soviet General Ivan Petrov, that the German Focke-Wolf-190A aircraft, which was put into service in 1943, "was rather the best at this time." Curiously, even here he did not say simply that the plane was better than its Soviet counterparts; only that it was "rather the best"—avoiding direct comparison. See Karpov, "The Commander," *Novyy Mir* (Moscow), No. 12, 1983, p. 11.

[13] *KPSS v resolyutsiyakh*, 1971, p. 268.

[14] See V. Zorin, Ed., *Vneshnyaya politika SSSR na novom etape* (The Foreign Policy of the USSR in a New Stage), Moscow, Gospolitizdat, 1964, p. 34.

[15] *XXII s'yezd kommunisticheskoy partii Sovetskogo Soyuza* (The 22nd Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union), Moscow, Politizdat, 1962, p. 50.

[16] A. Kurganov, in a letter to *Literaturnaya Gazeta* (Moscow), Jan. 4, 1984, wrote that he had recently "read materials about the dialogues with the Kennedy government on October 27, 1962, with great interest. . . . It is impossible not to be scared because the world was extremely close to its destruction. And what was lucky was that reason won out."

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seven percent of the respondents answered positively.[17] Similarly, our 1968 survey of *Pravda* readers invited respondents to raise any issue bothering them. Of the one-third of the sample who replied, virtually none mentioned a fear of war.[18]

The desire of the Soviet leadership to maintain a quiet atmosphere in the country was also seen in 1969, when they played down the military clashes on the Soviet-Chinese border, avoiding suggesting in any way to the populace that a major military episode with China was imminent. (At this time, the leadership also rejected efforts by party intellectuals such as Aleksey Rumyantsev and Fëdor Burlatskiy to promote the dissemination of liberal ideas within the Soviet Union as a means of enhancing the campaign against Mao Zedong and his Cultural Revolution.)[19]

With the rapprochement between the USSR and the United States in the early 1970's, the Soviet Union entered one of its most relaxed periods. While this comfortable mood reflected such internal factors as stability of party and state apparatuses, the absence of mass political repression, a sellers' market for labor, and improvements in the standard of living, the receding of the threat of war also played an important part. In particular, improvement in relations with the US were, as Leonid Brezhnev noted at the 25th CPSU Congress in 1976, of "radical importance for averting the danger of a new war and the strengthening of peace." The party leader promised to intensify "efforts in the struggle for a durable peace."[20]

War was a rare topic at Soviet social gatherings in this period, and even such bards of samizdat as Aleksandr Galich, Bulat Okudzhava, and Vladimir Vysotskiy did not deal with war in their songs. Nor can we locate traces of a fear of war in Soviet literature (legal or illicit), which is normally a sensitive indicator of the moods of the people.[21] This complacency was fueled by official media, which did not dwell on the topic of nuclear war or on the military might of potential Soviet adversaries.[22]

The "War Scare"

At the beginning of the 1980's, for reasons which cannot be precisely determined, Soviet leaders and Soviet propaganda radically altered their public evaluations of international developments and began to speak more and more frequently and alarmingly about the dangers of nuclear war. Already at the 26th CPSU Congress in early 1981, Brezhnev spoke of "a considerable increase in international tension, with all its dangerous implications" and warned of the "pernicious consequences of nuclear war for mankind." But, his message was basically optimistic regarding prospects for restoring good relations with the US and for improving international relations in general.[23]

With the accession of Yuriy Andropov to power in late 1982 and the impending deployment of new US nuclear missiles in NATO countries, however, Soviet propaganda on the danger of a new war acquired a radical new prominence. For the first time since Stalin's death, the Soviet population was exposed to a campaign suggesting that the world was on the verge of nuclear catastrophe.

Andropov's responses to questions posed by *Pravda* in March 1983 were particularly salient in this respect. The Soviet leader bluntly accused the US of preparing a first strike against the USSR and said that the Reagan Administration "invents new plans on how to unleash a nuclear war in the best way, with the hope of winning it.[24] A month later, in an interview with West Germany's *Der Spiegel*, Andropov repeated his apocalyptic assessment of the world situation.[25] And several weeks later, in a speech at a dinner for visiting East German leader Erich Honecker, he categorically asserted that the US was seeking world dominance, language rarely heard from a Soviet leader since denunciations of Hitler during World War II.[26]

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[17] B. Grushin, "*Komsomol'skaya Pravda*'s Institute of Public Opinion," in *Voprosy organizatsii i metodiki konkretnykh sotsial'nykh isseledovanii* (Problems of Organization and Methods of Concrete Social Research), Moscow, Statistika, 1973, pp. 198–99; also, B. Grushin and L. Chikov, *Ispoved' pokoleniya* (Confession of a Generation), Moscow, Molodaya Gvardiya, 1962; and B. Grushin, *Mir mnenii. . . .*

[18] On this study, see *Zhurnalist* (Moscow), No. 10, 1969.

[19] As a senior fellow in Rumyantsev's institute, the author—based on his survey of *Pravda* readers— prepared a memo to this effect to the Central Committee.

It is characteristic that even in the 1970's party intellectuals in denouncing Mao Zedong, continued to almost completely avoid any reference to the 1969 military confrontations. See, e.g., A. Rumyantsev, *Istoki i evolyutsiya "Idey Mao Tsedun"* (The Sources and Evolution of "Mao Zedong Thought"), Moscow, Nauka, 1972; and Fëdor Burlatskiy, *Mao i yego nasledniki* (Mao Zedong and His Successors) Moscow, Izdatel'stvo Mezhdunarodnyye Otnosheniya, 1979.

[20] L. Brezhnev, *Otchët tsentral'nogo komiteta KPSS i ocherednyye zadachi partii v oblasti vnutrenney i vneshney politiki* (Report of the CPSU Central Committee and Priority Tasks of the Party in Domestic and Foreign Policy), Moscow, Politizdat, 1976, pp. 12, 19–33.

[21] The absence of a theme of war is quite conspicuous, for example, in the novels of Yuriy Trifonov, one of the best portrayers of the morals and manners of the Soviet intelligentsia in the post-Stalin era. Concern about war is also not found in the novels of the writers of rural prose, such as Valentin Rasputin, Vasiliy Shukshin, or Fëdor Abramov. Moreover, the samizdat that thrived in this period also virtually ignored the theme. This is true of Alexander Solzhenitsyn, Georgiy Vladimov, and other prominent figures whose works circulated through illicit channels.

[22] Interestingly, Western radio broadcasts to the USSR, by strongly emphasizing the Soviet military buildup and the putative superiority of Soviet military forces over Western forces, may have aided Soviet propaganda on the second of these subjects.

[23] L. Brezhnev, *XXVI s"yezd kommunisticheskoy partii Sovetskogo Soyuza: stenograficheskiy otchët* (The 26th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union: Stenographic Report), Moscow, Politizdat, 1981, pp. 37–48.

[24] Yu. V. Andropov, *Izbrannyye rechi i stat'i* (Selected Speeches and Writings), Moscow, Politizdat, 1983, pp. 250–53.

[25] In ibid. pp. 259–71.

[26] In ibid., p. 274.

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Of particular significance for Soviet domestic audiences was Andropov's unprecedentedly candid discussion of American nuclear power. He informed the Soviet people that "each American submarine possesses 16 missiles and each missile can simultaneously hit 14 targets. The total nuclear capacity of each missile is equivalent to 500 of the bombs dropped on Hiroshima." He also noted that in recent years the number of American nuclear warheads had grown from 4,000 to 10,000.[27] Moreover, he provided figures demonstrating that the Soviet Union had, at best, military parity with the United States.

Andropov's harsh and frigthening assessment of the international situation was echoed in statements by figures such as foreign minister Andrey Gromyko and defense minister Dmitriy Ustinov.[28] But most alarming of all must have been the December 1983 press conference of Marshal Nikolay Ogarkov. To a Soviet public lulled for decades into an optimistic view of the future, Ogarkov presented this stark picture:

The strategic American nuclear forces can use now, in just their first salvo, 12,000 nuclear charges, with a total power of 3,400 megatons. And this is 170,000 times the power of the first bomb the Americans dropped on Hiroshima in 1945. 170,000 times! Just think of it![29]

That Andropov's answers to *Pravda* marked a turning point is evidenced by the difference in the tone of *Pravda* headlines in the several months before and after this event.[30] In the first two months of 1983, typical headlines read: "A Resolute No! to Nuclear Weapons" (January 4); "A Reliable Shield Against Militarism" (January 5); "Peace to the Planet" (January 7); "Uphold Peace on the Planet" (February 4); "Peace Is Not Utopia" (February 15); and "The Cause of Peace Is in the Hands of the People" (February 22). After the interview, one read: "Against Nuclear Insanity" (April 2); "Forestall Nuclear Catastrophe" (April 6); "Save Life and Peace on Earth" (April 12); "No to Nuclear Death" (May 14); "Do Not Play with the Fate of Mankind" (June 1); and "Safeguard the Planet from Fire" (June 8). There is nothing in these headlines about military victory for the Soviet Union, but only anxiety over the "fate of the planet."

The character of the propaganda campaign has softened only slightly since the death of Andropov in February 1984. Less than two weeks after the General Secretary died, Defense Minister Ustinov accused the US of seeking "world dominance."[31] Newspapers, popular magazines, and broadcast media in the Soviet Union have continued to highlight the danger of nuclear war and foster the image of the US as an imminent aggressor. For example, in the June 29 issue of *Pravda*, Soviet General D. Volokogonov, writing as a military expert, stated that "the bow-string of international relations has been drawn dangerously tight" and that the "military threat is now especially great." A radio discussion on Moscow's domestic service of July 8 and a Moscow television program of July 7 both sought to foster the image of the US rejecting serious disarmament negotiations with the Soviet Union.[32] Even the satirical magazine *Krokodil* has become involved in generating fear of nuclear war. Of the 12 issues spanning February through June 1984, only one did not contain at least one picture of an American missile threatening peace-loving people.

And perhaps most important has been the personalization of the campaign. American President Ronald Reagan is repeatedly depicted as a person willing and able to push the button, triggering a nuclear attack against the Soviet Union. His policy is even regularly compared to that of Hitler.[33] Indeed, according to a content analysis of *Pravda* in the first half of July 1984, conducted by the author and Boris Rumer, the American chief executive was referred to more frequently in the Soviet party newspaper than was General Secretary Konstantin Chernenko. Reagan was mentioned directly eight times and indirectly seven times per issue compared to only four mentions of Chernenko per issue. Such personalization of the enemy is an important factor in creating and maintaining a war mentality, and is hence a conspicuous indicator of the seriousness of the Soviet leadership's intent to create such an attitude.

Finally, one could point to increased appeals for military preparedness. This was seen in the Volokogonov item cited above or the *Pravda* editorial on July 8, 1984, which explicitly praised the Byelorussian republic's leadership for carrying out regular military exercises for the civilian population.

[27] In his *Pravda* interview, ibid., p. 251–52.

[28] See e.g., the report of a Gromyko press conference in *Pravda*, Apr. 3, 1983.

[29] Ibid., Dec. 6, 1983.

[30] Headlines play an extremely important role in Soviet propaganda. Unlike headlines in the West, those in the Soviet press above all must convey the ideological position of the leadership with respect to events described in the article, even if they do not necessarily deal with the most important features of the events discussed. Headlines and editorials allow the Soviet reader, in a quick scan of the newspapers, to grasp the direction of Soviet policy.

[31] *Pravda*, Feb. 23, 1984.

[32] See Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Soviet Union* (Washington, DC), July 9, 1984, pp. CC/1–2, and July 11, p. AA/4.

[33] *Ogonëk* (Moscow), No. 2, January 1984, p. 6; and No. 26, June 1984, p. 7.

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Reaction of the Public

Unfortunately, we do not have any scientific polling data to indicate how people in the Soviet Union feel about this campaign. In my judgment, it is unlikely that even the Soviet leadership—given its reluctance to support nationwide opinion studies—has such data. Yet there is considerable information from diverse sources suggesting that for the first time since Stalin's death, a large part of the Soviet population is deeply worried about the state of US-Soviet relations and believes in the strong likelihood of a nuclear war. For the first time since 1953, Soviet people feel that foreign policy pertains directly to their own fate.

Foreign correspondents in Moscow are unanimous on the subject. Jorgen Dragsdahl of the Danish *Daily Information* wrote that "fear of war is growing rapidly."[34] John Burns of *The New York Times* wrote on December 11, 1983, that "there seems little doubt that fear among Soviet citizens is as great as, and possibly greater, than [among] most Americans .... Recent articles, books, and television programs have given people a fuller grasp of the annihilation involved, to the point that few people any longer believe that they could survive." Serge Schmeman wrote in *The New York Times* of January 24, 1984, that "Western correspondents in Moscow are regularly asked how war can be avoided, and the Soviet newspapers are reportedly flooded with frightened inquiries." Soviet tourists and other visitors to the West also tell of the anxiety spreading among the Soviet population.[35]

Soviet newspapers are paying an unusual amount of attention to readers' letters. It is thus interesting that the letters chosen for publication demonstrate a growing fear. On May 17, 1983, at the height of the new propaganda campaign, *Pravda* published a survey of readers' letters that indicated many "reflections about the dangerous consequences for peace of the eventual deployment of new American intermediate-range missiles in Western Europe." In an unusual move, *Pravda* failed to give specific figures on the volume of mail (and the newspaper also hastened to suggest that readers remained basically optimistic).

But a similar survey in *Literaturnaya Gazeta,* authorized by Burlatskiy, was more alarming. He chose for discussion 12 letters, all of them pessimistic in tone. One wrote that "the failure of negotiations in Geneva demonstrates the collapse of hope for a compromise"; another stated that "mankind slides inexorably toward the Third World War." According to Burlatskiy, some readers even treated international developments as confirmation of New Testament prophecies about the Apocalypse.[36] Like the *Pravda* survey, Burlatskiy's failed to specify the number of letters submitted, but he spoke of "thousands."[37]

Fear of war has also managed to penetrate Soviet fiction. In a recent, artistically excellent, novel, *Gorodskoy Peyzazh* (City Landscape), the heroine asks her husband, who has been watching the television evening news: "What's new in the world? Danger? Tension?" He replies in a trembling voice "Very dangerous."[38]

One could also point to the emergence of unofficial peace groups such as The Group For Mutual Trust (*Gruppa Vzaimnogo Doveriya*), with an estimated total of 400 members.[39] (This small figure does not detract from the significance of the phenomenon as an indication of popular concern about the dangers of war. In a country where joining of unofficial organizations is prohibited, a membership of 400 is far from negligible and is suggestive of a much larger number of sympathizers.)

There is even some modest evidence that the Soviet leadership may feel that the war scare has gotten out of hand. Thus, in a speech to a group of veterans in December 1983, Defense Minister Ustinov stressed that while the international situation was bad, "it is not necessary to overdramatize it."[40] The same notion was repeated in an "Appeal of the Central Committee" to the Soviet people in February 1984 in connection with national elections.[41] Candidate member of the Politburo Boris Ponomarëv, in a February election speech, likewise tried to calm the public with the words that "there is no fatal unavoidability of war."[42] And in a June 27, 1984, article in *Literaturnaya Gazeta,* Burlatskiy depicted a dialogue between a father and his son in which the former refutes his son's fears of

[34]Cited in *The Philadelphia Inquirer*, Dec. 31, 1983.

[35]*The New York Times*, Mar. 4, 1984.

[36]*Literaturnaya Gazeta*, Jan. 4, 1984.

[37]"Thousands" of letters on a single foreign affairs topic is a comparative avalanche. In 1972, *Literaturnaya Gazeta* received a total of 16,000 letters reacting to articles on all topics in the newspaper. See Fomicheva, op. cit., pp. 69, 77. Articles on international issues usually make up about one-fourth of the newspaper's content. If we assume that in a "normal" period letters are distributed among topics in roughly the same proportion as the newspaper space devoted to the various topics, and that circulation has increased by 20 percent in the last 10 years, this suggests that *Literaturnaya Gazeta* receives in a typical year a total of 5,000 letters on all international issues. Some studies suggest that letters on international issues are even less common—perhaps only 1 to 2 percent of the total. See V. Davydchenkov, "Organization of Sociological Research and Application of the Results in a Central Newspaper," in Shlapentokh, *Sotsiologiya pechati,* p. 149.

[38]See *Novyy Mir*, No. 8, 1983, p. 119.

[39]See, e.g., *Novoye Russkoye Slovo* (New York), Feb. 13 and Mar. 17, 1984.

[40]*Pravda*, Dec. 15, 1983.

[41]Ibid., Feb. 4, 1984.

[42]Ibid., Feb. 25, 1984.

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war by pointing to the decency of human nature and many other factors that make nuclear war and world annihilation highly improbable.

Who's Seen as the Culprit?

In reflecting on the Soviet propaganda campaign and the evidence that it has had a serious impact on public perceptions in the USSR, it is not clear whom that public is likely to blame for the perceived dangers. Is it their own government or the United States that is viewed as primarily responsible?

As suggested above, Russian patriotism is a significant factor in the attitudes of a large part of the public. Those familiar with Soviet history will recall that during the Second World War, White Russian emigrants in the West were deeply split—some of the fiercest enemies of the Bolsheviks wished with all their hearts for a Soviet victory over Russia's enemies.

Moreover, it would also be an error to suppose that all critics of the Soviet system automatically take the side of the West. For example, Roy and Zhores Medvedev tend to place more blame for current trends on successive American administrations because they have been "more provocative and less predictable."[43] It appears that in some circles of the Soviet public there is the ingrained belief that—for better or worse—the political initiative in the world belongs to the USSR, that the Soviet Union is successful in all its international actions, and that the West has, in effect, guaranteed peace only by backing down before Soviet aggression. Such individuals could fear that emergence of a new US administration not inclined to back down increases the risk of full-scale nuclear war, not to mention the possibility that it would stimulate hawks and new repressions within the Soviet Union.

At the same time, even the letters cited by Burlatskiy are indicative of a lack of consensus among the population on this issue. They stray far from official interpretations of events: two explain international tensions in terms of long-term trends pushing humankind toward catastrophe rather than blaming the US alone; another suggests that it is technological progress that has rendered the US-Soviet competition so dangerous. Moreover, some of the letters seem willing to assign equal responsibility to the US and the USSR.[44]

* * *

One cannot predict what direction future Soviet foreign policy will take. However, it seems fair to say that the majority of the Soviet population now perceives the world situation in a different light than it has for several decades. The spectre of war, once deemed irrelevant, now is on their mind and many of them feel emotionally involved in international developments.

Should the Soviet authorities decide to return to the psychological atmosphere of the 1960's and 1970's, they will have to take many steps to reduce the level of fear that has been generated. One should not exaggerate the intensity of this fear, but one should not ignore it either.

[43] *The Nation* (New York), Jan. 16, 1982, pp. 38–50.

[44] This diversity is particularly striking in light of the traditional official repression of dissenting opinions about foreign policy issues.

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Books

Kremlin Factions and Foreign Policy

Arnold Beichman

GAVRIEL D. RA'ANAN. *International Policy Formation in the USSR: Factional "Debates" during the Zhdanovshchina.* Hamden, CT, Archon Press, 1983.

JIRI VALENTA and WILLIAM C. POTTER, Eds. *Soviet Decisionmaking for National Security.* Winchester, MA, Allen & Unwin, 1984.

IN HIS HISTORY, *The Communist Party of the Soviet Union,* the late Leonard Schapiro wrote that Andrey Zhdanov's sudden death on August 31, 1948, was followed by the "Leningrad Case," a ruthless purge of his associates and supporters—among them Nikolay Voznesenskiy, A. A. Kuznetsov, Pëtr Popkov, and Mikhail Rodionov, all executed on trumped-up charges. Schapiro then adds, "What induced Stalin to initiate or tolerate this extermination of valuable administrators can only be conjectured and no conclusive information has come to light."[1]

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Now, a quarter-century after Schapiro's pioneering work, and after mountains of new research into one of the murkier episodes of the "Stalinishchina", Gavriel Ra'anan has produced a well-grounded theory to explain the "Leningrad Case." However one may differ with him in detail, his theory is about as much "conclusive information" as we are ever going to get about Stalin's motivations for initiating this particular purge. Ra'anan's highly persuasive analysis is likely to remain definitive until a Freedom of Information Act becomes effective in the USSR, that is, until, as Khrushchev once said in another context, a shrimp learns to whistle.

Ra'anan maintains that there are sufficient "footprints" of an ongoing Soviet ideological "debate" to be found in the open Soviet political literature, and in recently published memoirs dealing with the 1944–52 period, to make possible "meaningful efforts to retrace the convoluted (factional) paths beaten by the protagonists in CPSU decision-making" (p. 161). In addition to careful and insightful readings of published Soviet documentation, Ra'anan has used the works of such scholars as Schapiro, Robert Conquest, Anton Antonov-Ovseyenko, Boris Nicolaevsky, and Adam Ulam; he has interviewed Alexander M. Nekrich, Stephan Dedijer, Aron Katsenelinboigen, Mark Kuchment, and Herman Field as on-the-spot observers of the Zhdanovshchina; and he has produced a bibliography of the period that should satisfy the most demanding Sovietologist.

Rejecting the "single actor model," Ra'anan employs a "factional model" as a guide for the interpretation of Soviet decisionmaking (p. 5). His analysis addresses three key issues: (1) The impact of factional struggles on the political process in closed societies. (The political process, writes Ra'anan, "cannot be halted by fiat or 'ukaz'; it simply assumes different, 'factional' forms"); (2) The ramifications of factional conflict within the CPSU upon policies adopted by other communist parties and states; and (3) The degree to which Soviet decisionmaking in foreign policy takes into account statements and actions of Western leaders.

Of particular importance in Ra'anan's factional model is his argument that often the development of Soviet policy had more to do with interminable internal struggles for dominance than with

[1] Leonard Schapiro, *The Communist Party of the Soviet Union,* 2nd ed., New York, Random House, 1971, p. 513.

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any one action by Western governments. From this he concludes that

the 'revisionist' historians have little basis for their assumption that the West could have changed Moscow's hostility during this period, but for Washington's supposed sins of commission and omission. (p. 2)

The same might be said, for example, of those who argue that the sole motive behind the Soviet boycott of the 1984 Olympics was "revenge" for President Carter's 1980 boycott. And even more so is Ra'anan's insight applicable to critics of President Reagan's "strident" anti-Soviet rhetoric; the massive contemporary Soviet military buildup began not during a period of unusual international tension but during the heyday of détente. Skeptics such as Schapiro, Conquest, Richard Pipes, P. J. Vatikiotis, Gregory Grossman, and others were prescient in warning, a decade ago, that détente "will not be genuine as long as 'peaceful coexistence' is for the Soviet leaders only a euphemism for a conflict by all means short of war."[2] Likewise, the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan surprised only those who believed that avowals of Western pacifism could have a moderating effect on Moscow's historically adventurist behavior.

This misunderstanding is rooted in a conceptual failure. As Ra'anan observes,

most revisionist accounts of the "Cold War," to the extent that they address themselves at all to the Soviet side of the picture, portray the Soviet leaders both as monolithic and essentially passive, "reacting" merely to Western moves and policies. The Soviet decisionmaking process, however, was contingent as much upon developments in factional struggles within the Soviet empire, as upon "objective" Soviet interests abroad. (p. 8)

THE EVIDENCE for this assertion, at least as far as the early postwar period is concerned, is abundantly presented in Ra'anan's book. The author, who has also written *Yugoslavia After Tito,*[3] demonstrates that the Zhdanov/Voznesenskiy "leftist" faction (as against the rival "rightist" Malenkov faction) developed 'intimate ties" with Yugoslavia and with the communist parties of Bulgaria, Finland, and, briefly, of India as well (p. 8). This Zhdanov constellation, which must have seemed overpowering during Stalin's frequent absences from Moscow because of protracted illnesses (pp. 179-80), pressed for a militant, "ultra-leftist," even adventurist foreign policy in Europe and Asia (p. 162).

On the home front, charged with supervising party policy on ideology and culture, Zhdanov instituted a major cultural purge, which so shocked Western intellectuals that many refused to go along with Stalin's Stockholm "Peace" Appeal. Zhdanov's purge led to the expulsion of Mikhail Zoshchenko and Anna Akhmatova from the Writers Union and to savage attacks on Dmitriy Shostakovich, Sergey Prokofiev, Aram Katchaturian and Sergey Eisenstein (pp. 56–58). All these events were part of the factional battle with Malenkov and his supporters for Stalin's crown.

These policies represented a meteoric comeback for Zhdanov. During the war he had suffered demotions because of what was regarded (retrospectively, of course) as his pro-German policy before the Nazi invasion, and because of his later espousal of "National Bolshevism." With the war over, however, he began asserting himself in foreign affairs, and in October 1945 traveled to Belgrade as chief of the Central Committee department in charge of relations with foreign communist parties. This was the beginning of the Leningrad-Belgrade-Sofia alliance that reached its zenith in September 1947, when Zhdanov assigned Josip Tito the militant international leadership role in the communist world.

Having elbowed Malenkov aside, Zhdanov was now riding high as Stalin's heir-presumptive. (He was even cover-storied by *Time* magazine in 1946). But Zhdanov forgot or perhaps never understood that Stalin had felt "personally threatened," says Ra'anan, by the Leningrad party bosses, Grigoriy Zinoviev in 1927 and Sergey Kirov in 1934 (p. 20). Looking back, one can say that Zhdanov's doom was foreordained.

In fact, according to Nekrich as cited by Ra'anan, the Zhdanov-Malenkov rivalry was the classic example of how Stalin operated: arrange overlapping areas of responsibility and influence to ensure that rather than conspiring against him, his underlings would be busy snarling at each other; then move in for the kill (p. 25). As Vernon V. Aspaturian suggests in his essay, "The Stalinist Legacy in Soviet National Security Decisionmaking" (in the volume edited by Jiri Valenta and William C. Potter under review here), Stalin's arrangement of "conflicting lines of authority between party and state provided an *ad hoc* system of

[2]See "Detente: An Evaluation," *International Review* (Toronto), Spring 1974.

[3]Gavriel Ra'anan, *Yugoslavia After Tito: Scenarios and Implications*, Boulder, CO, Westview, 1978.

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crosschecks and balances." It was in this perpetually tense milieu that the factions so skillfully dissected by Ra'anan could maneuver, but ultimately fall victim to Stalin's maleficent suspicions.

RA'ANAN'S MODEL is particularly apposite for understanding Soviet policy in occupied Germany at the war's end, when that country became "a factional battleground" for the Zhdanovite-Malenkovite rivalry. The internal battle within the party apparatus was concealed behind a façade of "competing doctrines." Such has often been the case in the history of the Soviet party—which explains "why victorious factions show so little compunction about picking up the fallen banners of their rivals from the battlefield, or why biographical data seem to play such a central role in determining the composition of the various political 'clans'" (p. 85).

The ups and downs of G. F. Alexandrov, who rose to prominence during 1946 and whose rubber-ball careerism Ra'anan describes in fascinating detail, are an example of how much can be learned about the permanent struggle for power in the Soviet party bureaucracy by graphing, on a chronological continuum, superordinate-to-subordinate biographical data (pp. 173–76). A more recent example might be the paralleled biographies of Mikhail Suslov and Yuriy Andropov. The latter was a lot luckier (or shrewder) than Alexandrov, who jumped from Zhdanov to Malenkov and then—unfortunately for Alexandrov, at just the wrong moment—back to Zhdanov's "ghost," Voznesenskiy. A good sense of timing (with a little bit of luck, too) is an essential attribute for bandwagon-hopping in any society.

In a similar vein, Robert Conquest's brief but generous introduction to Ra'anan's book focuses on an aspect of Andropov's relationship to the Leningrad apparatus. In 1947, Andropov was elected second secretary of the Karelian Soviet Socialist Republic, always regarded as "an appanage of Zhdanovite Leningrad." Out of the Leningrad Case purge that also struck Karelia, he managed to emerge with a top job in Moscow's Central Committee. Andropov's two superiors were not so fortunate. N. G. Kupryanov, the local first secretary, was tortured and imprisoned; his successor, A. A. Kondakov, lasted only a short time before he was shot. Obviously, the future general secretary must have done something right. The recurrence of such conspiratorial patterns in Soviet politics suggests why, as Conquest observes, Ra'anan's analysis "has profound implications not merely for the period it covers, but also for the events of a later epoch" (p. ix).

There is a sad note with which I must end this discussion. Gavriel Ra'anan died recently, while still a young man. His untimely passing cut off what promised to be, as this book amply demonstrates, a notable career as a scholar and historian.

THE EXCELLENT collection of essays edited by Valenta and Potter is in its way a useful test of the Ra'anan "factional" model, since it too deals with the Soviet decisionmaking process. The book is based on papers presented at an August 1980 conference, but the papers have been updated for publication. For the most part, they are rich in research material, despite "the paucity of data on Soviet policymaking" noted by the editors in their introduction (p. 2).

The book is divided into four sections. Part 1 is an attempt to conceptualize Soviet national security decisionmaking, and an examination of how policymaking has developed since Stalin's death in March 1953. Part 2 deals with the role of the Soviet military in decisionmaking, weapons development, defense research and development, and strategic arms negotiations. Part 3, for some readers probably the most interesting section, contains case studies of Soviet decision-making—the 1968 intervention in Czechoslovakia (Valenta), the 1973 Arab-Israeli war (Galia Golan), and the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan (Valenta). All three events, it should be noted, occurred during the Brezhnev era (1964–82) of "peaceful coexistence," when, as Dimitri Simes points out, "the Soviet Union was gradually transformed from a continental empire into a truly global military power" (p. 74).

Part 4 consists of two essays—one by Potter, the other by Stephen M. Meyer—that suggest techniques for integrating "the disparate elements of the state of the art of scholarship on Soviet decisionmaking into a cohesive and rigorous methodology." The hope, as expressed in the book's introduction, is that such a methodology could "improve the analytical and ultimately predictive capabilities of the effort to understand Soviet decisionmaking under the new leadership" (p. 2).

AT THIS POINT a general caveat to the valiant efforts represented in this anthology is very much in order: almost seven decades after the Bolshevik Revolution, we may be as far as we ever were from understanding the "how's" of Soviet decisionmaking, even though we may understand some of the "why's." In large part, this situation

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arises from a deliberate Soviet design; indeed, secrecy has been described by Adam Ulam as "probably the most potent weapon that the 20-odd people at the very top of the Kremlin hierarchy dispose of in warding off any attempt by outsiders to interfere with their rule."[4]

Quite often, therefore, what you do see or read of the Soviet world is not necessarily what you get. Anyone who has examined the recently published *Dezinformatsia* by Richard Shultz and Roy Godson[5] or *New Lies for Old* by Anatoliy Golitsyn[6] will get an uneasy feeling that to depend upon Soviet formal sources, especially since Stalin's death, for any level of analysis (not to mention prediction) may be dangerous to our health. Analysts of Soviet decisionmaking must work on the assumption that Kremlin policymakers will do all they can, like drug smugglers worried about Doberman sniffers at modern airports, to create plausible but false scents for the "enemy" analyst to follow. Unfortunately, the importance of such Soviet "active measures" or disinformation about Soviet decisionmaking receives little attention in this volume.

Examining the complex Ra'anan "factional" model as an overlay on what is known of the present Politburo would show how little one can depend today upon Soviet printed sources, let alone upon Georgiy Arbatov's periodic private revelations to selected US savants. It may sound exaggerated to suggest that the USSR was more open territory for analysts of Soviet affairs in Stalin's day. Yet, perhaps it *was* simpler in Stalin's day, when there were only a handful of actors, all dominated by Stalin, involved in national security decisionmaking. (Jerry Hough would probably disagree with this distinction, however, since his essay on "The Historical Legacy in Soviet Weapons Deployment" argues [p. 90] that a Committee of Defense, created by Stalin in 1937, gave the Politburo members who served on this body "wide-ranging responsibilities in those realms where the military interacted with civilian institutions.")

As for contemporary Soviet defense policy, the extent of our knowledge (or ignorance) of the internal players and procedures whose interactions produce the relevant Soviet "outcomes" is discussed in several of the other contributions. Since Stalin's time, Arthur J. Alexander ("Models for Defense Decisionmaking") argues, there has been "much progress" in understanding this realm of Soviet policy formulation. A good deal is in fact known about organizational structure in the Soviet defense sector. Nevertheless, as Alexander himself concedes, the important Defense Council "is still shrouded in considerable uncertainty as to its day-to-day role, and even its membership" (p. 21).

Similarly, Stephen M. Meyer notes that "we really *understand* very little about the nature of and relationships between defense-related policy inputs, policy process(es), policy outputs and resulting outcomes" (p. 256). As a result, to take but one further example from the book at hand, Raymond L. Garthoff's essay on "The Soviet Military and SALT" gives us few clues for determining who in the Kremlin during June and July 1984 was in a position to decide whether or not to reciprocate President Reagan's (qualified) acceptance of the Soviet bid to start talks on antisatellite weapons.

More broadly, today's Soviet policymaking process, according to Simes ("The Politics of Defense in the Soviet Union: Brezhnev's Era"), may be described as

> *controlled pluralism within defined totalitarian limits—pluralism confined to official institutions, pluralism only for those and among the elite, without much input from other political constituencies and, finally, pluralism which implicitly accepts several key unifying themes and rules of the game which should remain unchallenged.* (p. 76)

Dennis Ross ("Risk Aversion in Soviet Decisionmaking") would agree with Simes's concept, I would judge, since, according to Ross, the prospect "that totalitarian dictatorship would gradually give way to a pluralism of elites ... flowed logically from the elite decision to abandon terror and to forsake revolutionary change engineered from above" (p. 238). My own feeling, though, is that "controlled pluralism" is merely fancier, updated cant for "democratic centralism." In any case, we still do not know enough to characterize this process with much confidence or precision.

FUTURE EFFORTS to unravel the Soviet foreign policymaking enigma may benefit from Potter's windup essay on the "Study of Soviet Decisionmaking for National Security: What Is To Be Done." It is a splendid piece of work, with enough suggestions for doctoral dissertations and research grants to keep national security analysts and foundation secretaries busy for the foreseeable future. The various contributions to this volume would constitute a natural and valuable

[4] *National Review* (New York), Aug. 19, 1983, p. 1022.

[5] Richard H. Shultz, Jr., and Roy S. Godson, *Dezinformatsia: Active Measures in Soviet Strategy*, New York, Pergamon, 1984.

[6] Anatoliy Golitsyn, *New Lies for Old: Communist Strategy of Deception and Disinformation*, New York, Dodd, Mead, 1983.

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point of departure for such a wide-ranging effort.

Still, I doubt that with all the rigorous, disciplined, computerized or noncomputerized effort in the world, we shall be fortunate enough to better our predictive capabilities about Soviet decision-making, shrouded as it is in almost impenetrable secrecy supported by an effective intelligence and counterintelligence infrastructure. Soviet military strategy, according to a classic article in *Voyennaya mysl'*, depends on surprise, misleading the enemy by "camouflage, fake troop movements and operations, dummy targets, etc."[7] And military disinformation is, after all, only the continuation of political disinformation by other means.

[7]Cited in Joseph D. Douglass, Jr., and Amoretta M. Hoeber, *Soviet Strategy for Nuclear War*, Stanford, CA, Hoover Institution Press, 1979, p. 44.

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Castro's Costly Path to Dependency

Antonio Jorge and Jaime Suchlicki

CARMELO MESA-LAGO. *The Economy of Socialist Cuba: A Two-Decade Appraisal.* Albuquerque, NM, University of New Mexico Press, 1981.

CUBA is a prime example of the adverse effects of the hybridization of Marxist socialism and underdevelopment, which have been compounded by the traditionalist *cacique*-like approach to governance employed by Fidel Castro. After a quarter-century of jolting social transformations and economic misadvantures, Cuba finds itself in an economic dead-end, more dependent on outside assistance than it was before the revolution or than it needed to be if postwar trends in the country's economic life had been allowed to continue without the revolutionary upheaval.

Prior to the revolution, Cuba's postwar developmental strategy had been well attuned to the country's resource endowment, to the size of internal markets, and to opportunities offered by the external sector.[1] The strategy sought to increase import substitution, diversify agriculture, and decrease the concentration of foreign trade with the United States by opening new markets in the European Economic Community and with Japan.

The country entered the postwar period with unusual advantages over other less-developed countries. Among these were: a positive disposition among the population toward economic modernization; familiarity with international trade and an advantageous geographic location; a marked degree of political participation and social awareness; an extensive network of mass communications media; remarkably favorable indicators of longevity, infant mortality, and literacy; traditions of entrepreneurship and petty trading; a large, urbanized middle class; considerable professional and technical expertise; favorable topography and fairly good transport and distribution capabilities; and last but not least, a long and improving relationship with the dynamic economy of the United States.

Prior to 1959, Cuba's low-risk, market-oriented, balanced growth approach was definitely yielding favorable results. Cultivation of rice, coffee, fruits, and vegetables was complementing the traditional sugar culture. Expansion was also evident in the production and export of copper, iron, and nickel. From 1945 to 1951, Cuban national income per capita (in current prices) increased an average 9 percent a year; for 1951 to 1958, the rate was still 4.6 percent. Over the years 1947–58, industrial production increased by close to 50 percent.[2]

Compare this to a 2.8 percent average annual real rate of growth in gross national product from 1960 to 1978.[3] With an estimated annual average growth in population of 2 percent for the same period, net growth per capita under the revolution has been less than 1 percent. And even this did not necessarily benefit the Cuban consumer. With domestic investment running at 27 percent of gross material product in the second half of the 1970's, with a 1981 price hike for 1,510 consumer goods (amounting to an approximately 50

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[1] See Cuban Economic Research Project, *A Study on Cuba*, Coral Gables, FL, University of Miami Press, 1965, Part II; also José Illan, *Cuba: Datos Sobre Una Economía en Ruinas* (Cuba: Facts About an Economy in Ruin), Miami, New House, 1963; Julián Alienes, *Características Fundamentales de la Economía Cuban* (Fundamental Characteristics of the Cuban Economy), Havana, Banco Nacional de Cuba, 1950; and Henry Wallich, *Monetary Problems of an Export Economy*, New York, Arno, 1978 (originally published in Cuba in 1950).

[2] The data on prerevolutionary Cuba are taken from *A Study of Cuba*, chs. 37–41. This book, along with the dated but monumental *Report on Cuba* by the Truslow Mission (published by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Washington, DC, in 1951), are the most complete and authoritative sources on the Cuban economy before 1959.

[3] International Monetary Fund, *International Financial Statistical Yearbook 1980*, Washington, DC, 1981.

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percent increase in the cost of living for the average family), with growing rationing, and with soaring prices in both the officially sanctioned "parallel" market (government-supervised trade of goods at prices close to their market value) and in the black market, one quickly discerns the perverse welfare function of the Castro system.[4] As Jorge Domínguez has observed, the growth performance of the Cuban economy since 1959

has been very poor by any standards—compared to its own pre-revolutionary past, compared to other Communist countries, or compared to other Latin American countries. High rates of investment are wasted at times through persistently inefficient practices.[5]

What about Cuba's economic prospects? In the reviewed volume, Carmelo Mesa-Lago predicts that the period 1981–85 for the Cuban economy would be characterized by "caution and frugality,"[6] as growth in production stagnated, investment growth slowed, and improvements in social consumption virtually froze. Others have since painted an even bleaker picture of a Cuba faced with the possibility of a decrease in the massive flow of resources it has been receiving from the Soviet Union and its East European associates (estimated at $3 billion a year from the USSR alone),[7] hopelessly reliant on sugar production, and facing major debt servicing problems in both East and West (Havana owes the noncommunist world an estimated $3.5 billion on which payments have recently been rescheduled, and service on the debt to the USSR is due to begin in 1986).[8]

Cuba's revolution has not measurably decreased the island's concentration on sugar, nor has it succeeded in reducing the excessive vulnerability of the Cuban economy. Domestic production facilities are weak and insufficiently diversified, still greatly susceptible to external shocks and pressures. Beyond this are the enormous social costs, which we do not even explore here. Only when all these costs are considered together can one realize the magnitude of the price paid for the failed Cuban revolution.

SOME ANALYSTS of the economy of Castro's Cuba tend to overlook these consequences. Immersed in detailed and technical studies of such matters as trends in Cuban national income statistics, they fail even to discern that the national income generated served vastly different welfare functions in pre-1959 and post-1959 Cuba.

A good example is Carmelo Mesa–Lago, author of numerous detailed and well regarded works on the Cuban economy, including the volume reviewed here.[9] In his zeal to display objectivity, Mesa-Lago ends up obscuring not only the deep social and political costs of the revolution, but also the economic opportunity costs that Cuba has had to pay.

An apt illustration of this fallacy is evident in Chapter 2 of the reviewed volume, in which Mesa-Lago attempts to visualize the aims of the revolution and categorizes its policies in terms of traditional or orthodox economic objectives derived from the Cuban official goals in the prerevolutionary era. In fact, Castro's ideologically motivated effort to transform the society radically has had perverse economic effects. As noted, the revolution ironically has increased, not decreased, the degree of political and economic dependence of the island nation on external forces.

WHAT explains this dénouement? One can suggest three sets of factors: those relating to revolutionary strategy, to methodology and ideology, and to human relations. In addition, it is important to assess to what degree unpredictable external events can be blamed for Cuba's economic woes.

Problems of strategy. The presence of a charismatic but megalomaniac and messianic leader bent on expanding his influence abroad and creating a new Cuba at home, regardless of cost, resulted in unpredictable and inefficient economic policies.[10] Initially, Castro pursued a variant of the Soviet forced-industrialization approach to growth; agriculture and the sugar industry were played down. Then there was a sharp reversion to sugar monoculture. Under the justifying mantle of Hegelian logic, the new policy was advertised as deepening and ag-

[4] See also Carmelo Mesa-Lago, "The Economy," in Jorge Domínguez, Ed., *Cuba: Internal and International Affairs*, Beverly Hills, CA, Sage, 1982, pp. 113–66, esp. pp. 133 and 157–58; and Mesa-Lago, *The Economy of Socialist Cuba*, p. 194.

[5] Domínguez, op. cit., p. 11

[6] Mesa-Lago, "The Economy," loc. cit., p. 140.

[7] Ibid., p. 150.; also National Foreign Assessment Center, *The Cuban Economy: A Statistical Review*, Washington, DC, March 1981, p. 39; and Lawrence H. Theriot, *Cuba Faces the Economic Realities of the 1980s: A study prepared for the use of the Joint Economic Committee, US Congress*, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, March 1982, pp. 15–22.

[8] Theriot, op. cit., p. 37. In 1983, sugar accounted for 81 percent of Cuban exports (compared to 84 percent in the decade prior to the revolution). See Roger Lowenstein, "Sugar Is Cuba's Triumph and Its Failure," *The Wall Street Journal* (New York), Aug. 3, 1984.

[9] We would single out Mesa-Lago's previously cited contribution to Dominguez, op. cit.; his *Cuba in the 1970's: Pragmatism and Institutionalization*, Albuquerque, NM, University of New Mexico Press, 1974 (an earlier version of the 1981 book), and his contribution with Luc Zephirin, "Central Planning," in Carmelo Mesa-Lago, Ed., *Revolutionary Change in Cuba*, Pittsburgh, PA, University of Pittsburgh Press, 1971, pp. 145–84.

[10] See Antonio Jorge, "How Exportable Is the Cuban Model? Cultural Contact in a Modern Context," in Barry B. Levine, Ed., *The New Cuban Presence in the Caribbean*, Boulder, CO, Westview, 1983, p. 229.

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gravating existing contradictions—namely the monoculture system—in order to bring about that system's ultimate disappearance. In simpler terms, Cuba sought to increase sugar production and sales in order to obtain the wherewithal to finance growth.

To this end Castro, in the late 1960's, seized on the monumental dream of a 10-million-ton sugar harvest. As with other Castro plans, this was more than just an overambitious economic goal. It had its further political goals of enhancing the revolution's international prestige and Castro's leadership and power. Failure to achieve the production goal brought grievous economic consequences. It produced a major dislocation of established resource allocation patterns; it directly led to a serious neglect of other sectors of the economy as well as to a major increase in the number of unfinished investment projects; and it brought about a drastic decline in labor productivity. As a result, there was a gradual reorientation toward a more balanced macrosectoral growth model, i.e., toward a more traditional developmental pattern. Although Mesa-Lago acknowledges this to be the end result of the failed experiment, he does not dwell on the causes nor on the unintended outcome, which was contrary to the original policy of the regime.[11]

Observers of prerevolutionary Cuba long stressed the need for balance, moderation, and diversification. Such prescriptions were advanced by the Sociedad Económica de Amigos del País as far back as the 18th century, and more recently by the contributors to the famous *Report on Cuba* by the 1950 Truslow Mission of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development.[12] Whether in colonial times or after, excessive concentration of resources on one activity has invariably proven to be the Achilles heel of the Cuban economy. Only at its own peril can Cuba ignore this axiomatic truth.

Unfortunately—something that Mesa-Lago fails to point out—a return to a more sensible and balanced growth strategy no longer will assure the benefits that would have accrued from such a move two decades ago. Many of the advantages postwar Cuba had going for it have now been dissipated, for example, the close commercial relationship with the United States and the West; a highly developed entrepreneurial spirit; and the practical absence of a foreign debt. There are further complications in the political-ideological, motivational, and purely economic spheres.

Ideology and methodology. The varying ideological stances adopted by the leaders of the revolution go far to explain the wide swings in preferred growth strategies and the magnitude of economic failures. Only ideological naïveté and gross ignorance of the lessons of economic history—combined with power politics and the personality and ambitions of key Cuban leaders—can explain the blind adherence, in quick succession, to the Stalinist economic model, to Maoist experiments in radical human and socioeconomic change, to Soviet economic reformism, and finally, to an uneasy mix of the latter with the persistent antiorganizational traits and charismatic mass mobilizational ethos of the Cuban revolution.[13]

Moreover, Soviet planning ideology has also fostered counterproductive traits: overcentralization and rigidity of decisionmaking mechanisms, inflexibility of resource allocation patterns, tight control of financial operations and accounting procedures, deep distrust of money and a related insistence on planning in physical terms, and resistance to use of such capitalistic devices as profits. These traits have persisted throughout the strategic shifts and turns of economic policy.

Human factors. One should also examine the effect of two sets of human factors. The first relates to the communist government's approach to motivating individual behavior. Castro has chosen to concentrate on the psychology of the workers, using moralistic exhortations and acrimonious vilifications. His impatience to create a new man was, from the start, the most distinctive socio-psychological peculiarity of the Cuban revolutionary experience. Some even found this emphasis youthful and refreshing.[14] However, until the 1970's, when the emphasis on complete and instantaneous change gradually began to wane, the endeavor smacked more of utopianism than of a measured effort at creating genuinely new psychological structures.[15]

[11]On the policies of the 1960's, the failure of the 10-million-ton harvest effort in 1970, and the gradual increase of the Soviet presence and influence at the start of the 1970's see Jaime Suchlicki, "An Assessment of Castroism," *Orbis* (Philadelphia), Spring 1972, pp. 35–37. Mesa-Lago gives considerable detail on Cuba's policy meanderings during the 1960's and 1970's in both *Cuba in the 1970's*, ch. 1, and *The Economy of Socialist Cuba*, ch. 2.

[12]On economic thought in Cuba during the 18th century see Ramiro Guerra, *Manual de Historia de Cuba*, Madrid, Ediciones R., 1975, ch. 13; also Jaime Suchlicki, *Cuba from Columbus to Castro*, New York, Scribners, 1974, pp. 63–65. On the IBRD report, see fn. 2.

[13]See, e.g., Edward Gonzalez, *Cuba Under Castro: The Limits of Charisma*, Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1974, chs. 8–10.

[14]See P.J.D. Wiles, *Economic Institutions Compared*, New York, Wiley, 1977, Chs. 2, 3, and 21.

[15]For a detailed account of the role of moral incentives in Cuba, see Robert M. Bernardo, *The Theory of Moral Incentives in Cuba*, University, AL, The University of Alabama Press, 1971, esp. ch. 5. For a critique of moral incentives and their performance in Cuba, see Wiles, op. cit., ch. 2.

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Second, the expectation that a vast psychological reordering could be had on demand is probably related to the *cacique* style of government (a Latin American derivative of Iberian *caudillismo*) deeply embedded in the spirit of the Cuban Revolution.[16] For all the talk, there have not occurred in Cuba any serious attempts even faintly resembling in magnitude those of the Yugoslav or Maoist experiments, which would have vouched for the seriousness of the Cuban leadership's efforts to devolve power to the workers, even within the communists' own ideological framework. The degree of genuine popular participation at various levels of decisionmaking and organization has always remained low, decreasing sharply at higher levels. Solidarity, cooperation, and moral incentives were never conceived as organically linked to a truly participatory system.

It is interesting to speculate on the repercussions that the sharp shift toward the use of material incentives—especially since 1976, when Cuba's first five-year plan went into effect—has had on the ideological images of the Cuban people. The ethos of the revolution has always been highly egalitarian, even if the privileged position of the higher bureaucracy and elite refuted this ideal in practice. It was only the mystique of austerity and simplicity that "justified" the radical sacrifices consistently demanded of the Cuban people. To the extent that technocratic values and efficient performance are pushed to the forefront, it will no longer be possible to play down personal wants and material consumption. Insistence on domestic economic growth and increased levels of consumer welfare are also hardly compatible with the idea of internationalist solidarity, permanent revolution, and the forthcoming apocalyptic Armageddon against Cuba's enemies.

External events. A final issue is the impact of external events. The Cuban government often points to natural disasters and expected fluctuations in the prices of exports and imports as factors contributing to Cuba's poor economic performance. The point that should be made, however, is that the external shocks and instabilities that Cuba—like other underdeveloped economies—has experienced have been aggravated by the efforts to effect a Marxist-oriented revolution in conditions of a Latin American caudillo-like cacique. Charisma and authoritarianism, improvisation and amateurish grandstanding certainly do not contribute to foresight and effective responses to unexpected contingencies.

Indeed, the only "successes" of Castro's Cuba have been its fitful attempts to undo the very damage that the revolution has inflicted on the island's economy. Under a different system, Cubans might have enjoyed both higher rates of economic growth and a freer political life. Castro's "model" has provided Cubans the worst of both worlds.

[16] See Howard J. Wiarda, "The Struggle for Democracy and Human Rights in Latin America: Toward a New Conceptualization," in Wiarda, Ed., *The Continuing Struggle for Democracy in Latin America*, Boulder, CO, Westview, 1980, p. 241. On Castro, see Claudio Veliz, *The Centralist Tradition of Latin America*, Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1980, p. 300. On the relationship of Castro's *caudillismo* to ideology, see Theodore Draper, *Castroism, Theory and Practice*, New York, Praeger, 1965, pp. 48–56.

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Theory and Praxis of Soviet Economic Modernization

Bruce Parrott

ERIK P. HOFFMANN and ROBBIN F. LAIRD. *The Politics of Economic Modernization in the Soviet Union.* Ithaca, NY, Cornell University Press, 1982.

ABRAM BERGSON. *Productivity and the Social System: the USSR and the West.* Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1978.

MARTIN CAVE. *Computers and Economic Planning: The Soviet Experience.* Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1980.

WILLIAM J. CONYNGHAM. *The Modernization of Soviet Industrial Management.* Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1982.

FYODOR I. KUSHNIRSKY. *Soviet Economic Planning, 1965–1980.* Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 1982.

VLADIMIR ANDRLE. *Managerial Power in the Soviet Union.* Lexington, MA, Lexington Books, 1976.

IN RECENT YEARS, the Soviet economy, which has not often made headlines in the Western press, has received uncommon public attention. Western observers have become keenly interested in the domestic political consequences of the Soviet economic slowdown, in its implications for Soviet foreign policy, and in the prospects for economic reform. Except for the vagaries of succession politics, the economy has become the most salient element in Western thinking about the USSR's internal evolution and foreign relations. However, the influence of economic forces on the future of the Soviet system remains uncertain. Clearly the pressures will have a major effect. But what kind of effect will it be?

Any attempt to answer this question must take careful account of what the Soviets think about their own economic situation. The book by Erik Hoffmann and Robbin Laird focuses on the development of Soviet elite attitudes regarding the domestic economy, the world economy, and the desirable relationship between the two. The authors' main concern is to analyze the ideas of the "economic modernizers," those scholars and officials who think that economic modernization requires closer technological ties with the advanced capitalist countries and improved economic efficiency at home. These modernizers, in keeping with their belief that the USSR must participate more fully in the worldwide "scientific-technological revolution," advocate closer diplomatic cooperation with the West and argue that economic rather than military power is increasingly important as a source of international influence. By contrast, conservatives and a small group of neo-Stalinists tend to deprecate the importance of improved relations with the West and to accentuate the significance of military instruments of foreign policy.[1] They favor deeper Soviet economic integration into Comecon or even the pursuit of autarky.

Hoffmann and Laird make a persuasive case for the existence of these divergent views within the Soviet elite. They base their book primarily on the writings of Soviet social scientists, especially researchers employed in the USSR Academy of Sciences. By examining these writings seriously, rather than treating them as mere "ideology," Hoffmann and Laird have shed much light on the way the mind-set of the Soviet elite is changing in response to economic circumstances. In so doing, they have concentrated their attention primarily on political and economic

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[1]Some of these foreign policy issues are examined more fully in the companion study by Hoffmann and Laird, *"The Scientific-Technological Revolution" and Soviet Foreign Policy*, New York, Pergamon Press, 1982.

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ideas, rather than on actual policymaking. They recognize the growing salience of bureaucratic groups in Soviet politics, but except for an intriguing discussion of the debates over reforming the administration of foreign trade, they do not systematically explore the interaction of bureaucratic interests with the ideas of either the modernizers or the conservatives. The result is an unusually perceptive map of many of the ideas on which Soviet political debates have centered during recent years, but with little discussion of the political struggles that such ideas have engendered.

A strong argument can be made for adopting this approach. Hoffmann and Laird have traced the modernizers' views with a thoroughness and sense of nuance that would be impossible in a study concentrating on nuts-and-bolts politics, and have thereby helped illuminate the intellectual climate in which Soviet policy is made. That climate, which can give important clues to the dynamics of the policymaking process, is something that Western political scientists have made too little effort to understand.

But the book's focus on ideas does raise an analytical problem confronting students of Soviet affairs. Once one has abandoned the notion that everything published in the Soviet media is part of a homogeneous ideology directly approved by the party chiefs, what does the appearance of public differences like those between modernizers and conservatives tell us about the content of Soviet policy? How much overlap is there between the regime's policies and the ideas coming out of Soviet think tanks? The resolution of this important issue requires careful collation of the ideas espoused by Soviet social scientists, administrative functionaries, and political leaders, as well as close investigation of the personal ties linking these groups. For this task, we badly need books like that of Hoffmann and Laird. But we also need studies that join such work with a detailed examination of Soviet bureaucratic politics, so that we can better understand how some ideas, but not others, are transmuted by the political process into official policy.[2] Studies of this kind will better equip us to judge how deeply the modernizers' ideas about the expansion of East-West economic ties (or about the changing utility of military power) have penetrated the thinking of the top leaders who actually make Soviet policy.

ONE OF THE MOST critical policy choices now facing Soviet leaders is the allocation of resources among investment, consumption, and military spending. Under Brezhnev, major changes were made in Soviet budgetary priorities. In a 1973 article reprinted in *Productivity and the Social System*, Abram Bergson pointed out that these changes marked a significant step toward a new model of Soviet economic growth. The regime, which had traditionally set rates for the growth of capital stock well above growth rates for GNP and consumption, was now slowing the growth of investment in an effort to keep it from absorbing an ever larger share of national income. Bergson suggested that the investment slowdown was likely to continue, primarily because Soviet leaders were unwilling to undermine domestic political stability and labor incentives by cutting back consumption. He also speculated that the search for new sources of productivity might conceivably prompt the political elite to embark on a substantial decentralization of the economy.

Bergson's analysis perceptively identified the investment pattern that Soviet policymakers were trying to achieve. By one Western calculation, the 10th Five-Year Plan (1976–80) targeted an average annual rate of investment growth only about half as large as the rate during the preceding five years, and the 11th Five-Year Plan (1981–85) called for a further slowing of the expansion of investment. In both plans, GNP and consumption were slated to grow faster than investment.[3] The Brezhnev leadership's rationale for this striking departure from past policies was that better central management would increase the economy's efficiency, permitting the plan targets to be met with smaller increases in new capital investment.

The difficulty was that while Brezhnev and his associates had a new economic model in mind, they did not devise an economic mechanism to make that model a reality. Computerization and other alterations in economic administration did not produce the increases in efficiency posited by the five-year plans, so the regime was unable to implement fully the new budgetary priorities that the plans contained. Although the growth of investment slowed, so did the growth of the economy as a whole. From 1976 to 1980, investment growth continued to outpace the expansion of GNP; and annual consumption growth, though still a substantial 2.8 percent, fell short of the planned level.[4] In the current five-

[2]For an insightful discussion of this topic, see Thane Gustafson, *Reform in Soviet Politics*, New York, Cambridge University Press, 1981, ch. 6, "Bringing New Ideas Into Soviet Politics."

[3]Daniel L. Bond and Herbert S. Levine, "The 11th Five-Year Plan, 1981–1985," in Seweryn Bialer and Thane Gustafson, Eds., *Russia at the Crossroads: The 26th Congress of the CPSU*, Boston, MA, Allen and Unwin, 1983, p. 93.

[4]Ibid.

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year plan, investment is again rising much faster than the original targets, and at a pace that significantly exceeds the growth rate of the economy as a whole. Thus the share of national output channeled into investment is still increasing, and the squeeze on budgetary resources is continuing to tighten.

THIS PROBLEM is intertwined with leadership choices about which budgetary priorities will best promote Soviet national security. Operating on the assumption that Soviet military expenditures rose at 4–5 percent per year throughout Brezhnev's tenure, some Western observers have suggested that in the mid-1970's, party leaders elected to maintain the rapid expansion of both military spending and overall consumption by cutting investment—in effect mortgaging the economic future to the political present. According to this interpretation, the Soviet leaders concluded that military power had become more important than long-term economic growth for the attainment of the country's national goals.[5] In terms of the categories outlined by Hoffmann and Laird, the outcome was a victory for the ideas of the conservatives over those of the modernizers.

The validity of this conclusion, however, remains open to question. During the 1970's the growth of investment did diminish sharply; one estimate puts the annual average rate at 6.4 percent in the first half of the decade, compared with 3.6 percent in the second half.[6] However, recent calculations by the CIA indicate that in the mid-1970's the growth of Soviet military spending also declined to a long-term rate of 2 or 3 percent a year.[7] If correct, this figure suggests that Brezhnev and his cohorts did not make a clear-cut decision to subordinate investment in long-term growth to the accumulation of military power. The tempo of investment was indeed slowed, but so was the pace of military buildup. Measured against the sectoral growth rates of the early 1970's, the reductions in investment and military-spending growth were roughly proportional, whereas the slowdown in consumption growth was less drastic. This interpretation is consistent with the general pattern of policymaking under Brezhnev, which typically involved bureaucratic log-rolling and efforts to give all sectors of the economy steady if somewhat smaller increases in material resources.

The slowdown in the expansion of the economic pie, however, has made this approach more difficult to sustain, and in the last two or three years Soviet controversies over budgetary trade-offs have become more heated. The champions of military programs, producer-goods industries, and consumer goods have all become more outspoken. Citing the American military buildup, some influential Soviet military figures have pushed hard for a larger share of the budget. They have rejected suggestions that development of the economy's nondefense sectors should take precedence over an immediate acceleration of military production, precisely in order to enhance Soviet military capabilities in the longer run.[8] Other spokesmen have argued that failure to sustain higher levels of investment in heavy industry will undermine the country's economic growth.[9] Meanwhile, advocates of consumer interests have countered that the high-priority treatment of consumer industry must be continued over the long term, in order to stimulate the labor force and assure domestic stability—something that has been very much on the mind of the party leadership in the wake of the mass unrest in Poland.[10] Economic pressures have also sparked tensions among the republics over plans to speed up the development of Siberia while curbing investment in some European and Central Asian regions.[11] Although we need to know more about the complex and shifting political coalitions supporting these viewpoints, it is clear that the broad consensus on economic priorities that existed during most of Brezhnev's tenure has broken down.

FOR MOST of the Brezhnev era, there was also a large measure of consensus on the virtues of economic centralization. The partial decentralization initiated in the mid-1960's was soon rolled back, and during the 1970's the overriding tendency was to try to improve the operation of the economy without making changes in its institutional structure. A key element of this approach was a large-scale effort to computerize economic administration. In his thorough study of the application of computers at levels ranging from local enterprises to the State Planning Committee (Gosplan), Martin Cave concludes that the primary difficulty of the program is that the computer systems have been shaped to conform to the prevailing practices of

[5] Myron Rush, "Guns over Growth in Soviet Policy," *International Security* (Cambridge, MA), Winter 1982/83, pp. 167–79.

[6] Bond and Levine, loc. cit.

[7] "Soviet Defense Trends," staff study prepared for the Joint Economic Committee, US Congress, September 1983 (mimeo).

[8] See, e.g., the article by First Deputy Minister of Defense Nikolay Ogarkov in *Kommunist* (Moscow), No. 10, 1981, pp. 84–85; and *Kommunist Vooruzhënnykh Sil* (Moscow), No. 3, 1983, p. 17.

[9] *Ekonomika i organizatsiya promyshlennogo proizvodstva* (Moscow), No. 3, 1982, pp. 20–25.

[10] See, e.g., *Planovoye khozyaystvo* (Moscow), No. 1, 1983, pp. 110–13.

[11] *Kommunist*, No. 12, 1982, pp. 6–9.

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the economic bureaucracy, rather than leading to major changes in its operations. The process of computerization was begun without a clear conception of its relationship to economic planning, and no single agency was put firmly in charge of the overall effort. As a consequence, computer systems have been employed to perform relatively simple tasks, but not the complex tasks of plan optimization that the most ardent proponents originally envisioned.

Because of the numerous problems attending the introduction of these systems, the Soviet elite's initial enthusiasm for computerization began to decline in the mid-1970's. Cave regards this change of mood as a healthy step toward greater realism about the actual capabilities of computerized management systems. By contrast, William Conyngham, in his wide-ranging study of Soviet management theories and organization, concludes that the disillusionment runs deeper, and has eroded the political support that the computerization program enjoyed during its heyday in the early 1970's.

This reviewer's judgment is that, while administrative inertia has troubled the Soviet program, a more determined attempt to rationalize central planning through the comprehensive introduction of computers and mathematical methods might have backfired. Both Cave and Conyngham note that in the early 1970's, Gosplan officials rejected many proposals from mathematical economists in the Academy of Sciences who thought their ideas would allow the country to attain a new level of sophisticated, optimal planning.

It seems reasonable to assume that the planners' skeptical response to the optimizers was dictated in part by a self-interested wish not to lose authority to specialists who had mastered new, unfamiliar techniques. As Fyodor Kushnirsky points out in his book on Soviet economic planning, most of the central planners have professional backgrounds in engineering and little training in economics. Yet drawing upon his own extensive experience as an economist in a Soviet academic institute, Kushnirsky admits that planners are not actually responsible for the defects of the planning system, which is inevitably distorted by a politically dictated requirement to "mobilize" resources through unrealistically taut plans.

But bureaucratic politics, though undoubtedly part of the explanation, was apparently only one cause for rejection of the optimizers' proposals. Another was that their ideas were untried and could have led to large mistakes. This may seem surprising to those who tend to regard Soviet economists, almost by definition, as persons who know best how to make their system operate better. Nevertheless, Soviet academic economists, deprived of much concrete information by the planning organizations, tend to underestimate the complexity of the problems they propose to overcome. As a result, the application of their suggestions frequently leads to justified disillusionment on the part of the planners. A vicious circle thus works against improvements in the mechanism of central planning. Planning officials often screen out economists in order to maintain their own prerogatives and hide their own mistakes. But when economists do gain acceptance for their ideas, those ideas frequently prove unworkable because they are based on erroneous notions about the concrete problems facing the planners.

IN THE 1980's, the diminishing faith in the possibility of optimal planning and the increasing painfulness of the budgetary choices confronting the top leadership have put the issue of economic reform back on the Soviet political agenda. After a period of quiescence in the 1970's, the advocates of economic decentralization have again started making their case in public. They have also begun discussing reform not just as an intellectual problem but as a political process. Some of their articles have mentioned the resistance of mid-level officials, and have discussed ways to induce these officials to accept a diffusion of economic authority. While a number of advocates have held out the hope of educating economic officials to the importance of reform, a few others have stated flatly that self-interest will lead the majority of both officials and workers to oppose the creation of a more competitive and demanding economic system. One particularly outspoken economist, Tatyana Zaslavskaya, has publicly proclaimed that only the top political leadership represents the interests of the economy as a whole and that only with active support from the top can Soviet economists, who are otherwise powerless, make any headway in improving the system.[12]

This observation reflects the frustration of relatively liberal Soviet economists, while pointing up the political problem that faces any reform-minded member of the Politburo: the lack of a clear bureaucratic constituency for a major decentralization of the economy. The traditional interests of almost all

[12] *Vestnik Akademii Nauk SSSR* (Moscow), No. 2, 1983, pp. 74–76. The strikingly critical "Novosibirsk paper," which argued for a major economic decentralization and received wide notice in the West, was authored by Zaslavskaya. For the text, see *Arkhiv samizdata* (Munich), No. 5043, Aug. 26, 1983.

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social groups make this kind of measure seem unattractive, and no Politburo member can take much comfort from knowing that he has the backing of the liberal wing of the economics profession.

There was a time when Western observers thought that factory managers would support a major reduction in the authority of central planners. But, in retrospect, this belief appears to have represented a rather careless extension of ideas about Western government-business relations (and imprecise ideas, at that) to the Soviet system. Indeed, Vladimir Andrle's sociological analysis of Soviet managers, which treats their career patterns and relationships with other social groups, concludes that most managers are members of a well-entrenched local elite with a vested interest in the continuation of a planning system they know how to manipulate. The individual managers who favor a significant reduction in central economic controls are actually the exceptions rather than the rule.

A newer nominee to the ranks of potential Soviet economic reformers is the military establishment. It is now occasionally suggested in the West that the officer corps may back major reforms as a way of multiplying the economic and technological resources needed to stay militarily abreast of the United States. No doubt many Soviet military men want more and better weapons, and would welcome an increase in economic effectiveness if it made that aim easier to achieve. On this abstract level, many officers are probably in favor of reform.[13]

But when it comes to major institutional changes, military leaders are likely to be wary. We should remember that the Soviet military has reached its current level of technological prowess thanks to a highly centralized planning system closely geared to military needs. During past periods of partial decentralization, military-related industries were the last to be decentralized (and were decentralized less than nonmilitary ones); and in periods of recentralization the military-related sectors were the first to be affected.[14] One probable reason for this pattern is that the defense establishment identified economic centralization with its institutional needs, and there is little or no evidence to indicate that it has recently changed its mind. Some officers may favor more limited measures, such as the transfer of administrators and of managerial techniques employed in weapons production to other economic sectors. But these techniques, which have been effective largely because of the special priority and resources assigned to weapons manufacture, are unlikely to generate major benefits when applied in lower-priority sectors.

NONE OF THIS MEANS that it would be impossible to marshal *any* bureaucratic support for a major economic decentralization. At least one planning agency, the State Committee for Science and Technology, evidently harbors a number of officials who favor such a step;[15] and individual supporters may perhaps be found in other agencies, such as Gosplan, whose officials generally oppose major reforms. To carry through a decentralizing program, however, a reform-minded leader must accumulate a great deal of political power and must piece together a supporting coalition from minorities of officials based in various hierarchies. During his brief tenure as general secretary, Yuriy Andropov gave a few hints of interest in decentralizing the economy. But without good health and the prospect of a long term in office, Andropov, though a formidable political figure, lacked the leverage and possibly also the determination necessary to restructure the economic system.

His successor, Konstantin Chernenko, seems less inclined intellectually and less able politically to embark on changes of such scope. While we will probably witness a wide-ranging debate among Soviet scholars about the future of their economic system, major changes will become possible only if a younger, reformist leader comes to power—and then only if a substantial segment of the elite concludes that a restructuring of the system is economically essential. Accurate Western assessments of the system's path of development will depend on our ability to follow shifts in Soviet political and economic theories and in the regime's internal bureaucratic dynamics—both of which receive valuable attention in one or another of the books under review—and then, crucially, to combine our knowledge of the two.

* * *

[13]Ogarkov, for instance, has alluded (loc. cit., pp. 85–86) to the need for better administration of the economy, but without saying how this should be achieved.

[14]This was true of Khrushchev's 1957 efforts to decentralize industry and of the 1965 reform program for returning the supervision of industry to branch ministries. See Bruce Parrott, *Politics and Technology in the Soviet Union*, Cambridge, MA, M.I.T. Press, 1983, pp. 173–74, 214.

[15]See, for instance, the article by V.A. Trapeznikov in *Pravda* (Moscow), May 7, 1982; and *Voprosy filosofii* (Moscow), No. 6, 1982, pp. 150–53.

CORRECTION

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